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ABSTRACT
The first chapter of this dissertation argues that privatization and other policy
changes in China during the past decade had a direct effect on input prices. This is in
contrast to most previous work, which instead emphasized the effect of privatization
on productivity. I illustrate the importance of taking such differences into account
by estimating the parameters of a static firm competition model using the Chinese
Industrial Enterprises Database and calculating a measure of total factor productivity
for each firm out of those estimates. The results of my analysis indicate that the
percentage difference in productivity between private and state-owned firms may be
overestimated by as much as 135 percentage points if the difference in input prices is
not properly addressed.
The second chapter of my dissertation establishes empirical support for such a
difference in input prices by constructing a dynamic structural model of privatization,
firm heterogeneity and industry evolution, and estimating its parameters using the
Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database. My estimates of the model confirm many
well documented institutional features about China's reform, including "grasp the
large and let go of the small" policy, easy access to credit for state-owned enterprises
v
(SOEs), and selection for privatization according to firms' probabilities of success. In
addition, the estimated structural model provides the basic tool for policy simulations
and enables us to see the effects of hypothetical policies, for example "grasp the small
and let go of the large" and "removing SOEs' easy access to credits".
In the last chapter, I study the effect of privatization of state-owned enterprises
in China, focusing on not only the effect of privatization on a firm's productivity, but
also its effect on market output allocation. I use the method proposed by Olley and
Pakes (1996) to find improvements in average market productivities for all industries
in China. This growth in productivity resulted from enterprises becoming more pro-
ductive, but not from more efficient output allocation within the market. Private
firms are proven to be more productive than state-owned enterprises in all industries,
but privatization itself improved firm efficiency only for some industries.
vi
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Chapter 1
Governments' Favoritism toward
State-Owned Enterprises and Firms'
Productivity
1.1 Introduction
During the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War from 1937 to
1949, China's economy was heavily disrupted. Afterward, the victorious communists
installed a planned economic system strictly following the Soviet model, but were not
able to bring about economic recovery. Furthermore, the famine accompanying the
Great Leap Forward which killed between 30 and 40 million people, and the purges
of the Cultural Revolution drove the economy deeper into a hole. Data showed that
urban Chinese citizens had experienced virtually no increase in living standards since
1957, and that rural Chinese had no better living standards in the 1970s than the
1930s (Brandt and Rawski (2008)).
The economic turning point arrived when reformists in the Communist Party of
China assumed power after Mao Zedong's death. In 1978, designed and guided by
Deng Xiaoping, China started its economic reform and adopted the principle Reform
and Opening-up which entailed twin policies of opening its door to foreign trade and
investment, and reforming its state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter).1 Since then,
unprecedented economic growth occurred, with overall GDP increasing by a 9.5%
1The reform principle is called Gai Ge Kai Fang in Mandarin Chinese, and it is also translated
by various sources as Reform and Opening.
1
2average annually from 1978 to 2014.2 Today, China's socialist market economy is the
world's second largest economy by nominal GDP, and the world's largest economy by
purchasing power parity according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
China's massive and rapid economic transformation has attracted a great deal of
attention, and much research has been devoted to China's economic reform policies
in the past decade.3 However, there are several shortcomings in the existing stud-
ies, that warrant more careful and thorough attention. First of all, most current
researches focus on the effect of government ownership on total factor productivity
and ignores the effect on input prices. In fact, SOEs are always favored by govern-
ments and granted easy access to loans from banks, most of which are also owned
by governments.4 In other words, SOEs are able to obtain investment at a cheaper
price than their private counterparts. Second, even though there are papers focusing
on the role played by input mis-allocation (which can be a result of different input
prices) on industry productivity measure, for example Hsieh and Klenow (2009), they
study the issue with a static model and overlooked the fact that input price affect
firms behavior in a dynamic fashion. In addition, while Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
view state ownership as a possible source of capital cost heterogeneity, they do not
study the relationship between which firms are state owned and the behavior and
productivity of those firms.5 On the other hand, my approach is much more specific
2Many economists suspect that the accounting method used in China might over estimate the
GDP growth rate by roughly two percentage points, but the growth rate is still impressive even
without any measurement errors.
3Some of the most notable ones are Kroeber (2016), Naughton (2007), Starr (2001), Hu and
Khan (1997), Lin (2011), Bai, Lu and Tao (2009), Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012),
Jaumandreu and Yin (2016), Rodrik (2006), Montinola, Qian and Weingast(1995), Yao (2002), etc.
4By using plural form `governments', I am referring to all levels of government (national, provin-
cial, municipal, etc.) in China that are involved in investment and privatization decisions.
5The issue is explicitly explained in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The static monopolistic compe-
tition model we deploy could be a poor approximation of all three countries. Although we provided
reassuring evidence on these concerns, our investigation was very much a first pass. In addition to
investigating these issues more fully, future work could try to relate differences in plant productivity
to observable policy distortions much more than we have. (Hsieh and Klenow (2009))
3on those issues.
To better understand the importance of different input prices, we consider a situ-
ation where firms decide how much capital to invest for the coming year according to
their observed current productivities. If SOEs face a very low investment price, the
relationship between investment level and productivity will be weakened, and SOEs
are very likely to over-invest in capital relative to private firms with the same pro-
ductivity level. Hence SOEs are inefficient because they operate at a lower marginal
of product of capital, and their productivity measures can certainly be improved if
they pay careful attention to how much to invest in capital. In contrast, I propose
a different channel to explain productivity differences among different types of firms.
I believe that the SOEs' inefficiency results from certain qualities of the firms that
attract low-productivity labors, but has nothing to do with bad decisions concerning
how much to invest due to low input cost.6 In sum, I expect that the estimated pro-
ductivity differences between these two types of firms may well be exaggerated in the
previous works in which the difference in input prices is over looked.7 Unfortunately,
to the best of my knowledge, there is no previous work focusing on such an important
issue or explicitly modeling firms' distinct behaviors under different input prices.
In this paper, I construct a simple model and estimate firms' revenue function
as well as their productivities following Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015).
The model takes ownership as one of the state variable in order to control for input
price difference and allow the productivity level to be different for different types of
firms. In addition, this model differs from the previous work (Chen, Igamiz, Sawadax
and Xiao(2017)) by allowing productivity to grow in different rate as well, which is
6This new channel of explaining the difference in productivities between SOEs and private firms
will become clear once the theoretical model is introduced.
7Chen, Igamiz, Sawadax and Xiao(2017) have estimated that, overall, private firms in China are
229% more productive than their state-owned counterparts, but this is proven to be too big of a
difference once input prices are incorporated.
4accomplished by adding an ownership dummy variable into the productivity evolution
function. This addition to the model is how I control for the fact that different
types of firms have different incentive to improve their productivity due to distinct
investment costs. Thereafter, the estimated model and productivity measures provide
us an opportunity to compare firm productivity among groups of firms with different
ownership.
The results prove my expectation that the productivity difference between private
firms and SOEs are overestimated in previous papers, and our estimates are much
more reasonable. First of all, the estimates confirm that not only private firms are
more efficient than their state-owned counterparts, but they are also more likely to
realize a higher productivity in the next period than an SOE with the same level of
current productivity (i.e. their productivity grow faster than their state-owned coun-
terparts). Second, if comparing the average productivity of private firms with that
of SOEs, the former appears to be more efficient than latter by as large as 39.357%.
Third, when comparing the productivity of privatized SOEs before privatization with
that after, SOEs see 47.711% improvement in productivity once privatized. Finally,
The SOEs selected for privatization have a higher average productivity than SOEs
that do not go through the privatization process, which illustrates that governments
are more likely to privatize more productive SOEs, but more likely to terminate less
productive ones that may have a hard time to survive on their own once privatized.
In addition to investigating the importance of different input prices, the paper also
contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First, this is the first paper that
addresses the data misinterpretation problem resulting from the mass layoffs (i.e.,
the surge in layoffs) in the 1990s; ignoring this issue significantly biases measures of
SOE productivity. Second, Even though it has become standard in the literature to
assume that SOEs maximize profit during that period of time, previous papers did
5not provide convincing evidences. In this paper, I will offer formal justification to
SOE profit maximizing behavior with the institutional features before privatization.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1.2, I present background
information about China's economic reforms that will help readers understand some of
my modeling decisions in the later sections. In section 1.3, I provide a brief description
of the data set and present relevant summary statistics. My theoretical model of
firm competition is presented in Section 1.4 and the estimation method in Section
1.5. Section 1.6 summarizes the parameter estimates and explains their validity and
implications. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 China's Economic Reforms
To study China's economic reform more carefully and take into account some
institutional factors that have been neglected in the past, such as different input
prices and mass layoffs, we must begin with background information about China's
development in general. In this section, I briefly describe China's economic reforms
since 1978, as well as some specific characteristics of China's market that will help
readers understand my modeling choices in section 1.4.
1.2.1 Course of Reforms
The Chinese economic reform was started in December 1978 by reformists within
the Communist Party of China, led by Deng Xiaoping.8 The goal of the reforms
was to establish a system known as Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and,
generally speaking, Chinese Characteristics referred to market principles existing
within a socialist system. Contrary to the Soviet Union's reform, China took a slow
and gradual approach that was summarized by Deng as cross[ing] the river by feeling
8Deng Xiaoping is regarded by the Chinese people as the architect of the Chinese economic
reforms.
6the stones, meaning that even though China was moving forward in new directions,
it needed to stay grounded, to proceed incrementally, feeling its way forward even
amidst uncertainty. Today, the reforms have persisted for almost 40 years and are
still changing China on a daily basis.
In general, we can summarize the reforms by identifying the following four stages.
In the first stage of the reform (1978-1984), Deng and his reformist allies concentrated
on agriculture, a sector long neglected by the Communist Party. They implemented a
central reform theme of decollectivizing agriculture and emphasizing the household-
responsibility system, which divided the land of people's communes into private plots.
Henceforth, farmers were given the right to keep parts of their lands' output while
paying a share to the state. This movement effectively boosted incentives, which
increased production in the agricultural sector as well as the living standards of hun-
dreds of millions of farmers.9 In urban industry, a dual-price system was introduced,
under which SOEs were for the first time allowed to sell any production above the
plan quota in a free market at a negotiated price.10 These initial changes in China's
economic system allowed citizens to reverse the shortages of the Maoist era to some
extent. During the 1980s, the adoption of the Industrial Responsibility System, al-
lowing the use of contracts by individuals or groups to manage enterprises, further
promoted the development of SOEs. Furthermore, for the very first time since the
foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, private businesses were allowed
to operate and to compete with SOEs, and they gradually began to account for a
greater percentage of industrial output. At the same time, a series of special eco-
9China's path to reform is often referred to as a bottom-up approach, because it started with the
most fundamental sector of the economy, agriculture, and then built reforms in other industries on
top of a successfully transformed agricultural system. This is actually the opposite of perestroika in
the former Soviet Union, which adopted a top-down approach that indirectly resulted in its disinte-
gration. The bottom-up approach is considered by economists as an important factor contributing
to the success of China's economic transition.
10Before the reform, SOEs produced according to government plans and sold all outputs back to
the government at predetermined plan prices.
7nomic zones for foreign investments were created, as the country was finally opened
to foreign investment for the first time since 1949.
During the second stage of the reform (1984-1993), the initial reforms in the first
stage continued, and regulations on private ownership and government interventions
were lifted further. A notable contribution in this stage was the decentralization
of state control, which left many production decisions that formerly made by the
central government to local provincial governments and enabled local governments to
experiment and find their own ways of increasing economic growth. Among numerous
experiments, firms that were nominally owned by local governments but effectively
privately-owned, for example township and village enterprises, began to gain market
share at the expense of the state sector. It should be noted that, even though there
was some small-scale privatization of SOEs that eventually had become unsustainable,
large-scale privatization was not the focus of the reforms until 1992. Although the
economy grew quickly during this period, it was not in satisfactory condition as the
inefficient state sector continued to grow, heavy losses in some SOEs drained the
economy, and inflation became problematic.
The third stage (1993-2005) saw a series of radical transformations in the econ-
omy. Despite Deng's death in 1997, reforms were able to continue as his successors,
Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, were also ardent reformers. In 1997 and 1998, large-
scale privatization was officially started under the guise of the grasp the large and
let go of the small policy. This policy was adopted in September 1997 at the 15th
Communist Party Congress. The grasp the large component indicated that policy
makers should maintain state control over the largest state-owned enterprises, while
let go of the small meant that governments should relinquish control over smaller
state-owned enterprises. In the following several years, all state enterprises, except
a few large monopolies, were liquidated and their assets sold to private investors.
8Progress was so far reaching that as much as 48% of SOEs in 2001 were reformed by
2004 (Brandt and Rawski (2008)). The domestic private sector first exceeded 50% of
GDP in 2005 and expanded further thereafter. Many other initiatives were launched
by governments during the same period, including tariff reduction, regulation allevi-
ation, trade barrier removal, banking system reform, the dismantling of the Mao-era
social welfare system, investment cuts in military-run businesses, inflation reduction,
and participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). These moves were ac-
companied by the formation of large discontented groups, mostly consisting of laid-off
employees of SOEs during the reforms (a phenomenon known as mass layoffs in the
1990s or Xiagang in Mandarin Chinese).
The pace of reform was significantly slower during the very last stage (2005 to the
present). In fact, the Hu-Wen Administration was so conservative that some of Deng's
achievements in economic reforms were reversed in 2005. Governments increased
subsidies and applied more controls over the health care sector. The privatization
process also was halted. In addition, they increased investment in the privileged
state sectors, which on the other hand created national giants capable of competing
with foreign corporations.
1.2.2 Credit Market
It is well documented that SOEs in China receive easy access to credits from
state-owned Chinese banks (Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005)), while private firms
face significant financial constraints (Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005)), especially for
capital goods purchases (Dollar and Wei (2007); Riedel, Jin, and Gao (2007)). The
reasons behind such preferential treatment of SOEs can be explained from two dif-
ferent perspectives. First, a major source of government revenue in 1990s was profits
made by SOEs, and therefore the profitability of SOEs was a major concern of gov-
ernments. Second, loans to SOEs are considered less risky because they are usually
9backed by governments when these enterprises experience financial difficulties. Thus
it is not surprising that governments tend to allocate capital systematically away
from the private sector and towards SOEs, even though the latter are less produc-
tive. This further leads to an inefficient allocation of capital by the Chinese financial
system (Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005)).
In addition, state-owned banks dominate China's financial market. The banking
system in China comprises the central bank, four large state-owned commercial banks,
three policy banks, 10 national joint-stock commercial banks, about 90 regional com-
mercial banks, and thousands of urban and rural credit cooperatives. Yet, as of late
2001, the four state-owned commercial banks accounted for 63% of loans outstanding
and 62% of deposits. With 103,000 branches among them, they are the only financial
institutions that cover virtually all locations in China.
Summarizing the information presented above, we know that it is easier for SOEs
to obtain loans from state-owned banks, and most loans are initiated by state-owned
commercial banks. In other words, SOEs on average should have received better
prices for loans, in terms of lower annual interests rates, than private firms. In my
theoretical model below, I distinguish the unit costs of physical capital investment for
state-owned and private firms, and expect my estimates to confirm this observation.
1.2.3 Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small
At the 15th Communist Party Congress in September 1997, a series of policies
generally summarized as grasp the large, let go of the small was formally adopted.
As noted above, the grasp the large component indicates that policy makers should
focus on maintaining state control over the largest state-owned enterprises, whereas
let go of the small refers to a policy that small state-owned firms were to be relin-
quished. Relinquishing control over these enterprises took a variety of forms, including
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privatization and termination. 11
Instead of adopting a uniform reform policy for both large and small SOEs, the
governments decided to take conservative and gradual steps and experiment with
policy on the smallest SOEs first before applying it to larger ones. According to
policy makers, this is a good approach because it slows the pace of transformation and
prevents political turmoil. Additionally, delaying policy reforms for larger enterprises
enabled them to pursue another objective, that of creating capable national giants in
order to compete with other leading corporations in each industry at the global level.
In fact, grasp the large was much more complicated than let go of the small,
which only involved privatization or termination of selected SOEs. There were two
major approaches to grasping large SOEs, one involving a change in legal registra-
tion and one without. The latter was the most strict approach, which was to maintain
public ownership of an SOE as it was, without any restructuring or new registration.
In contrast, many state-owned firms were merged into large industrial conglomerates,
and the control over these conglomerates was to be consolidated by the central gov-
ernment or by local governments.12 In this case, SOEs were often incorporated as
limited liability corporations, some of which were even publicly traded, but the dom-
inant share holders were state-owned conglomerates. As a result, this complication
makes it difficult for us to identify state ownership using only registration status, and
I will discuss in detail how I define state ownership in section 1.3.
1.2.4 Road to Privatization
Large-scale privatization was officially started in 1997 and 1998, when China's
SOE reform had been in progress for almost 20 years. Yet the firms in 1997 were
nothing like the ones before 1979. It is thus important for us to understand how
11Hsieh and Song (2015) present a comprehensive set of empirical facts illustrating the processes
of the reform using the same dataset as mine.
12Hsieh and Song (2015) show examples of this in China's steel sector and automobile industry.
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reforms had changed China's economy before privatization, in order to model firms'
behaviors accurately. In this subsection, I briefly review some important policies prior
to privatization that help to explain some related modeling choices in section 1.4.
The first few years of the reform were designated as the period of readjustment"
(1979-1983), during which key imbalances in the economy were to be corrected and a
foundation was to be laid for a well-planned modernization drive. The main policies
in this period were to increase the autonomy of enterprise managers, reduce the
emphasis on planned quotas, allow enterprises to produce goods outside the plan for
sale on the market, and permit enterprises to experiment with the use of bonuses to
reward higher productivity. All these actions increased the incentive for enterprises
to make profits and substantially added to their autonomy.
From 1983 to 1986, the government implemented Tax Replacing Profit, Loan
Replacing Funding. The goal was to re-balance profit shares between SOEs and
the state by means of a modern taxation system. Rather than remitting all of their
profits to the state, as was normally done, these enterprises were allowed to retain
a balance, from paying a tax on their profits, for reinvestment and distribution to
workers as bonuses. In addition, instead of obtaining investment funds directly from
governments, SOEs had to apply for loans at government banks and were obligated
to pay interest even though many bank loans carried no interest and did not have
to be repaid. As of 1987 the interest rate charged on such loans was still too low to
serve as a check on unproductive investments, but the mechanism was in place. This
is also the origin of SOEs' easy access to credits discussed above.
Since 1986, the central government implemented a series of policies to isolate man-
agement rights from property rights and to strengthen the autonomy of enterprise
managers. The most notable was the system under which the factory director as-
sumes full responsibility, which endowed the factory director with the ultimate right
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to make production decisions for the firm. In fact, the official managers included
not only the factory director but also a enterprise management committee formed by
heads of different departments, chief engineer, chief accountant, secretary of the party
committee, chairman of the union, shop stewards and so on. The enterprise manage-
ment committee was given the obligation to advise and supervise decision-making.
However, in the event of a conflict between the factory director and the enterprise
management committee, the factory director could make the final decision against
others' opposition. It is important to note that, under this system, the secretary of
the party committee became a member of the enterprise management committee and
was no longer the decision-maker of the SOE. Thus governments that were the owners
of SOEs reduced their role in business management.
In addition to large-scale privatization, the 15th Communist Party Congress in
1997 also announced hard budget constraints for all SOEs. This meant that the
role of governments in decision-making was to be eliminated, as well as their role
in providing financial support. Many SOEs were merged, sold, or terminated, and
the surviving ones were on their own when dealing with their debt, investment, and
profits. They also exercised full autonomy in hiring and firing, and mass layoffs ensued
as SOEs sought to release redundant labor and cut financial losses. Additionally, the
performance of SOE directors was evaluated solely by their ability to make a profit,
rather than to fulfill social functions previously forced on SOEs by governments.
Thus, SOEs in the starting year of my sample (1997) were nothing like those
in 1979. During almost 20 years of reform, a cluster of policies promoting greater
flexibility, autonomy, and market involvement made significantly more opportunities
available to most enterprises, generated high rates of growth, and improved market
efficiency. Enterprise managers gradually gained greater control over their units,
including the right to hire and fire, although the process had required endless struggles
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with bureaucrats and party cadres. All of these changes over the years are very
important to my modeling considerations. Firms' behaviors and decision-making
processes are greatly affected by the economic system, which I will discuss in detail
when explaining my theoretical model in section 1.4.
1.2.5 Mass Layoffs in the 1990s
In the 1990s, as a byproduct of the reform, the number of laid-off employees
exploded. Many studies have shown that SOEs suffered from a serious over staffing
problem that contributed to their low productivity. However, as more and more
SOEs started to adopt the system under which the factory director assumes full
responsibility, governments no longer played a dominant role in those enterprises
and were not more responsible for compensating their losses. Therefore, in order to
survive intense market competition, often the very first thing the managers of SOEs
decided was to lay off redundant labor, a process also referred to as mass layoffs in
the 1990s. In this subsection, I describe how China's labor market changed over
time and why understanding the mass layoffs is important for my study.
Before 1980 urban workers in China benefited from the so-called iron rice bowl.
Typically, workers were assigned jobs by state authorities and employment was often
guaranteed for life. SOEs were intended not only to provide jobs but to serve as
health and welfare agencies for urban Chinese workers. Housing, health insurance,
pensions, childcare, and, in some cases, education for children were arranged by SOEs,
and wages were more or less guaranteed. SOEs in this era were designed to be a
major source of economic security for Chinese workers, and their productivity and
profitability were of secondary importance.
In the mid-1980s, many SOEs started to transform their leadership systems to
meet the standard of the system under which the factory director assumes full re-
sponsibility. The most notable difference of this new system from the previous
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planned economy system was that SOEs were mainly concerned with their own prof-
its instead of governments' social targets when making decisions. This was a big step
toward a market economy even though there were few privatizations or ownership
changes. During this period of time, SOEs were still not fully autonomous in hiring
and firing their employees, but the power given to the managers became a stepping
stone toward mass layoffs later.
In the early 1990s, the private sector had developed at a very fast pace while SOEs
had experienced high debt ratios, large numbers of redundant laborers, heavy social
responsibilities, low incentives, and, most importantly, financial losses. The first half
of 1996 saw 43.3% of SOEs losing money, and almost all SOEs reported losses in the
first quarter of 1998 (Price and Fang (2002)). Among all the problems faced by SOEs,
the most acute was that SOEs were desperate to dump their redundant labor but had
limited rights to do so because of their social responsibilities enforced by governments.
In addition, governments' budgets were too tight to provide any subsidies, which were
also not allowed under the new system. Nevertheless, SOEs started to experiment
with some creative alternatives in order to survive, and were able to cut their labor
force without any official firings. More specifically, many employees of SOEs were
asked to stay at home without any tasks and paid only 20% to 30% of their regular
wage. In this way, the laid-off workers were still registered officially as employees, but
were laid off in reality.
The Fifteenth National Congress in 1997 was a watershed event, which completely
changed the existing arrangements. After 1997 all SOEs faced hard budget con-
straints. With much more restricted budget and greater autonomy, some enterprises
began to initiate bankruptcy, restructuring, or mergers. Hence it became critical for
them to reduce their workforce as quickly and massively as possible, and more and
more workers began to be placed off-duty. In the context of this massive workforce
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reduction, most workers retained a contractual relationship with SOEs and a few even
continued to receive some of their previous benefits (e.g., housing, health insurance,
child care, etc.), albeit in significantly reduced amount in most cases. However, they
were neither paid a wage by SOEs nor officially registered as employees.
As described above, the changes to China's labor market during the reforms were
very complicated. It turns out that the number of employees reported in the data for
certain years may be mistakenly interpreted if we ignore the details involving mass
layoffs. In section 1.3.2, I discuss in great detail the potential risk of misunderstanding
the data and present my simple and effective method of dealing with it.
1.3 Data Set and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data set and presents relevant summary statistics. It
shows how I process the raw data into a set of data entries that is suitable for use in
this study. Additionally, I carry out several reduced-form regressions in order to find
empirical evidence supporting the institutional factors underlying China's reforms
and my modeling choices.
The data set used to estimate my model is a subset of the Chinese Industrial
Enterprises Database, which consists of an unbalanced panel data set extracted and
reorganized from the annual surveys of manufacturing and mining firms conducted
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The target firms of the survey include
all state-owned enterprises and sizable non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales
revenues larger than 5 million RMB (approximately 724,000 US dollars).13 Up to
2007, there are more than 330,000 enterprises recorded, and their total gross industry
output value accounts for around 95% of the national total. The recorded enterprises
span more than 40 different industries and every enterprise has hundreds of variables.
13In this paper, I use the RMB:USD exchange rate for March 8, 2017.
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All of the above make this database the most comprehensive and authoritative firm-
level database, and hence the most important resource in studies of economics and
management in China.
My data set encompasses the period from 1997 to 2006, which mainly correspond
to the third stage of the transition introduced in section 1.2.1.14 Since the third
stage was mainly about large-scale privatization, these data are perfect for studying
firms' ownership changes and their effects on the economy. Among the large variety
of events occurring during this period, in addition to SOEs' easy access to loans, the
most relevant to my study include the grasp the large and let go of the small policy
as well as the SOE reforms prior to privatization and mass layoffs, on which I have
devoted much discussion in sections 1.2.3, 1.2.4, and 1.2.5, respectively.15 Later in
this section, I provide further supporting empirical evidence, and explain a bit more
about why we must pay attention to those events and how neglecting them affects
my results.
Even though there are a wide variety of industrial firms in the survey, I focus on
the Electronic and Telecommunications Industry (having the two-digit industry code
40 in the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database) in this paper. The first reason
I select this industry is that it is one of industries most strongly influenced by the
reforms. Bai, Lu and Tao (2009) list the percentages of privatization for all indus-
tries reported in the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, and the Electronic and
Telecommunications Industry, with a percentage of privatization of 26.6%, is among
14Even though I also have survey data for 2007, the lack of firm IDs makes it difficult to match
the 2007 data with the firm entries in the previous years. Despite this obstacle, I was able to carry
out my estimation and obtain meaningful results without the entries for 2007.
15All other policies implemented in this stage are not as relevant. Many of them, for example tariff
reduction, trade barrier removal, and joining WTO, concern imports and exports which are not the
main focus of my model. Many other policies have nothing to do with the market I am working
on, such as the dismantling of the Mao-era social welfare system. Finally, some policies have no
supporting data, for example regulation alleviation and investment cuts in military-run businesses.
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the 10 most highly privatized industries.16 The higher privatization rate assists us in
discerning the effects of the relevant policies. Second, the Electronic and Telecommu-
nications Industry is much less regulated and monitored by governments compared
to industries such as Medical and Pharmaceutical Products, Raw Chemical Materials
and Chemical Products, Metal Mining and Dressing, Petroleum Refining and Coking,
and so on. The minimal role of governments at all levels makes it easier to isolate the
effects of other policies from those of privatization, which further reduces complexity
when interpreting model estimates. Third, it is one of the industries dominated by
private firms during the sample period. In 1997, the beginning of my sample pe-
riod, only 26.374% of firms are SOEs in this industry, which is one of the industries
with the lowest share of public firms in that year, compared to many other indus-
tries including Coal Mining and Processing (51.172% SOEs), Petroleum and Natural
Gas Extraction (95.238% SOEs), Food Production (47.185% SOEs), Tobacco Pro-
cessing (90.857% SOEs), etc. Hence the Electronic and Telecommunications Industry
functions in a way that resembles a market economy more closely during my sam-
ple period, whereas the other industries mentioned above are embedded with more
characteristics of a planned economy. To summarize, I am able to avoid many com-
plications created by a highly concentrated and overly controlled environment when
working with this industry.
The variables used for this study include legal person number (unique firm iden-
tification number), two-digit industry identification number, location identification
number, main operation revenue and cost, annual average number of employees, fixed
assets, long term investment, and, of course, ownership and registration type. I use
these variables to construct measures of revenue, cost, labor, real capital, ownership,
and so forth. All value-based variables are discounted using the producer price index
16The highest percentage of privatization is 37.8%, for the Medical and Pharmaceutical Products
Industry.
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(PPI) found in China's statistical year-book.
I use firms' legal person number provided in the data to match firms over time.
Unfortunately, as discussed in section 1.2.3, the number may change when a firm is
restructured or acquired by another firm, and when this happens I lose track of the
firm. Therefore, for the sample of firms that I cannot match over time using the legal
person number, I follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) and use firms'
names, addresses, and phone numbers to identify surviving firms.
I focus on firms' actual production and use main operation revenue and cost,
instead of total revenue and cost, to measure their revenue and variable cost, respec-
tively. Main operation revenue and cost are appropriate measures to use because
they only contain the incomes and expenditures related to primary production, but
exclude those from other activities, for example land appreciation, investment div-
idends, bank interest, employees' holiday dividends, crisis management costs, etc.,
which do not correctly reflect information about the firms' production process, nor
about their true productivities.
Fixed assets reported in the data is the accumulation of acquired assets at their
original purchase prices. Hence, taking fixed assets as a measure of real capital
directly without any adjustment would be problematic. To address this issue, I follow
the approach proposed by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012), in which they
develop a procedure based on a perpetual inventory method that converts capital
values at original purchase prices into real values that are comparable across time
and firms. The detailed procedure can be found in the appendix of this paper.
As mentioned in section 1.2.3, an SOE may be reincorporated but still predomi-
nantly owned by state-owned conglomerates. Therefore, using firms' legal registration
type to identify state ownership may cause a problem because a firm registered as
a limited-liability corporation, shareholding firm, or foreign firm can ultimately be
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state controlled and behave just like a public firm.17 Even though this problem is not
as pronounced in the Electronic and Telecommunications Industry as in many other
heavily regulated industries such as Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction, Ferrous
Metal Mining and Dressing, and Medical and Pharmaceutical Products, I have de-
cided to minimize the error to the extent possible and follow Hsieh and Song (2015)
in defining a firm as state-owned when its share of registered capital held directly
by the state exceeds or equals 50% or when the state is reported as its controlling
shareholder.18 This definition excludes firms in which the state holds a minority share
through a holding company.
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 provides some basic summary statistics of my firm-level panel data for
the Electronic and Telecommunications Industry. The mean level of all variables as
well as their standard errors are calculated for each sample year. All values are in
millions of RMB, except for the number of workers and the number of firms. On
average, all variables rise gradually over time, corresponding to China's fast-growing
economy and the growth of enterprises during those years. Because of both the
growing economy and the policies encouraging new private entrants, the number of
firms in the industry grows by more than three times, from 1983 firms in 1998 to
6297 firms in 2007. Over all sample years, there are 43,710 observations in total, with
main operation revenue of 289.476 million RMBand cost of 269.704 million RMB,
implying a profit margin of 7.33%. An average firm is endowed with 65.778 million
17At the first glance, it may seem improbable that a foreign firm could in fact be state-owned.
However, this can happen because a firm of which at least a third of the ownership is foreign held
can be registered as a foreign firm. Therefore, it is possible that as much as 66.6% of a foreign firm
can be owned by various levels of government in China. The joint ventures of the Shanghai local
government with GM and Volkswagen (Shanghai-GM and Shanghai-Volkswagen) are examples of
this situation.
18Please consult Hsieh and Song (2015) for a detailed explanation of the definition of state own-
ership.
20
RMB worth of real capital and hires 519.009 employees.
For this study in particular, it is also very important to disaggregate firms accord-
ing to ownership type. Table 1.2 shows that the percentage of SOEs decreases from
26.374% in 1998 to only 3.637% in 2007. This drop in the percentage of SOEs is the
result of both the SOE reform which caused the number of SOEs in the market to
drop from 523 to 229 in 10 years, and the opening-up which added thousands of
new private entrants to the economy. By the end of the sample period, the percent-
age of SOEs (3.637%) is so low that the industry is unlikely to be endowed with any
characteristics of a planned economy.
1.3.2 Evidences of Mass Layoffs
To make certain the data represent market correctly, it would be helpful if we
could find empirical evidence that justifies the observations about layoffs presented
in section 1.2. In this subsection, I focus on finding evidence for mass layoffs in the
1990s, and related issues.
Let's first take a look at some examples, and try to understand exactly how mass
layoffs were carried out. Through inspection, I find out that there are two basic
types of laying-off processes. An example of the first type is Kai Feng Guang Xia
Electronics Production Ltd., in which there is only a one-time mass layoff, as shown
in the left panel of Figure 1·1. In contrast, Wuhan Zhongyuan Electronics Group Co.
represents the second type, where two mass layoffs occur back to back in successive
years, as in the left panel of Figure 1·2. These two types of mass layoffs cover almost
all possible cases. To document this, I counted how many SOEs underwent a mass
layoff only once, how many shed workers in two consecutive years, etc., and the results
for different levels of worker declines are presented in Table 1.4. If we believe a mass
layoff takes place when a firm gets rid of more than 30% of its current workforce,
229, 33, and 2 SOEs have experienced one, two, and three consecutive mass layoffs,
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respectively. One additional information shown by this result is that laying-off was
unlikely to be a controlled process. In other words, I believe there was no adjustment
cost entailed in employment changes, and the reasons are as follows. Firstly, there
are very few firms that went through more than one mass layoff even when I define
the layoff size to be as low as 30%.19 Second, there are more than 100 firms (more
than 14% of all SOEs) that have fired at least 50% of their employees within one year,
which is too big of a drop to justify the existence of adjustment costs.20 Third, there
is almost no SOE that has experienced more than two consecutive mass layoffs.21
Now, I run some simple regressions to justify the existence of mass layoffs in the
data. The hypothesis is that SOEs were finally free to shed their redundant labors
without any limitations or legal consequences imposed by governments once hard
budget constraints were in place after 1997. In other words, we should be able to
see in the data large declines in the number of SOE employees if there was indeed
a massive surge in layoffs. To do this, I classify all observations into three different
groups, (1) private firms that are still private during the next year, (2) SOEs that
become private during the next year (privatization), and (3) SOEs that are still
state-owned during the next year, and define D2 and D3 to be dummies indicating
observations in group 2 and 3, respectively. Then I regress the yearly changes in the
number of employees on D2 and D3 along with other control variables. Table 1.3
reports the results of such regressions. I include only D2, D3, and a constant as
regressors in Model 1, which in other words calculates the simple averages of labor
differences from the current period to the next for the three groups. Private firms on
average hired 64.012 employees each year while SOEs hired 16.642 if privatized (much
19If a labor adjustment cost is in fact in place, we should see SOEs shedding workers slowly and
gradually to spread these costs over several years.
20If there were labor adjustment costs, SOEs would not try to shed this many of employees in a
single event.
21Again, this proves that SOEs do not have an incentive to carry out layoffs gradually, as they
would when adjustment costs are present.
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less than private firms) and laid off 32.433 if there was no ownership change.22 If I
further control for the number of employees, real capital (firm size), and total wage
bill in Model 2, similar results hold. For firms with the same level of hiring, size,
and cost, labor changes in SOEs are 53.797 and 111.232 less than in private firms in
the cases of privatization and no privatization, respectively. The regression results
provide some preliminary evidence that SOEs were indeed able to shed unwanted
workers and mass layoffs did occur.
Based on the empirical evidence above, it appears that my understanding about
mass layoffs and the labor market is fairly accurate. However, there is one additional
concern, that the reported number of employees may be overstated for the observa-
tions proceeding a mass layoff. Specifically, the mass layoff itself is not a concern, but
I worry about the case in which some workers might be officially registered as employ-
ees, but actually stayed at home with no job. Recall the second example presented
above, of the Wuhan Zhongyuan Electronics Group Co. where the pace of layoffs may
seem too fast to be true, since more than 70% of their workers went jobless in less
than two years. In fact, the discussion in section 1.2.5 suggests that such dramatic
changes in numbers may not reflect real layoffs. Prior to hard budget constraints,
many SOEs had to shed redundant employees even though they were not de jure to
do so and had to keep those employees registered at all times. Once the hard budget
constraints were implemented in 1997, SOEs were given the right to fire and could
finally wipe those jobless employees off the list.23 Therefore, such dramatic changes
22I am not surprised to see a positive labor change in group 2, because it is possible that SOEs
shed so many employees prior to privatization that they actually experienced a lack of labor once
becoming more efficient after privatization. If we take a look at all industries, 33 out of 39 exhibited
negative labor changes in group 2 and 34 out of 39 showed negative changes in group 3, which
confirms the observations regarding nationwide mass layoffs.
23In some SOEs, massive layoffs occurred one or two years after 1997. This is not unreasonable
because (1) it took some time for local governments to react to the new policy designed by the
central government, and (2) the SOEs also may have needed time to figure out how to implement
the layoff.
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may simply involve getting rid of names from the employee registration list, instead
of real layoffs. To show this is in fact the case, I plot in the right panels of Figure
1·1 and 1·2 the revenue over time for the two example firms. Interestingly, their rev-
enue did not drop in the years when mass layoffs took place. It is very unlikely that
revenue kept increasing when large amount of worker were laid off. Therefore, the
data could well overstate the true number of employees prior to mass layoffs and the
measure of their labor productivity can be greatly impaired. Hence, I try to identify
these cases and eliminate the observations that possibly suffer from this problem.
Unfortunately, the existing literature is not able to take this factor into account and
usually underestimates SOE productivities. Table 1.5 shows the labor productivities
(measured by added value per worker) before and after deleting observations prior to
mass layoffs for a variety of decline sizes. If a 30% annual drop in labor is defined as
a mass layoff, there are 334 observations prior to layoff, of a total of 3259 state-owned
observations. Dropping these cases from my data set increases average labor produc-
tivity by 3.911%, from 63,639 to 66,128 RMB added value per worker. In this study,
I define a mass layoff to be a 30% drop in the labor force, and delete the observations
prior to a mass layoff for a more accurate estimation.24
1.4 Theoretical Model
This section develops a theoretical model of firm competition in the production
market. An incumbent firm i's short-run marginal cost at time t is given by
cit = β0 + βaait + βkkit + βwWt − TFPit (1.1)
24There is no solid definition that tells us how big of a drop in the number of workers constitutes
a mass layoff. I choose 30% because it appears to be fairly reasonable according to the results in
Table 1.4.
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where cit is the log marginal cost, ait is the age, kit is the log real capital stock, andWt
is a vector of logged variable input prices that are common among all incumbent firms
in period t.25 A firm's capital stock is treated as a fixed factor in the short run, which
affects its marginal cost in the sense that firms with large capitalization are more
capable of transferring labor productivity into output, which in turn reduces their
marginal costs. The firm-specific total factor productivity TFPit captures differences
in technology or managerial ability and is known by the firm but not observable to
econometricians.26 TFP may reflect many different sources of firm heterogeneity in
principle, but I consider TFP primarily as a reflection of management quality, in
the spirit of Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen's (2016) notion of management as a
technology. In this paper, I explicitly model TFP to depend on whether the firm is
state-owned or private, since there is sufficient evidence suggesting that management
quality varies significantly across firms with different ownership types, such that
TFPit = ωit − βρρit, (1.2)
where ρit is the private ownership dummy, βρ is its coefficient, and ωit is the unob-
served, structural productivity component that evolves over time. 27
To sum up, cost heterogeneity across firms is caused by differences in the following
three factors: capital stock, ownership, and the unobserved structural productivity
component. This specification of the marginal cost function follows directly from
Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015). The key to this assumption is that
marginal cost does not depend on the level of total output a firm produces. As
25I present one possible model in the appendix that can be used to derive a marginal cost like the
one in equation (1.1). If the base of the model is same as the one presented in the appendix, Wt
includes log prices of all variable inputs, in specific log wage rate and log price of intermediate input.
26The main reason for the negative sign in front of TFP is that equation (1.1) is a marginal cost
function, and the more productive a firm is, the less cost it incurs.
27The dependency of TFP on ownership type strictly follows Chen, Igamiz, Sawada, and Xiao
(2017)
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shall be seen in a moment, the independence between marginal cost and total output
simplifies the optimal pricing function, provides a tractable relationship between price
and revenue, and in addition assists in the model's identification.28
Assuming incumbent firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market in
which each firm produces a similar but differentiated product, and firm i faces the
following demand function at time t,
Qit = Qt(
Pit
Pt
)η =
It
Pt
(
Pit
Pt
)η, (1.3)
where
Qt =
[
Nt∑
j=1
Q
1+η
η
jt
] η
1+η
Pt =
[
Nt∑
j=1
P 1+ηjt
] 1
1+η
(1.4)
are the aggregate industry output and the industry price index in period t. The firm-
specific variables are its output level Qit and sale price Pit.
29 Accordingly, It is defined
as the market size at time t. Parameter η represents the elasticity of demand which
captures the elasticity of substitution between different products. η is a negative
number and assumed to be constant for all firms in the industry.
This demand function is adopted directly from the widely used monopolistic com-
petition model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). However, unlike the traditional monop-
olistic competition model, we have a limited number of firms in the industry. To deal
with this issue, I learn from Xu (2008) and follow a version of monopolistic compe-
tition by Yang and Heijdra (1993) where each firm's output decision influences the
28A marginal cost function independent of output can be derived from a firm's cost minimization
behavior with some necessary assumptions. The model in the appendix provides such an example.
29With a bit of abuse in the choice of notations, I use Q and P with only a time subscript to
represent the market-level quantity and price in a certain year, and I use Q and P with both firm
and time subscripts for firm-level quantity and price at a certain time.
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aggregate industry price index, which in turn affects firms' profits. In other words,
one firm's production decision affects the profits of all other firms indirectly through
the market price index.
I assume that the main objective of SOE is to make a profit, and thus model
them as profit maximizers. However, one might question whether this assumption
is reasonable, since SOEs were instruments of governments and performed social
functions in a planned economic system. However, as described in section 1.2.4, two
decades of market reforms greatly transformed China's economic system, as well as
the role played by SOEs. Even though SOEs in 1997 might not have functioned in
exactly the same way as private firms, their autonomy, flexibility, and the right to
control their units made sure that they behaved very much like profit maximizers.
Furthermore, as noted in Chen, Igamiz, Sawadax, and Xiao (2017), the governments'
public finances have historically relied heavily on SOE profits, and their managers'
(i.e., party and government officials') political careers mainly have depended on the
firms' performance, which implies that managers of SOEs have the incentive to make
as much profit as possible. Although I believe that non-profit objectives in SOEs still
exist, these are insignificant compared to the goal of maximizing profit. In addition,
non-profit objectives can take a great variety of forms and are difficult to specify
because no systematic record of them exists. Consequently, a reasonable way to
model SOEs is to consider those non-profit goals as idiosyncratic shocks to the main
objective, maximizing profit.30
Thus, in each period, a firm maximizes its short-run profit by setting its price to
30Liu (2017) uses a similar argument to justify firms' profit maximizing behavior. Also, many
other papers make similar assumptions including Jaumandreu and Yin (2014), Kalouptsidi (2014),
and Chen, Igamiz, Sawadax, and Xiao (2017). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first
to offer a comprehensive and detailed justification based on the history and institutional evidence
of China's privatization.
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be a constant markup over its marginal cost,31
Pit =
(
η
1 + η
)
exp(cit). (1.5)
Given this optimal pricing function (equation (1.5)), together with log marginal cost
(equation (1.1) and equation (1.2)), demand (equation (1.3)), and price index (equa-
tion (1.4)), the firm's log revenue rit = pit + qit can be derived, where I use lower-case
p and q to denote log price and log quantity,
rit = log(It) + (1 + η) [βaait + βkkit + βρρit − ωit]
− log
Nt∑
j=1
exp ((1 + η) [βaajt + βkkjt + βρρjt − ωjt]) . (1.6)
Given this simple form of pricing, I can also derive a succinct relationship between
firms' short-run profits and their revenues,32
p¯iit = p¯ii(St) = p¯i(ωit, ait, kit, ρit, S−it) = −1
η
exp(rit), (1.7)
where p¯iit, p¯ii(St), and p¯i(ωit, ait, kit, ρit, S−it) are no more than different notations for
the same profit value. I can substitute the revenue function (equation (1.6)) and find
firms' profits given their own states and the state of the whole market,
p¯iit = p¯ii(St) = p¯i(ωit, ait, kit, ρit, S−it)
= − It
η · PIt · exp ((1 + η) [βaait + βkkit + βρρit − ωit]) (1.8)
where
PIt =
Nt∑
j=1
exp ((1 + η) [βaait + βkkjt + βρρjt − ωjt]) (1.9)
31The detailed derivation of the optimal pricing function is presented in the appendix.
32The derivation of this relationship between profit and revenue can be found in the appendix.
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which I call the price index.33 An interesting fact about this profit function is that,
even though profit depends on the states of all other firms in the market (S−it),
we do not have to know more than the price index PIt about it. This is actually
an advantage of working with a monopolistically competitive market. Later in my
empirical model, the fact that the states of the whole market can be summarized into
a price index makes my estimation much simpler.34
Finally, a firm's total productivity state evolves as
ωit+1 = G(ωit, ρit) + εit+1
= α0 + α1ωit + α2ω
2
it + α3ω
3
it + α4ρit + εit+1.
(1.10)
The function G(·) is the conditional expectation of future productivity and εit is a
zero mean stochastic shock. This functional form carries some very important infor-
mation about productivity evolution. First, a firm's productivity persists over time,
with the degree of persistence captured by the coefficients α1, α2, and α3. This persis-
tence over time is one of the most important features in firm-level productivity data.
Second, I assume that not only the level of productivity can be different for different
type of firms as shown in Equation (1.2), but their productivity growth rate can also
be different as indicated by the ownership dummy included in Equation (1.10). In
33Readers may be confused by the term price index, which seems to refer to Pt in equation (1.4).
In fact, even though PIt and Pt are different expressions, they are highly correlated with each other.
That is also the reason for denoting it with PIt and naming it the price index. If I substitute a
marginal cost function (equation (1.1)) into the optimal price (equation (1.5)), and then into price
index Pt (equation (1.4)), I get the following expression,
Pt =
η
1 + η
[exp((1 + η)(β0 + βwWt))]
1
1+η
 Nt∑
j=1
exp((1 + η)(βkkjt + βρρjt + ωjt))
 11+η
=
η
1 + η
[exp((1 + η)(β0 + βwWt))]
1
1+η [PIt]
1
1+η ,
which shows us how PIt and Pt are related to each other.
34Ryan (2012) also tries to aggregate the states of all firms in the market into one number, the
total capacity. The introduction of total capacity works very similarly to my price index PIt.
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other words, an SOE and a private firm may realize different future productivities
even though they are exactly the same other than their ownership. The magnitude
of ownership effects is captured by the coefficient α4.
35 Third, the specification rec-
ognizes the inherent randomness in firms' productivities, which is reflected by the
stochastic shock εit+1. I assume productivity shocks εit+1 are i.i.d. across time and
firms, and are drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2ε .
Notice that, because of the first feature above, which elaborates the persistence of
productivity, a shock to productivity today will be carried on into the future. The
profit function (equation (1.8)) and productivity evolution function (1.10) conclude
the discussion of my theoretical model.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I estimate the static profit function and productivity evolution
process. It is important to explain why I need to estimate productivity evolution
process in order to identify the parameters in profit function, rather than working on
profit function alone. The short answer is that, unlike ownership and capital level,
productivity is unobservable to econometricians. More specifically, the evolutions
of ownership and capital, which are observed state variables, can be estimated by
reduced-form regressions, but firms' productivity evolution function (equation (1.10))
must be estimated with their revenue function, which implicitly defines unobserved
productivities using firms' observed data. To summarize, the key parameters to be
estimated in this subsection are the parameters of cost function (βa, βk, and βρ), the
parameters of productivity evolution (α0, α1, . . . , α4), and the elasticity of demand
35Hsieh and Song (2015) have found that the exit and privatization of state-owned firms had
negligible effects on aggregate output growth. However, in Section 1.6, I will show that the results
from this paper confirm a positive effect of privatization on firms' productivity. Perhaps, allowing
different productivity evolutions among different types of firms is the key for finding such interesting
results.
30
(η).
The optimal pricing function (equation (1.5)) can be rewritten as
1 +
1
η
=
exp(cit)Qit
PitQit
,
which suggests estimating the elasticity of demand (η) using the ratio of total variable
cost to revenue ( exp(cit)Qit
PitQit
), which can be calculated with firms' observable informa-
tion. It is straightforward to use the average cost-revenue ratio of all firms as an
estimate of 1 + 1
η
. I use ηˆ to denote the estimate of the elasticity of demand η, which
can now be derived by the estimate of 1 + 1
η
.
To estimate α0, α1, . . . , α4, βa, βk, and βρ, I follow the method proposed by Peters,
Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015) in which a proxy variable approach is employed.
This approach is pioneered by Olley and Pakes (1996), and its basic idea is that if
firms observe their draws of productivity when making production decisions, the cho-
sen amount of variable inputs must be systematically related to their productivities.
Therefore, a firm's demand for an intermediate input, for example materials, can be
written as a function of TFP and capital, and TFP can be further decomposed into
a structural productivity component ωit and ownership type ρit as in Equation (1.2),
mit = f(ait, kit, TFPit) = f(ait, kit, ωit, ρit), (1.11)
where mit represents log expenditures on intermediate inputs and function f is as-
sumed to be strictly monotonic in ωit for a given ait, kit, and ρit. The monotonicity
of function f ensures the demand for intermediate inputs is invertible such that
I can solve for ωit in terms of intermediate inputs, ownership, age, and capital,
ωit = f
−1(ait, kit,mit, ρit). Substituting it into equation (1.6), a firm's log revenue
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can be written as,
rit =
∑
ι
γιDι + (1 + η) [βaait + βkkit + βρρit − ωit] + υit
=
∑
ι
γιDι + (1 + η)
[
βaait + βkkit + βρρit − f−1(ait, kit,mit, ρit)
]
+ υit
=
∑
ι
γιDι + h(ait, kit,mit, ρit) + υit,
(1.12)
where
h(ait, kit,mit, ρit) = (1 + η)
[
βaait + βkkit + βρρit − f−1(kit,mit, ρit)
]
. (1.13)
Dι denotes the time dummy for sample year ι, which is used to control for all time
invariant terms in equation (1.6) (in this case Iι and PIι), and υit represents transitory
shocks and measurement errors in the firm's revenue. Since ait, kit, and ρit enter the
revenue function through two different channels - (1) directly through the term βaait,
βkkit, and βρρit, and (2) indirectly through productivity f
−1(ait, kit,mit, ρit) - βa, βk,
and βρ cannot be separately identified. To proceed, I introduce h, which encapsulates
unobserved function f−1, βaait, βkkit, and βρρit, and is written as an unknown function
of ait, kit, mit, and ρit. Replacing h(ait, kit,mit, ρit) with a third-order polynomial of
its arguments,36 equation (1.12) can be estimated with OLS to get estimates of time
dummies Dι.
The results from the previous OLS regression enable us to construct an estimate of
the h(ait, kit,mit, ρit) function, hˆit, which can further be used to express productivity
as,
ωit = −( 1
1 + ηˆ
hˆit − βaait − βkkit − βρρit). (1.14)
I can substitute this expression into the productivity evolution function (equation
36I have also tested replacing h(kit,mit, ρit) with higher order polynomials, but the results are not
significantly affected.
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(1.10)) to find my key regression,
hˆit+1 = β
∗
aait+1 + β
∗
kkit+1 + β
∗
ρρit+1 − α∗0 + α1(hˆit − β∗aait − β∗kkit − β∗ρρit)
− α∗2(hˆit − β∗aait − β∗kkit − β∗ρρit)2 + α∗3(hˆit − β∗aait − β∗kkit − β∗ρρit)3
− α∗4ρit − ε∗it+1, (1.15)
where α∗2 = α2
1
1+ηˆ
and α∗3 = α3
1
(1+ηˆ)2
, and all other parameters with an asterisk
(β∗a,β
∗
k , β
∗
ρ , α
∗
0, α
∗
4, and ε
∗
it+1) are the corresponding original parameters times (1 + ηˆ).
Estimating this equation with a non-linear least square regression (NLLS) gives us
the estimates of those asterisked parameters, and then the estimates of parameters
that I am looking for, αˆ0, αˆ1, . . . , αˆ4, βˆρ, βˆa and βˆk, can be easily recovered by their
definitions.
To recap, I have estimated the parameters ηˆ,αˆ0, αˆ1, . . . , αˆ4, βˆa, βˆρ, and βˆk in this
subsection. With all these estimates in hand, I am able to calculate each firm's
productivity using
ωˆit = −( 1
1 + ηˆ
hˆit − βˆaait − βˆkkit − βˆρρit). (1.16)
The static profit of each firm p¯iit can also be calculated from its definition (equation
(1.8)).37
1.6 Empirical Results
In this section, I present the estimates of static profit function and productivity
evolution function. I adopt several different models and the estimates are compared
with each other in order to find the most reasonable ones to use.
37Interested readers are encouraged to consult Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015) for two
differences between their model and the one developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). The differences
mentioned there also apply to my model. Briefly speaking, my model (1) assumes productivity
evolution as an exogenous process and (2) sidesteps the necessity of estimating a production function.
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1.6.1 Static Profit
The key parameters to be estimated for the static profit function p¯i are fixed
time effects γ1, γ2, . . . , γ10, elasticity of demand η, marginal cost change in age βa,
cost elasticity of capital βk, and the difference in marginal costs between private and
state-owned firms βρ. The results are presented in Table 1.6. In this table, I show the
numbers derived from two different models. The second column presents the results
of a simple OLS, regressing each firm's main operation revenue rit on time dummies
D1, D2, . . . , D10, age ait, log real capital kit, and a private ownership dummy ρit.
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The numbers in the third column are the estimates of my empirical model in the
previous section.
Because the regressions used are completely different between OLS and my model,
I am not surprised to see different sets of time fixed effects. However, both models
reflect that firms become more capable of generating sales and revenues over the
years. This is consistent with the story of China's successful market transformation
and GDP growth, which makes people more prosperous and endows them with greater
purchasing power.
1 + 1
η
is estimated the same way in both models and its value is 0.894, implying
an elasticity of demand η = −9.452. Demand elasticity is an important piece of in-
formation about firms' ability to convert productivity into profit, as seen in equation
(1.8). Notice that, given a demand function defined in equation (1.3), the elasticity
of substitution is equal to −η = 9.452, which measures to what degree two goods or
services can be substitutes for one another.39 More simply, it tells us how easy it is
for a consumer to substitute one good for another. The Electronic and Telecommuni-
cations Industry is relatively competitive and firms produce substitutable products.
38This is the model presented in the first line of equation (1.12).
39The detailed derivation of the elasticity of substitution for this model can be found in the
appendix.
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Therefore, a high level of elasticity of substitution is expected. This number is also
comparable to the one reported in Jaumandreu and Yin (2016), in which, estimated
using exactly the same dataset, the Electronics Industry has an elasticity of substi-
tution of 6.1 in the domestic market and 10.7 in the foreign market.
The cost elasticity of capital βk is estimated to be -0.073 in OLS and -0.029 in my
model. Negative values of βk imply that firms with higher capital stocks have lower
production costs because they are able to use less variable inputs, for example labor
and material, to produce the same amount of goods. To interpret the numbers in a
more straightforward way, I calculate implied input elasticity of capital using the cost
minimization model presented in the appendix (equation (1.23)). The implied input
elasticity αk measures the responsiveness of output to a change in levels of capital
used in production. αk = 0.029 reported in my model means that a 1% increase in
capital usage would lead to approximately a 0.029% increase in output. Once again,
this number is comparable to the one estimated in Jaumandreu and Yin (2016), 0.077.
Finally in this table, I report the estimates of βρ which are -0.061 and -0.022 in
simple OLS and in my model respectively. According to equation (1.2), the negative
numbers confirm the observation that private firms are more efficient than their state-
owned counterparts. Other than indicating that private firms are more productive,
the coefficients themselves do not mean anything if we do not examine the other
component of total factor productivity, ωit. I do this in the next subsection.
1.6.2 Productivity Evolution
To characterize productivity evolution (equation (1.10)), I estimate its parameters
α0, α1, . . . , α4. The results are presented in Table 1.7. The persistence of firms'
productivity level is measured by the coefficients of ωit, and of its squared and cubed
terms. In this case, it is highly persistent since the marginal effects of ωit on ωit+1 for
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an average firm (with productivity level of 0.274) is 0.948.40 The effects are not linear
as the effects of the squared and cubed terms are statistically significant. I also find
that a private enterprise is more likely to realize a higher productivity in the next
period than an SOE with the same level of current productivity. This result is in
accordance with other papers in the literature, for example, Bai, Lu, and Tao (2009).
With firms' estimated productivities calculated by equation (1.16), I am able to
summarize in Table 1.8 the industry-level productivities across firms with different
ownerships. More specifically, I classify firms into five different groups. SOEs and
private firms contain state-owned and private observations, respectively. I separate
SOEs into two types, (1) the SOEs that were eventually privatized and (2) those that
had never been privatized. The latter form a group called non-privatized SOEs,
and the former are further divided into observations before privatization and those
after, called privatized SOEs before privatization and privatized SOEs after priva-
tization, respectively.
As we can see from this table, there are many more private observations (39,852)
than state-owned ones (3,858) due to a large number of private start-ups and pri-
vatizations, and private firms on average appear to be more productive than SOEs
by 20.716% and 23.283%, if calculated with unweighted and capital-weighted means
respectively. These results are not surprising because SOEs are considered to be old,
decaying and lacking vitality during my sample period. As predicted by my theoret-
ical model, these percentage differences in productivity are much smaller than those
estimated in some other studies, for example, 171.7% estimated by Chen, Igamiz,
Sawada, and Xiao (2017).41 It confirms that a method that does not take into account
40I take the derivative of equation (1.10) with respect to ωit to obtain the equation for marginal
effect, α1 + 2α2ωit + 3α3ω
2
it.
41In their paper, data for China's Electronic and Telecommunications Industry shows that private
firms are 171.7% more efficient than SOEs, and the full sample with firms in all industries gives an
even more dramatic productivity difference, 229%.
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differences in input prices may overestimate the productivity difference between the
two types of firms, and the degree of overestimation can be as large as 148 percentage
points.
The SOEs selected for privatization (privatized SOEs before privatization) have
a higher average productivity than SOEs that do not go through the privatization
process (non-privatized SOEs). This is consistent with my findings in section 2.5.3
later in this paper that governments are more likely to privatize more highly pro-
ductive SOEs, but more likely to terminate less productive ones that are unlikely to
survive on their own once privatized.42 The main reason for governments conducting
such a selective privatization process is to maintain a relatively high success rate by
personalizing treatments.
In particular, I am very interested in comparing the productivity distribution of
two groups, privatized SOEs before privatization and privatized SOEs after privati-
zation, because it reflects the direct effects of privatization on firms' productivity. In
general, SOEs see 16.741% (19.267% without weighting) improvement in productivity
once privatized. The histograms of these two groups are plotted in the left panels
of Figure 1·4, along with their corresponding probability density functions (PDFs) in
the right panels derived by a kernel density estimation with a normal kernel smooth-
ing function and optimal bandwidth for normal density. Plus, to make the figures
mare comparable, I plot dotted vertical lines to indicate zero productivities and solid
vertical lines to label mean levels. We can see from the graphs that the mass of
productivity distribution after privatization shifted to the right compared to that be-
fore privatization, indicating improvements in SOEs' productivities once privatized.43
42Notice that the sample size of privatized SOEs before privatization and non-privatized SOEs
sum to the number of SOEs. In addition, since there are 39,852 observations in private firms and
866 observations in privatized SOEs after privatization, the number of observations of permanent
private firms can be calculated by their difference, which is 38,986.
43Note that there are clearly fewer observations before privatization than after, since ownership
changes occurred mostly in the first several years into my sample period. According to Table 1.8,
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Since it may be difficult to compare them with the naked eye, I superimpose in Figure
1·5 the two PDFs from the right two panels of Figure 1·4, from which the relationship
described above is very clear.
In fact, the presented method above that compares the productivity between
SOEs and private firms does not exclude the selection effect. In contrast, I will
compare their productivity using a different approach in this paragraph. Specifically,
I start with two firms with average productivity measure in 1996 (ω = 0.211), and one
firm is private and the other is state-owned. Then I calculate how their productivity
will evolve differently according to estimated productivity evolution function, Equa-
tion (1.10). Finally, their TFP are calculated and plotted against time in Figure 1·3.
The top panel shows TFP evolution over time for these two types of firms. While the
SOE slowly improves its productivity level, the private firm becomes more efficiency
with a much faster pace by 55.159% (from 0.252 in 1997 to 0.391 in 2006). In the
bottom panel, I plot the percentage differences in productivity between them. At the
begin of our sample period, the private firm is only 9.239% more productive than the
SOE, and ten years later, the difference become quite large, 36.913%. On average
across ten years, private firm is 20.783% more productive than the SOE. Even though
we see larger difference in this approach, they are not as large as 171.7% estimated
by Chen, Igamiz, Sawada, and Xiao (2017). Again, this shows the advantage of this
model, that is being able to derive more reasonable productivity measures.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a simple static competition model to study firms' produc-
tivity in China during recent economic reform. Specifically, I focus on the differences
in input prices among different types of firms and believe that they are in fact very
there are 576 observations in the first group and 866 observations in the second. However this does
not affect my conclusion that the mass of productivity shifted to the right after privatization.
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important for explaining the reform. The model is estimated with the technique
proposed by Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015) and the results confirm my
expectation that SOEs are less efficient than private firms, but by not as much as we
were led to believe when input prices were not incorporated into the analysis.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Construction of Firms' Real Capital
To construct the measure of firms' real capital measure, I follow a five-step process.
1. I find the industry average fixed asset value in 1993 and calculate the average
rate of growth in nominal capital stock at the industry level between 1993 and
1997. Then I can estimate the yearly nominal capital growth rate from 1993 to
1997 by simply assuming the growth rates are equal in all years. In addition,
the yearly growth rate between 1997 and 2006 can be calculated directly from
the data.
2. For each firm, I discount its fixed asset value reported in the last available year
using the growth rates calculated in step 1, to obtain a measure of its nominal
capital at birth.
3. I use the information calculated from steps 1 and 2 to obtain a nominal capital
for each firm from its birth year to the last year it appears in my data set.
4. The difference in nominal capital between two consecutive years can be thought
of as nominal investment. Then real investment is derived by discounting nom-
inal investment using the Brandt-Rawski deflator.44
5. Finally, a firm's real capital stock for each year can be calculated using the
perpetual inventory method, Kit =
∑τ=t
τ=0(1 − δ)τ × Iiτ , which means the real
capital of firm i at time t is the summation of all real investments I (depreciation
accounted) from its birth year to the current year.
44See Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012).
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1.8.2 Marginal Cost Function Derived from Cost Minimization
By making some minor assumptions concerning firms' cost-minimizing behaviors,
I can derive a marginal cost function independent of total output. This section
presents one such example. First, I assume that an incumbent firm i determines
how to produce a certain amount of output Qit in period t by choosing the level of
labor and material so as to minimize its total cost (TCit) of producing Qit. Thus the
problem faced by each firm is as follows,
minimize
L,M
TCit = rtKit + wtLit + τtMit
subject to Qit ≤ exp(TFPit)LαLit KαKit MαMit
(1.17)
where K, L, and M are firm's real capital, labor, and material (not logged) used
in production, respectively, and r, w, and τ are the prices of these components.45
Production technology follows Cobb-Douglas with input elasticities αL, αK , and αM .
TFP is the firm's total factor productivity.
To solve the minimization problem, I set up Lagrange, take derivatives with re-
spect to L and M , and solve the system of equations for the optimal level of two
choice variables, labor L and material M . To simplify the notation, I suppress the
time subscript of variable prices.
Lit =
[ τ
w
] αM
αM+αL ·
[
αL
αM
] αM
αM+αL · exp(TFPit)
−1
αM+αL ·K
−αK
αM+αL
it ·Q
1
αM+αL
it (1.18)
Mit =
[ τ
w
] −αL
αM+αL ·
[
αL
αM
] −αL
αM+αL · exp(TFPit)
−1
αM+αL ·K
−αK
αM+αL
it ·Q
1
αM+αL
it (1.19)
Then I substitute the two equations above into a total cost function to obtain the
45I can also think of the last input as intermediate input in general.
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following expression,
TCit = rKit +
([
αL
αM
] αM
αM+αL
+
[
αL
αM
] −αL
αM+αL
)
· w
αL
αM+αL · τ
αM
αM+αL
· exp(TFPit)
−1
αM+αL ·K
−αK
αM+αL
it ·Q
1
αM+αL
it . (1.20)
I take the derivative with respect to output Qit to get marginal cost (Cit),
Cit = A · w
αL
αM+αL · τ
αM
αM+αL · exp(TFPit)
−1
αM+αL ·K
−αK
αM+αL
it ·Q
1−(αM+αL)
αM+αL
it (1.21)
where
A =
1
αM + αL
([
αL
αM
] αM
αM+αL
+
[
αL
αM
] −αL
αM+αL
)
.
Finally I take the log on both sides to find an expression for marginal cost,
log(Cit) = log(A) +
αL
αM + αL
log(w) +
αM
αM + αL
log(τ)
− 1
αM + αL
TFPit − αK
αM + αL
log(Kit) +
1− (αM + αL)
αM + αL
log(Qit). (1.22)
To make marginal cost independent of output, I need to assume that αM + αL = 1.
This is in fact what Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015) and many other pa-
pers assumed implicitly. As long as a paper presents a marginal cost that is not a
function of output, some implicit restrictions on input elasticities must be in place,
even though the papers do not discuss those restrictions explicitly. In China's Elec-
tronic and Telecommunications Industry, the restriction that αM and αL sum to 1
can be backed up by Jaumandreu and Yin (2016), who estimate the joint distribution
of unobserved productivity (cost advantages) and unobserved demand heterogeneity
(product advantages) for Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008. That pa-
per uses exactly same data set as mine, and the production function estimates for
the Electronic and Telecommunications Industry show us that the sum of labor and
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material input elasticity is 0.959 (αL = 0.505 and αM = 0.454). Then I take the
assumption above into account and simplify equation (1.22) to obtain
log(Cit) = log(A)− αK
αM + αL
log(Kit) +
αL
αM + αL
log(w) +
αM
αM + αL
log(τ)
− 1
αM + αL
TFPit
which simplifies to
cit = β0 + βkkit + βwW − 1
αM + αL
TFPit (1.23)
where
β0 = log(A)
βk = − αK
αM + αL
βw = [
αL
αM + αL
,
αM
αM + αL
]
W = [log(w), log(τ)]′.
I use lower case c and k to represent the log of the corresponding upper case variables.
Comparing my simplified log marginal cost (equation (1.23)) with the assumed
functional form (equation (1.1)), as long as I redefine the productivity term to be
1
αM+αL
TFPit, I find that they are exactly the same. Hence, a marginal cost that is
independent of output (equation (1.1)) is derived.
1.8.3 Optimal Price Derived from Profit Maximization
Since I assume that marginal cost is not a function of output (equation (1.1)),
total cost can be written as TCit = exp(cit)Qit. Therefore, each firm has to solve the
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following unconstrained profit maximization problem,
mzximize
Pit
PitQit − exp(cit)Qit
I substitute the demand function (equation (1.3)), and take the derivative with respect
to price. I then have the optimal price (equation (1.5)).
1.8.4 Profit Function in Terms of Revenue
In my model, profit can be expressed as a function of revenue only, thanks to the
assumption that marginal cost is not a function of output (equation (1.1)). Continuing
with the profit function from the previous subsection in the appendix and replacing
price Pit with the optimal pricing function (equation (1.5)), we have
p¯iit = PitQit − exp(cit)Qit
=
η
1 + η
exp(cit)Qit − exp(cit)Qit
= (
η
1 + η
− 1)exp(cit)Qit
= −1
η
· η
1 + η
exp(cit)Qit
Notice that η
1+η
exp(cit) is just the optimal price (equation (1.5)). Therefore,
p¯iit = −1
η
· PitQit = −1
η
· exp(rit).
1.8.5 Elasticity of Substitution
Given demand equation (1.3), I can calculate the elasticity of substitution between
good i and good j. Firstly, the ratio of the two good quantities is
Qit
Qjt
=
(
Pjt
Pit
)−η
.
44
Then elasticity of substitution is defined by
ln(Qit
Qjt
)
ln(MRStij)
=
d(Qit
Qjt
)
d(
Pjt
Pit
)
·
Pjt
Pit
Qit
Qjt
= −η(Pjt
Pit
)−η−1
Pjt
Pit
(
Pit
Pjt
)−η
= −η,
where MRStit is the marginal rate of substitution between good i and good j at time
t.
45
T
a
b
le
1
.1
:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
Y
ea
r
M
ai
n
O
p
er
a-
ti
on
R
ev
en
u
e
M
ai
n
O
p
er
a-
ti
on
C
os
t
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
In
p
u
t
R
ea
l
C
ap
it
al
N
u
m
of
L
ab
or
N
u
m
of
O
b
-
se
rv
at
io
n
s
19
98
11
8.
65
4
10
5.
47
8
10
3.
70
7
43
.9
27
49
5.
90
4
19
83
(4
97
.8
82
)
(4
26
.4
10
)
(4
86
.6
67
)
(1
46
.4
32
)
(1
12
6.
03
0)
19
99
14
4.
41
4
12
9.
50
6
11
7.
31
7
48
.6
09
49
9.
87
6
22
75
(5
95
.3
85
)
(5
35
.3
44
)
(5
15
.0
72
)
(1
88
.5
44
)
(1
12
2.
99
8)
20
00
17
3.
32
9
15
3.
55
1
13
9.
53
8
49
.7
21
47
9.
24
4
26
86
(7
40
.3
70
)
(6
52
.0
35
)
(6
09
.8
64
)
(2
11
.9
42
)
(1
04
2.
64
2)
20
01
19
1.
33
3
17
4.
45
2
15
3.
44
5
50
.6
38
42
5.
63
5
29
76
(9
01
.8
79
)
(8
31
.0
75
)
(7
30
.5
71
)
21
5.
07
8
83
1.
82
1
20
02
21
6.
60
1
19
6.
83
7
17
9.
37
4
55
.5
09
44
3.
18
5
34
52
(1
13
0.
46
5)
(1
04
4.
16
9)
(1
00
8.
01
1)
(2
55
.9
49
)
(9
25
.6
83
)
20
03
29
9.
07
4
29
8.
21
0
23
5.
69
9
61
.5
97
48
9.
88
2
39
56
(1
74
8.
42
2)
(1
74
6.
99
6)
(1
50
6.
28
2)
(3
21
.5
45
)
11
09
.8
02
20
04
27
0.
45
0
25
1.
12
8
21
5.
49
4
58
.4
14
45
2.
48
5
64
19
(1
83
8.
01
1)
(1
74
5.
67
1)
(1
49
8.
27
2)
(3
82
.4
20
)
(1
33
6.
32
2)
20
05
30
2.
80
6
28
2.
36
7
24
3.
57
7
66
.1
44
51
0.
30
9
69
44
(2
20
7.
21
0)
(2
10
0.
96
1)
(1
93
4.
49
0)
(3
98
.7
80
)
(1
73
7.
81
9)
20
06
36
8.
10
3
34
3.
38
1
29
5.
10
3
78
.9
17
58
3.
35
1
67
22
(2
73
6.
80
1)
(2
61
0.
50
9)
(2
37
9.
54
1)
(4
39
.9
56
)
(2
29
1.
02
7)
20
07
44
6.
28
5
41
4.
99
3
36
5.
31
7
94
.1
96
66
2.
87
4
62
97
(3
44
3.
90
8)
(3
27
0.
43
6)
(3
01
4.
85
4)
(5
08
.3
58
)
(3
15
5.
16
0)
ov
er
al
l
28
9.
47
6
26
9.
70
4
23
3.
68
5
65
.7
78
51
9.
00
9
43
71
0
(2
15
2.
95
3)
(2
05
0.
32
0)
(1
86
5.
22
2)
(3
70
.4
17
)
(1
84
5.
15
8)
M
ea
n
va
lu
es
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
fo
r
ea
ch
va
ri
a
b
le
a
lo
n
g
w
it
h
th
ei
r
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
th
e
p
a
ra
p
h
ra
se
s.
T
h
e
u
n
it
s
o
f
a
ll
va
lu
es
a
re
m
il
li
o
n
R
M
B
,
ex
ce
p
t
fo
r
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
la
b
o
rs
a
n
d
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s.
46
T
a
b
le
1
.2
:
F
ir
m
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
Y
ea
r
N
u
m
of
F
ir
m
s
N
u
m
of
S
O
E
s
N
u
m
of
P
ri
va
te
F
ir
m
s
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
S
O
E
s
19
98
19
83
52
3
14
60
26
.3
74
%
19
99
22
75
50
3
17
72
22
.1
10
%
20
00
26
86
50
2
21
84
18
.6
90
%
20
01
29
76
39
6
25
80
13
.3
06
%
20
02
34
52
39
4
30
58
11
.4
14
%
20
03
39
56
35
0
36
06
8.
84
7%
20
04
64
19
34
5
60
74
5.
37
5%
20
05
69
44
33
0
66
14
4.
75
2%
20
06
67
22
28
6
64
36
4.
25
5%
20
07
62
97
22
9
60
68
3.
63
7%
ov
er
al
l
43
71
0
38
58
39
85
2
8.
82
6%
47
Figure 1·1: Mass Layoff Example (One Time Layoff)
Left panel shows the number of employees for Kai Feng Guang Sha Electronics Production Ltd.
over sample years. The number of employees is on vertical axis and year is on horizontal axis.
Right panel depicts the revenues for the same company in the same period. The revenue (in
thousands of RMBs) is on vertical axis and year is on horizontal axis. Kai Feng Guang Sha
Electronics Production Ltd. is an example of firms which pursue a one time mass layoff. This is
the most common types of mass layoff process out there in China's Electronic and
Telecommunications industry.
Figure 1·2: Mass Layoff Example (Two Consecutive Layoffs)
Left panel shows the number of employees for Wuhan Zhongyuan Electronics Group Co. over
sample years. The number of employees is on vertical axis and year is on horizontal axis. Right
panel depicts the revenues for the same company in the same period. The revenue (in thousands of
RMBs) is on vertical axis and year is on horizontal axis. Wuhan Zhongyuan Electronics Group
Co. is an example of the firms which carry out two consecutive mass layoffs. This is the second
most common types of mass layoff process out there in China's Electronic and Telecommunications
industry.
48
Table 1.3: Evidences of Mass Layoffs
Parameters Model 1 Model 2
const 64.012 15.268
(3.983)*** (3.426)***
Labor 0.046
(0.004)***
Labor2 2.720 ∗ 10−6
(0.040 ∗ 10−6)***
D2 -47.370 -53.797
(47.565) (37.528)
D3 -96.445 -111.232
(13.537)*** (10.712)***
Capital 5.078 ∗ 10−6
9.686 ∗ 10−6
Wage 0.002
(0.000)***
R-square 0.001 0.378
Num of Priv to Priv 32009 32009
Num of SOE to Priv 226 226
Num of SOE to SOE 3033 3033
sample size 35268 35268
Standard errors are in paraphrases.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 1.4: Counting Consecutive Mass Layoffs
Layoff Size One layoff Two Layoffs Three Layoffs Sample Size
> 10% 295 117 57 712
> 20% 284 58 16 712
> 30% 229 33 2 712
> 40% 163 15 1 712
> 50% 106 9 0 712
> 60% 77 3 0 712
> 70% 50 1 0 712
> 80% 31 0 0 712
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Table 1.6: Static Profit Parameters
Parameters OLS My Modle
1 + 1
η
0.894 0.894
(0.360)*** (0.360)***
βa 0.002 0.011
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
βk -0.073 -0.029
(0.000)*** (0.001)***
βρ -0.061 -0.022
(0.003)*** (0.004)***
γ1 4.294 6.734
(0.041)*** (0.206)***
γ2 4.349 6.747
(0.041)*** (0.206)***
γ3 4.450 6.764
(0.040)*** (0.206)***
γ4 4.467 6.766
(0.040)*** (0.206)***
γ5 4.511 6.773
(0.040)*** (0.206)***
γ6 4.639 6.800
(0.039)*** (0.206)***
γ7 4.606 6.832
(0.037)*** (0.206)***
γ8 4.660 6.841
(0.038)*** (0.206)***
γ9 4.753 6.858
(0.038)*** (0.206)***
γ10 4.849 6.869
(0.039)*** (0.206)***
implied profit margin ( η
1+η
− 1)100% 11.857% 11.857%
implied elasticity of demand η -9.452 -9.452
implied elasticity of substitution −η 9.452 9.452
implied input elasticity αK 0.073 0.029
sample size 35268 35268
Standard errors are in paraphrases.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 1.7: Productivity Evolution Parameters
Parameters My Model
const 0.050
(0.003)***
ωit 0.675
(0.012)***
ω2it 0.644
(0.030)***
ω3it -0.382
(0.027)***
ρit 0.011
(0.001)***
sample size 35268
Standard errors are in paraphrases.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 1·3: Productivity Evolution for Two Average Firms with Different Ownership
Top panel shows TFP evolution for these two types of firms. The TFP is on vertical axis and time
is on horizontal axis. Bottom panel is the percentage difference in productivity between these two
types of firms in different years. The percentage difference in productivity is on vertical axis and
time is on horizontal axis.
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Figure 1·4: Productivity Distribution of All Privatized SOEs Before and After
Privatization
Top-left panel shows the TFP histogram of privatized SOEs before privatization in my dataset.
Top-right panel depicts the probability density function estimated using the same dataset.
Bottom-left panel shows the TFP histogram of privatized SOEs after privatization in my dataset.
Bottom-right panel depicts the probability density function estimated using the same dataset. I
draw a dotted vertical line to indicate zero TFP and a solid vertical line to label mean levels of
productivity. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is on horizontal axises in all graphs. The number of
observations is on vertical axis in the left two graphs and probability is on vertical axis in the right
two graphs.
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Figure 1·5: Compare Productivity Distribution Before and After Privatization
Solid line represents PDF of TFP for privatized SOEs before privatization. Dotted line represents
PDF of TFP for privatized SOEs After privatization. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is on
horizontal axises and probability is on vertical axis.
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Chapter 2
Privatization and the Dynamics of
Productivity and Investment in China since
1990
2.1 Introduction
Even though the differences in input prices are well documented, there is a lack
of empirical evidences supporting it.1 The reason for such difficulty is that we do
not observe the corresponding information in the dataset. A firm's level of liability is
observable but not its price. Furthermore, we do not know the amount of subsidies
provided to SOEs. In order to empirically prove that SOEs are granted easy access
to credits comparing to private firms, a structural model can be very helpful, and
firms' investment behavior can be used to pin down the input costs of different types
of firms for further comparison.
In this chapter, I build such a dynamic structural model that integrates the fact
that state-owned and private firms incur different investment prices, as well as many
other important factors including government reform policies, heterogeneous firm
characteristics, and macroeconomic market conditions. Since such a difference in in-
put prices affects firms' decisions in a dynamic fashion, especially when governments
are particularly selective on firm' size when deciding which SOEs are to be privatized,
we draw on the fully dynamic workhorse industry evolution models by Hopenhayn
1All evidences provided in my first chapter of this dissertation, as well as all other papers in the
literatures, are not empirical. They are mainly from experiences and policy statements.
57
(1992) and Ericson and Pakes (1995).2 The model is used to study firms' dynamic
behaviors and market transformation in China during reform and look at the effect
of policy changes on the market. The parameters of the model are estimated using
an unbalanced panel data set of China's Electronic and Telecommunications Industry
from 1997 to 2006 extracted from the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database. 3
Because of such a large pool of possible states in our model, we use the two-step esti-
mation process proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) (BBL) to reduce the
computational burden. The estimation results provide significant evidences of input
price differences and correctly reflect many other well documented institutional reg-
ularities. Finally, simulations are carried out to study the effects of many interesting
alternative policies.
This chapter differs from the literature in the following aspects. First, this is the
first dynamic structural model in the literature to study the transformation of the
market during the reform in China. Second, firm entry is explicitly modeled in order
to incorporate the effects of policy that encourages the formations of new private
firms. Third, while many other papers implicitly assume that privatization and ter-
mination decisions are made by the SOEs themselves, I limit these decisions solely to
governments for a more accurate rendering. Furthermore, SOEs' privatization deci-
sions are modeled as probabilities of being selected by governments for reform, and
this innovative modeling choice greatly simplifies the estimation process of the model.
In this chapter, I study China's reform using a dynamic structural model that has
non-negligible advantages over reduced-form regressions, which lie in the capability to
simulate hypothetical policy changes and answer many types of questions that cannot
2The literature on privatization and ownership change has long acknowledged selection bias as a
major econometric problem. It is more evident in the case of China where a specific policy, grasp
the large and let go of the small, has been designed to guide the selection process in a certain
direction. The policy itself is a very important part of this paper and will be discussed in much
detail in later sections.
3This dataset is the same as the previous chapter.
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be easily solved with simple regressions.4 Therefore, at the end of the paper, I simu-
late market evolution under different circumstances and answer some very important
questions about policy changes. I start with the question what would happen if SOEs
were not given easy access to credit. In other words, SOEs are forced to pay a higher
price for investment. The second group of questions involves different government
selection schemes for reform. Firstly, the governments' privatization and termination
decisions are highly selective based on firm size, as epitomized in grasp the large,
let go of the small. It would be very interesting to ask what if governments reverse
the roll of firm size to the chance of being selected for reform. Second, the reform
policies are proven later in the paper to be selective based on firm productivity. It
is certainly worth checking how the market would react if there were no preference
on firm efficiency. The last question involves the two main channels of government
market reform, (1) encouraging new entrants and (2) privatizing existing SOEs. With
the help from my structural model, I am able to isolate the effects of one channel from
the other.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2.2, I provide a brief description
of the data set and present some preliminary evidences of easy access to credits for
SOEs. Section 2.3 presents my theoretical model of privatization, firm heterogeneity,
and industry evolution. Section 2.4 develops a two-stage estimation method for the
model. The first stage estimates the policy functions and underlying processes of
firms' productivity and ownership; the second stage uses these results as well as
equilibrium conditions to derive the dynamic parameters of the model. Section 2.5
summarizes the parameter estimates and explains their validity. Section 2.6 uses my
4In fact, being able to perform simulation is one of the reasons why I started with a dynamic
structural model rather than reduced-form regressions. Regressions are good at investigating the
effects of policies that have actually been implemented, but are limited in explaining the effects of a
hypothetical policy. This is mainly because we have no data available for a market evolving under
hypothetical policies that have never been carried out.
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estimated model to simulate alternative policies and answer some important questions
about China's economic reform. Section 3.5 concludes.
2.2 Data Set and Summary Statistics
The data used in this chapter is exactly the same as the one in previous chapter.
The details about how I process the raw data into a set of data entries that is suitable
for use in this study can be found in section 1.3 in the previous chapter.
2.2.1 Evidence of Easy Credit for SOEs
Since one of my main goal in this chapter is to provide empirical prove that
the input costs are different for firms with different ownership, I want to find some
preliminary evidences to verify that the data set justifies my observations about SOEs'
easy access to credit. My hypothesis is that SOEs and private firms pay different prices
for loans and the per unit investment cost for SOEs is less than that for private firms.
To check for empirical evidence, I regress firms' capital to labor ratio on their pri-
vate ownership dummy with other controls. I use three different model specifications,
which are: (1) a model with a private dummy as the only independent variable; (2)
a model with more controls including firms' added value, profit, and wage rate; and
(3) a model with a firm fixed effect added to the previous model. The results are
presented in Table 2.1. All three models yield negative estimates of coefficients on
private ownership, which suggests SOEs' easy access to loans since each worker has
less capital to work with in private firms.5
5Notice that the coefficient on the private ownership dummy in the firm fixed effect model is
negative but not significant. This is probably because the model is identified by the changes within
firms (instead of across firms), which are not an abundant case in my data set.
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2.3 Theoretical Model
This section develops a theoretical model of market evolution when firms' owner-
ship is subject to change. The model in this paper draws heavily on the fully dynamic
workhorse industry evolution models by Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson and Pakes
(1995). In most models following this framework as well as my model, a firm makes
a static decision on labor and realizes its current period profit through production,
and then decides on whether to exit and then how much to invest. In detail, the
model contains four structural components. The first is incumbent firms' static profit
function that states how much money a firm earns given the state of the market.
The second component describes the process of productivity evolution, in which the
types of ownership (private or state-owned) affect the probability distribution of a
firm's future productivity. Third, ownership is not fixed and can be changed by an
exogenous process that reflects governments' market reform policies. The fourth and
final component of the model depicts the behavior of potential entrants, which can be
either private or state-owned firms. The following subsections discuss each of these
components in greater detail.
2.3.1 Sequence of Actions
In this model, time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,∞. The firms com-
peting in the market are called incumbents and indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , Nt, where
Nt ∈ N is the total number of incumbents in period t. An incumbent i's state in
period t is represented by sit = (ωit, kit, ρit), where ωit ∈ Ω ⊂ R, kit ∈ K ⊂ R+, and
ρit ∈ {0, 1} are productivity, log real capital, and private ownership dummy, respec-
tively, for this firm in this period.6 ρit = 1 if firm i is privately owned at time t, and
6Note that I treat upper case and lower case letters differently in this paper. For example, lower
case sit represents an individual firm's state, while upper case letter St, which is defined in the
following sentences, represents the state of the entire industry.
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ρit = 0 if state-owned. Ω and K are the sets from which firms draw their produc-
tivity and log real capital, respectively. Following the conventions introduced above,
the whole-industry state at each period t is denoted by St = {s1t, s2t, s3t, . . . , sNtt},
and S−it = {s1t, s2t, . . . , si−1t, si+1t, . . . , sNtt} represents the market state St disre-
garding the state of firm i, sit. Because each firm's state sit is drawn from a set
X = Ω×K× {0, 1}, the set of all possible industry states is denoted by S ⊆ XN.
At the beginning of period t, all incumbents engage in competition in the product
market and simultaneously set their prices. This stage is static in the sense that
firms have choices only involving their short-run production factors such as labor
and material, but cannot alter dynamic variables such as capital, productivity, and
ownership. From production, incumbent i realizes profit p¯ii(St) in period t.
7
In the next stage, incumbent firms are confronted with exit and privatization
decisions. The decision-making processes differ drastically between private firms and
SOEs. In particular, a private incumbent observes an idiosyncratic scrap value φit
that is centered at φ¯ and i.i.d across different firms and time, and decides on whether
to exit given its own and all others' current state, St. On the other hand, even
though SOEs also observe a scrap value, they do not have control upon exit. Instead,
the government makes the exit decision for them according to their current states.
If an incumbent firm, either state-owned or private, is exiting, it earns the current
static profit plus scrap value. I use χit = 1 to represent an exit decision, and χit = 0
otherwise. In addition to exit, the government also decides on whether to privatize an
SOE based on a probability that is a function of the SOE's and all other firms' state
variables, St. If privatized, an SOE will appear to be a private firm in the following
period, ρit+1 = 1. Otherwise, it will remain an SOE, ρit+1 = 0. I assume that, private
7Unlike most papers on this subject, I denote a firm's profit from static competition by p¯i, instead
of pi. The reason is that I reserve symbol piit for the firm i's net earnings in period t. A firm's net
earnings is the amount of profit p¯i left after netting out its investment cost, capital adjustment cost,
entry cost, and exit cost (if any).
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firm will never be bought by governments because I find very few firms in my data
set that changed their ownership type from private to state-owned. For those private
firms that did become state-owned, I am not certain about the accuracy of such
developments, and it is very likely that there was confusion about their ownership
status during transition.
Upon remaining in competition, an incumbent has the option to invest in its own
physical capital, kit, to maximize the sum of its discounted expected future values.
Because explaining firms' investment behavior is not the focus of my model, I assume
a deterministic investment process, that a firm's physical capital in the following
year is the sum of its current capital (after adjustment to depreciation) and new
investment.8
Meanwhile, there is a group of potential entrants trying to make a decision about
entry. To enter the market, an entrant has to pay a fixed entry cost κ and draw
its initial state se = (ωe, ke, ρe) from a set Xe ⊆ X. Specifically, a potential entrant
decides to enter if the discounted sum of its expected future values is higher than
today's entry cost. I assume entry takes one period to realize due to a time-consuming
preparation process. it = 1 means the potential entrant i decides to enter at time t,
and it = 0 otherwise. With some minor assumptions, the number of firms entering a
market at state St is a Poisson random variable with mean M(St). At the very end
of this period, continuing incumbent firms and new entrants constitute the market in
the next period St+1, and the stages introduced above repeat all over again.
To summarize, the timing of events in period t is shown with the bullet points
below. Additionally, a graphic representation of the game (a game tree) can be found
in Figure 2·1.
1. Incumbent firms compete in the product market and realize profit p¯ii(St) through
8Notice that the physical capital mentioned here is not logged.
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production.
2. Both private and state-owned incumbent firms privately observe an idiosyncratic
scrap value φit.
• Private Firms: decide whether to exit or continue as a private firm.
• SOEs: obey governments' command to be either terminated (exit), or
privatized, or left untouched.
3. If continuing, they make physical capital investment decision.
4. Potential entrants decide on whether to enter in the next period based on the
current market state St.
5. Exiting takes place and the firms that are leaving receive their scrap values.
6. SOEs that are chosen to be privatized go through ownership transfer.
7. Continuing firms realize their investment outcomes, as well as their new draws
of productivity.
8. New entrants enter, pay a fixed entry cost κ and draw their initial state, (ωe,
ke, ρe), from the set Xe.
In the following subsections, I describe these stages in detail in the context of my
structural model.
2.3.2 Static Competition
How incumbents interact with each other in the production market is exactly same
as my static competition model described in section 1.4. The model specification fol-
lows tightly from Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2015). The key of their method
is that marginal cost does not depend on the level of total output a firm produces.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the independence between marginal cost and
total output simplifies the optimal pricing function, provides a tractable relationship
between price and revenue, and in addition assists in the model's identification.
2.3.3 Transition of States
In this subsection, I present the modeling for state transition. There are three
state variables for each firm: log real capital kit, ownership ρit, and the structural
productivity term ωit.
Transition of Capital
The first state kit evolves in a simple fashion. I assume investment in physical
capital has a deterministic outcome, which implies that a firm i's future real capital is
the sum of its current capital (adjusted by depreciation) and new investment without
any uncertainties. I follow the convention to define capital letter K as actual level of
capital (Kit = exp(kit) for all firm i and all time t), and define I as actual level of
investment (Iit = exp(iit) for all firm i and all time t). Thus the capital evolution can
be expressed by the following mathematical equations,
Kit+1 = (1− δ)Kit + Iit, (2.1)
where δ is depreciation rate.
To adjust a firm's physical capital stock, there are two costs involved: a capital
adjustment cost and a total investment cost. I use c˜(kit, kit+1) to represent the capital
adjustment cost and specify the following functional form,
c˜(kit, kit+1) = Ca
[
Iit
Kit
]2
Kit
= Ca
[
Kit+1 − (1− δ)Kit
Kit
]2
Kit,
(2.2)
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which is a way of saying that adjustment costs increase with (1) the amount of
investment per unit of capital and (2) the total size of capital stock.9 Total investment
cost can be calculated by multiplying the amount of investment by per unit investment
cost. As described in section 1.2.2, SOEs are preferred by the credit market because
they are backed by governments and less risky for investors. Comparatively speaking,
private firms are on their own and bare more risk, and probably find it more difficult
to borrow the funds they need. In accordance with these circumstances, I expect to
see a lower per unit investment cost for SOEs than for private firms. Therefore, I
model per unit investment costs to be different for different types of firms and denote
these costs for private and state-owned firms by CPK and C
S
K , respectively.
Having disparate per unit investment costs among firms with different ownership
is an important and distinctive feature of my model. The effects of reforms on firms'
productivity may well be overestimated if it is not incorporated into the model frame-
work. In a typical dynamic model, a firm decides on the amount of capital goods to
invest according to its observed current productivity in order to maximize the sum of
a stream of discounted future values. Investment policies are going to be dramatically
different for different types of firms if the unit prices that they have to pay are not
the same. A firm facing a cheaper investment cost is less selective and able to choose
a wider range of investment levels. Most of the time, it over-invests and purchases
capital goods that are not very productive at the moment. Hence, it is predictable
that its calculated productivities look unimpressive. However, these numbers do not
reflect the firm's intrinsic efficiency because, if easy access to loans is not granted, it
probably postpones such non-performing investments and focuses on improving the
real productivity of its existing capital instead. Thus, the potential productivity of
SOEs is not as deplorable as one might think, and the outstanding performance of
private firms compared to SOEs may be exaggerated.
9This functional form strictly follows Xu (2008).
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Another way to understand the importance of the difference in investment costs
is to think about how we compare firms' productivities among two groups of firms
with different characteristics. Usually, we divide the firms into groups according
to the characteristics we want to investigate and compute an average measure of
productivity within each group, which can be used to examine which group of firms
is more efficient. In order to derive more accurate average numbers, we can weight
productivities by firm size or total amount of capital in specific. Because of their
cheaper investment costs, SOEs are inclined to grow bigger in size and therefore
are given the heaviest weight when calculating average productivity. Therefore, the
inefficiency in state-owned firms is overstated if we overlook the difference in input
prices.
Transition of Ownership
The second state ρit evolves very differently for SOEs and private firms. As
mentioned above, private firms are assumed to be private in the next period if not
exiting, whereas SOEs can be privatized by governments. In other words, private firms
cannot change their ownership, but SOEs can. There is actually another implicit state
that specifies whether a firm exits the market. Exit decisions also are made in ways
that are different for different types of firms. A private firm is capable of making its
own exit decision χit, whereas an SOE has to follow governments' orders.
Notice that modeling governments as social welfare maximizers would be unprac-
tical, because firstly I don't have a concrete idea about how Chinese governments
measure social welfare, and secondly there are no relevant data to detect govern-
ments' concerns. Therefore, I model the government decision problem in reduced-
form. Specifically, I model governments' actions as probabilities of exit and priva-
tization that depend on firms' states. F (ρit+1 = 0 | ωit, kit) is the probability of
SOE i not being selected for privatization in period t; F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit) is the
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probability of it being privatized. The probability of it being closed is 1− F (ρit+1 =
0 | ωit, kit) − F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit), which is saying that, if an SOE is neither a
state-owned or private firm in the next period, it must have left the market.
Transition of Productivity
Finally, as presented in the end of section 1.4 of my previous chapter, a firm's
total productivity state evolves as
ωit+1 = G(ωit, ρit) + εit+1
= α0 + α1ωit + α2ω
2
it + α3ω
3
it + α4ρit + εit+1.
(2.3)
The function G(·) is the conditional expectation of future productivity and εit is
a zero mean stochastic shock. This functional form carries some very important
information about productivity evolution. The details are discussed in section 1.4
of my first chapter. Interested readers are welcome to refer to previous chapter for
further information.
To summarize, how each of these three state variables changes completely defines
how a firm evolves. In turn, the evolution of market condition is also defined. One
of the aspects that separates my model from others is that I allow one of the state
variables, ownership ρ, to be altered by a party that is not a strategic player of the
game, in this case governments.10 As we will see in my empirical model in section
2.4, this treatment offers great opportunities to estimate complicated problems in a
relatively simple fashion.
10I do not recognize governments as a player in the game because they do not interact with other
firms strategically and their behaviors are completely summarized by a set of probabilities that are
predetermined.
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2.3.4 Incumbent's Maximization Problem
As we know from the related literature, the full set of dynamic Nash equilibria
is unbounded and complex and thus I need to impose some restrictions in order to
derive a tractable model. Following Ericson and Pakes (1995), I focus on anony-
mous, symmetric, and Markovian strategies. In particular, all firms adopt the same
strategies, and they make decisions conditioning on their current state vector and
private shocks. In period t, incumbent firm i makes exit, production, and investment
decisions, collectively denoted by ait. Thus, its strategy, denoted by σi(St, ξit), is a
mapping from its states and shocks to actions,
σi : (St, ξit) −→ ait,
where ξit represents the firm's private information about its costs of exit and invest-
ment.
To present the value functions, there are more notations to be introduced. θ is a
vector of payoff-relevant parameters and β is the discount factor. Recall that firms
with different ownership have separate forms of value functions. The value function
for a private firm i at time t is
V (ωit, kit, ρit = 1, S−it;σ, θ, φit, ξit) = p¯i(ωit, kit, ρit, S−it)
+max{Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1 = 1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit), φit}, (2.4)
69
and the value function for a state-owned enterprise (SOE) i at time t is
V (ωit,kit, ρit = 0, S−it;σ, θ, φit, ξit) = p¯i(ωit, kit, ρit, S−it)
+F (ρit+1 = 0 | ωit, kit) · Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1 = 0, S−it;σ, θ, ξit)
+F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit) · Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1 = 1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit)
+(1− F (ρit+1 = 0 | ωit, kit)− F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit)) · φit
(2.5)
where the continuation value function Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit) is defined as
Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit)
= maximize
kit+1
{− [ρit+1CPK + (1− ρit+1)CSK] (exp(kit+1)− (1− δ)exp(kit))
− c˜(kit, kit+1)
+ β
∫
ωit+1
ES−it+1,φit+1,ξit+1V (ωit+1, kit+1, ρit+1, S−it+1;σ, θ, φit+1, ξit+1)dG}. (2.6)
In each period, both incumbent SOEs and private firms produce goods and re-
alize profits p¯iit from selling them on the market. Then private firms decide on
whether to exit (and then get scrap value φit) or continue as a private firm (and
earn continuation value Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1 = 1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit)), while, on the other
hand, SOEs undergo economic reform led by governments and may end up in one
of the following three conditions: (1) no change (and obtain continuation value
Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1 = 0, S−it;σ, θ, ξit)) with probability F (ρit+1 = 0 | ωit, kit), (2)
privatized (and earn continuation value Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1 = 1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit)) with
probability F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit), and (3) terminated (and only get scrap value φit)
with probability 1− F (ρit+1 = 0 | ωit, kit)− F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit).
The continuation value Vc(ωit, kit, ρit, ρit+1, S−it;σ, θ, ξit) is how much a firm is
worth once it realizes its static profit and decides to continue in the market. Each
firm chooses a physical investment level iit (which is equivalent to choosing the next
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period physical capital level kit+1, since capital evolves in a deterministic fashion)
to maximize the sum of the following three components. The first component is
negative total investment cost, which is the product of per unit investment cost, CPK
or CSK depending on its ownership the following year, and total amount of investment
exp(kit+1)−(1−δ)exp(kit). The second component is the negative capital adjustment
cost c˜(kit, kit+1) defined in equation (2.2). Lastly, I have the expected value of the firm
starting from the next period, V (ωit+1, kit+1, ρit+1, S−it+1;σ, θ, φit+1, ξit+1), discounted
by time preference β. It might not be obvious that continuation value depends on
ownership at time t, ρit. Notice that calculating expected value in future involves
integrating over all possible future productivities as shown in Equation (2.6), and a
firm's future productivity depends not only on current productivity, but also current
ownership type as indicated in Equation (2.3).
2.3.5 Entrant's Problem
The potential entrants are ex-ante identical. Upon entry, they draw their initial
endowment of state se = (ωe, ke, ρe) from a distribution Xe ⊆ X. The value function
for a potential entrant is
Ve(St;σ, θ)
= βES−it+1
∫
se
Eξit+1V (ωe, ke, ρe, S−it+1;σ, θ, ξit+1)dXe | St
 . (2.7)
This equation reflects the fact that a potential entrant's entry decision is made in
period t but it only starts producing in the next period t + 1. In other words, it
takes one period for an entrant to prepare and become an incumbent once the entry
decision has been made. Thus, an entrant's value is simply the expected value of an
incumbent at time t+ 1 discounted by time preference β.
Since new entrants furthermore have to pay a fixed entry cost κ, a potential entrant
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is entering (it = 1) if
Ve(St;σ, θ) ≥ κ, (2.8)
which is saying that the firm finds entering worth a try only if its expected value can
cover the entry cost. In addition, following Xu (2008), the number of firms entering
a market with state St can be modeled by a Poisson random variable with mean
M(St).
11 New entrants are important players in the market, in the sense that they
create intense competition with incumbents, drive low-productivity firms out, and
keep the technology used in the industry moving forward.
2.3.6 Equilibrium
As mentioned above, I restrict myself to anonymous, symmetric, and Markovian
strategies in order to obtain a tractable equilibrium. I use σ without a subscript to
represent a set of policy functions that describes all players' production, investment,
entry, and exit behavior, σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σNt}. σi is the strategy of firm i and
σ−i is the strategy of all firms other than i, such that σ = {σi, σ−i}. I follow the
convention of using a star (∗) symbol for equilibrium policies and therefore σ∗i is the
Symmetric Markov Perfect strategy for firm i. Following Ericson and Pakes (1995)
and Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007), a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
(MPNE) requires
1. each firm's strategy profile to be optimal given the strategy profiles of all its
competitors:
V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, θ, ξit)
≥ V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i, θ, ξit), (2.9)
11Please consult Xu (2008) for a simple enter model that justifies the use of a Poisson random
variable.
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for all firms i, all private shocks ξit, all states (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it) ∈ XN, and all
possible alternative strategies σ˜i, and
2. entrants to satisfy the zero profit condition such that,
Ve(St;σ, θ) ≤ κ (2.10)
with equality if the mass of entrants M(St) > 0.
In the empirical exercise below, I note that taking integration over firms' private
information does not affect the validity of the first MPNE condition (equation (2.9)),12
so that
V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, θ) ≥ V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i, θ) (2.11)
where V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ) = EξitV (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ, ξit).13 This will be the
condition used in the empirical model to identify the firms' dynamic variables. Work-
ing with the expected equilibrium condition (equation (2.11)) spares us from the extra
hurdle of making sure the equilibrium conditions are satisfied for all possible private
shocks ξit when searching for underlying parameter values. Finally, as discussed in
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010), there exists at least one pure strategy equilib-
rium by introducing private information over the discrete actions in settings similar to
the one presented here, as long as the best response curves are continuous. However,
I also notice that there is no guarantee on the uniqueness of equilibrium. These issues
are discussed in detail along with my empirical model in section 2.4.
12I adopt this trick from Ryan (2012).
13Notice that this expected value function is defined in exactly the same way as the value function
in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) (BBL hereafter), but equation (2.4) and (2.5) are not. The
difference is actually not about the obvious fact that the value function defined in BBL is written
as the summation of an infinite stream of payoffs instead of a Bellman equation. In fact, the real
difference is that the value functions in BBL do not depend on the current private shock ξit while
mine (equations (2.4) and (2.5)) do. Thus, if we take the one extra step of taking expectations over
current private shocks ξit, we have a value function that is exactly same as in BBL. The reason why
I keep ξit as one of the arguments in equations (2.4) and (2.5) is that those value functions are in
Bellman equation form, which looks unconventional if I integrate over ξit.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the model, we need to overcome two fundamental problems. First,
estimating a dynamic model such as this one can be very computationally demanding.
For example, to use maximum-likelihood approaches, it is necessary for us to compute
an equilibrium for every guess of the parameter vector, which can be unpractical and
may take years for a regular computer to run the program (Benkard (2004)). Second,
multiple equilibria may exist since firms strategically interact with each other. In
particular, each firm's actions have influence over the aggregate market condition
(summarized by a price index PIt), based on which other firms decide what to do.
The challenges of having multiple equilibria are twofold: (1) it is necessary to compute
all possible equilibria, and (2) it is difficult to define which equilibrium is played in
the data (Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010)).
To circumvent these two problems, I adopt the empirical method proposed by Ba-
jari, Benkard, and Levin (2007; BBL). Briefly, BBL is a two-stage estimation process,
of which the first stage flexibly solves for agents' policy functions and state transitions,
and the second stage recovers the dynamic parameters from the equilibrium condi-
tions. The intuition of BBL is straightforward and easy to understand. The actions of
agents, which are assumed to be generated from equilibrium policies, are observable to
us from the data. Therefore, estimating such actions using reduced-form regressions
with flexible functional forms recovers their optimal policies no matter what policies
they use. Then I can use the model's equilibrium conditions to find the parameters
of the underlying model that justify the estimated policies in the first step.
Specifically in this application, I start by estimating the equilibrium policy func-
tions governing entry, exit, and investment, (σi), along with governments' privati-
zation and termination decisions (F (ρit+1 | ωit, kit)), and the product market profit
function (p¯iit). The key to achieving an accurate estimation in this step is to impose
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as little structure as possible on the functions used. I mechanically characterize what
firms do given their state vectors. In other words, I carry out reduced-form regres-
sions of firms' actions on their states with functional forms that are made as flexible
as possible. In the second step, I impose the definition of MPNE in equation (2.11)
on the recovered policy functions. Given the policies estimated in the previous step,
it is possible to construct the expected value function of using an optimal strategy,
V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, θ). Similarly, I can also find the expected value of using
any alternative strategies, V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i, θ). The MPNE condition holds
if the value of using the equilibrium strategy is larger than that of using other al-
ternatives. Thus I can calculate a penalty value whenever the equilibrium condition
is violated for a sufficiently rich set of alternative strategies and states. Ultimately,
the parameters θ that minimize the accumulated penalties are the optimal ones that
make sense of the estimated policies.
As mentioned above, BBL is able to solve two common problems associated with
this type of estimation. Once I have presented more details about my specific es-
timation process, we can see how BBL works to deal with these problems. One of
the greatest advantages of this approach is that simple regressions are much easier
to run than computing the equilibrium using the nested fixed-point maximum likeli-
hood algorithm (Rust (1988)), which can be time consuming for a model like this.14
Furthermore, being able to estimate firms' policies with simple regressions is also
the reason why BBL can deal with the multiple equilibria problem. More than one
equilibrium may exist, and firms in the data set are functioning according to one or
another of them. However, the optimal policies estimated using reduced-form regres-
14In fact, even if I adopt BBL, the computational burden can still be insuperable. For example,
it may be necessary in some models to forward-simulate value functions for each set of parameters
θ, and searching over each possible θ can be very time consuming. Luckily, in this application, I
am able to linearize the profit function such that forward simulation needs to be done only once.
Details are presented in section 2.4.2
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sions in the first stage must be the equilibrium policies that are in fact followed by
the firms. Therefore, I actually know which equilibrium is played and can successfully
sidestep the need to compute all possible equilibria.15
2.4.1 Step One: Estimation of Static Profits And Policy Functions
In the first stage, I estimate the static profits that accrue to firms in each period,
investigate on what criteria governments' privatization and termination decisions are
based, and characterize firms' entry, exit, and investment behavior conditional on
their state variables.
Static Profits and Productivity Evolution
I start my estimation with the static profit function and productivity evolution
process. Since the static competition part of my dynamic model is identical to the
model used in my first chapter, I am able to adopt the same estimation strategy, as
well as its results. As mentioned earlier, it is important to explain why I estimate
productivity evolution together with the profit function, rather than working on them
separately as for all other state variables. The short answer is that, unlike ownership
and capital level, productivity is unobservable to econometricians. More specifically,
the evolutions of ownership and capital, which are observed state variables, can be
estimated by reduced-form regressions, but firms' productivity evolution function
(equation (2.3)) must be estimated with their revenue function, which implicitly de-
fines unobserved productivities using firms' observed data. To summarize, the key
15To make sure the multiple equilibria issue is properly dealt with, we often have to make some
other necessary assumptions. For example, Ryan (2012) assumes that the same equilibrium is
played in all markets. This is to prevent the possibility that different markets converge into different
equilibria, and to ensure that the estimated policies derived from the pulled dataset are able to
accurately characterize the equilibrium. In fact, it may not even be possible to estimate a distinct
set of policies for each market since there are not sufficient data available. However, in particular for
this application, there is only one monopolistically competitive market rather than several different
ones in different locations, and the estimated policy functions surely can characterize firms' behaviors
if I make the same assumption as in Ryan (2012).
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parameters to be estimated in this subsection are the parameters of cost function (βk
and βρ), the parameters of productivity evolution (α0, α1, . . . , α4), and the elasticity
of demand (η). All the estimation details are presented in section 1.5 of the previous
chapter.
Privatization and Exit Policy Function
As mentioned in my theoretical model, private firms decide by themselves whether
to exit, but SOEs take privatization and termination orders from governments. While
private firms are not allowed to change their ownership type, SOEs can be transformed
into private firms if selected by governments to go through privatization. Both pri-
vate firms and SOEs can exit the market, but they have to go through two different
channels; private firms exit because they are not profitable, but SOEs stop operat-
ing because governments believe it is better to terminate them. In the rest of this
subsection, I consider the exit and privatization policies of these two types of firms
separately, beginning with private firms.
I first pull all private observations together and then define an exit dummy variable
χit, which equals 1 if a private firm i is present in period t but disappears from the
dataset at time t + 1. The exit decision by private firms is modeled by a logistic
regression,
logit(F (χit | ωit, kit, S−it)) = βe0 + βe1ωit + βe2kit + βe3PIt. (2.12)
Notice that I use PIt to control for current market conditions so that I do not have
to know all other firms' states. In the results section below, I also adopt other model
specifications for comparison. Once I obtain a set of estimates, a probability of exit
can be calculated for each firm given the firm's state vector.
For SOEs, I collect all state-owned observations and define a categorical variable
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Yit which equals 1 if SOE i becomes privately owned in period t + 1, equals 2 if it
disappears in period t+1, and equals 3 if it is still an SOE in the next period. Hence,
the definition of variable Yit can be summarized as,
• Yit = 1 if privatized,
• Yit = 2 if terminated, and
• Yit = 3 if unchanged.
I use a multinomial logistic regression to characterize governments' decisions,
log
Pr(Yit = 1)
Pr(Yit = 3)
= βp0 + β
p
1ωit + β
p
2kit + β
p
3PIt
log
Pr(Yit = 2)
Pr(Yit = 3)
= βt0 + β
t
1ωit + β
t
2kit + β
t
3PIt,
(2.13)
where Pr(·) represents the probability of the event in parentheses. In this regression,
I treat unchanged SOEs as my reference group to which the other two groups are com-
pare. Later in the results section, the estimates of several alternative specifications
are also presented for the purpose of comparison.
Investment Policy Function
I would like to estimate firms' investment policy using a function that is as flexible
as possible. In order to do that, I regress the log of firms' capital in the next period
on a third-order polynomial of their current states,
kit+1 = β
k
0 + β
k
1kit + β
k
2ωit + β
k
3ρit + β
k
4PIt + β
k
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k
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2
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2
itρit + νit (2.14)
I cannot include all possible terms in the regression because the regressors may form
a deficient matrix that could affect the accuracy of my estimates. Different versions
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of specification are tested and their results are also presented in a later section.16 In
fact, as will be discussed in a moment, it is important for the model to contain up to
at least the third-order terms in this application, because this ensures that the growth
rate (or the derivative) of the regression line decreases in relation to firms' capital
level, such that a simulated firm could never be equipped with an infinite amount of
capital.
Entry Policy Function
In theory, a potential entrant makes its entry decision according to the current
market state St. However, I simplify this process in my empirical model because
(1) there are only a few different market states available (only 10 in this case) for
me to find accurate estimates, and (2) I believe that most entries during my sample
years in China are policy driven instead of market driven.17 Hence, even though I
still assume that the mass of entrants is a Poission random variable, it is invariant to
different market states. The mean and variance are estimated by the average number
of entrants calculated from my data set.18
Upon entry, a new entrant draws its initial endowment of state se = (ωe, ke, ρe)
from a distribution Xe ⊆ X. To estimate the distribution Xe, I first calculate the
percentages of state-owned entrants in each sample year, and the overall average is
the estimated probability of an entrant being state-owned. The distribution of initial
capital is estimated separately for SOEs and private firms. To achieve maximum
16In the empirical results section, I adopt several different models for comparison. I also replace
the dependent variable with the level of investment and the investment per unit of capital. In
addition, I test a much simpler linear model. Furthermore, any combination of these changes should
also be anticipated.
17At the end of 1997s, there were mass layoffs, which created a rapid rise in the unemployment
rate. Most unemployed workers had not saved enough for retirement and had to find alternative
sources of income. Opening a small business became one of the most viable options, and sometimes
the only option. Therefore, many new businesses during that period were actually not carefully
planned and their openings had little to do with the market state at that moment.
18As a reminder, the mean of a Poisson distribution is equal to its variance.
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flexibility, I adopt a nonparametric method. In particular, I apply a kernel density
estimation with a normal kernel smoothing function and optimal bandwidth for nor-
mal density. Likewise, the distribution of entrants' productivity is estimated in a very
similar way to that of initial capital.
2.4.2 Step Two: Estimation of Structural Parameters
In the second step, I try to find the values of the dynamic parameters that make
sense of the policy functions found in the previous step. Theoretically, the actual
strategies employed by participating firms must be the ones played in the equilibrium
of my model, which generate the highest present values than any other alternatives.
Thus I can impose optimality conditions defined in MPNE on these recovered strate-
gies to estimate the dynamic parameters.
Estimating Value Function
I define piit to be firm i's net earnings in period t.
19 A firm's net earnings in period
t equals its static profit p¯iit netting out its investment cost, capital adjustment cost,
entry cost, and exit cost if there are any in this period. Notice that, unlike static
profit p¯iit, net earnings piit depends on firms' strategy profile, dynamic parameters and
private shocks. Mathematically, for an incumbent i,
piit = pi(ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ, ξit) = p¯i(ωit, kit, ρit, S−it)
− [ρit+1CPK + (1− ρit+1)CSK] (exp(iit))− Ca [ exp(iit)exp(kit)
]2
exp(kit)
+ χitφit, (2.15)
where iit, χit and ρit+1 are generated from investment policy, exit policy, and govern-
ment privatization and termination policy, which depend on firms' current states and
19Ryan (2012) refers to net earnings as a per-period payoff function.
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the state of the entire market. Then a firm's expected value function (equations (2.4)
and (2.5) integrated over current private shock ξit) can be rewritten as,
V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ) = E
[ ∞∑
ι=t
βι−tpi(ωiι, kiι, ρiι, S−iι;σ, θ, ξiι) | St
]
, (2.16)
where the expectation is over current and future values of private shocks ξiι and states
Sι.
20.
I now show how forward simulation can be used to estimate firms' expected value
functions for any given strategy profiles σ (including the equilibrium profile σ∗ and
any alternatives σ˜) and any given parameters θ = {CPK , CSK , Ca, φ¯} ∈ Θ. Following
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), the simulation steps can be summarized as: 21
1. Specify the selected starting state of the market St = S and draw private shocks
ξit for each firm i.
2. Calculate static profit p¯i(ωit, kit, ρit, S−it) for each firm i.
3. Calculate each firm's actions ait (which include investment i, privatization ρ, and
exit χ) according to its own policies σi(St, ξit) and governments' privatization
and termination policies derived in the first stage.
4. Given the actions calculated from the previous step, update each firm's states
for the next period, (ωit+1, kit+1, ρit+1).
5. Draw the mass of entrants M from the estimated Poisson distribution. Each
20Note that this definition of the value function is exactly same as the one in BBL, not only because
it is written as the summation of an infinite stream of payoffs, but also because it is integrated over
current private shocks ξit. Furthermore, I only have to write one value function for both private
firms and SOEs, where in equations (2.4) and (2.5) I have two different value functions for them.
The reason behind this is that, if value functions are written as the summation of a stream of net
earnings instead of in a Bellman equation form, the differences between the two types of firms are
fully captured by their ownership dummy ρit+1 and exit decision χit.
21The procedure is in fact a bit different from the one in BBL, mainly because I have firms' exit
and entry actions explicitly written out.
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new entrant realizes its initial state se = (ωe, ke, ρe) drawn from the estimated
distribution Xe.
6. The market state of the next period, St+1, is updated according to the informa-
tion on incumbents' new states and incoming new entrants.
7. Repeat steps 1 to 6 with new market state St+1 for T periods. The value function
for each firm can be calculated as the sum of all discounted net earnings in these
T periods.
In fact, the discounted sum of a firm's net earnings per period gives us just one
possible value of this firm. Small differences in private shocks may change its value to
some extent. Hence, I do the same steps above for Ns times, and take the average as
an estimate of V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ), which I denote as Vˆ (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ).22 In
practice, the number of simulations Ns is set to 100. The starting state S is chosen to
be the market condition of China's Electronic and Telecommunications Industry in
1997, the first year of my sample period. The number of periods simulated forward,
T , is set to 300. Most papers that adopt a similar strategy do not simulate more
than 300 periods into the future because (1) most firms do not survive that many
years, and (2) the discount factor for a year more than 300 periods away from now is
so small that the net earning in that period is almost irrelevant to us today.23 I also
follow Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) to set an annual discounting rate β at 0.95
and an annual rate of depreciation δ at 0.06.
However, the forward simulation procedure introduced above is much more dif-
ficult to perform than to explain. As will be shown in later subsections, in order
to find the optimal parameters θ∗ using equilibrium conditions, I have to implement
a procedure that scans over many different parameter values. For each set of these
22Note that this value function does not depend on private shock ξit because it is the expected
value function over private shock.
23Ryan (2012) simulates 200 periods.
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parameters, I have to repeat forward simulations for all states even if the same simula-
tion draws are used throughout. Therefore, finding the optimal set of parameters can
be a time-consuming process. Luckily, the net earnings can be linearized to reduce
necessary computations and the details are the focus of the next subsection.
Exploiting Linearity
The net earnings function (equation (2.15)) can be written as a linear function in
parameters θ,
piit = pi(ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ, ξit) = [p¯iit, ζit] · [1, θ]′ , (2.17)
where
ζit =
[
−exp(iit) · ρit+1,−exp(iit) · (1− ρit+1),−
[
exp(iit)
exp(kit)
]2
exp(kit), χit
]
θ =
[
CPK , C
S
K , Ca, φ¯
]
.
Then the value function defined in equation (2.16) can be further transformed into,
V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ, θ) = E
[ ∞∑
ι=t
βι−t [p¯iit, ζit] | St
]
· [1, θ]′
= Wit · [1, θ]′ ,
(2.18)
where I define Wit = W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ) = E [
∑∞
ι=t β
ι−t [p¯iit, ζit] | St]24. Again, the
expectation in the equation above is over current and future values of private shocks
ξiι and states Sι.
What makes this form of value function much easier to work with is that Wit is
independent of unknown parameters θ. In the next subsection, I explain in detail the
need to forward-simulate value functions for each set of parameters θ when trying to
24Wit is a five dimensional vector, Wit = {W 1it,W 2it, . . . ,W 5it}.
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find the estimates θ∗. If the value function is in fact linear in unknown parameters as
in equation (2.18), we only have to forward-simulate once to get Wit, and the value
functions for any set of parameters θ are easily calculated by multiplying θ by Wit.
Imposing Equilibrium Conditions
Now I make use of the model's equilibrium conditions (equation (2.11)) to find
the underlying model parameters θ∗. Recall that a strategy profile σ∗ constitutes a
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if,
V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, θ) ≥ V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i, θ),
for all firms i, all states (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it) ∈ XN, and all possible alternative strategies
σ˜i. Define
g(`; θ) = V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, θ)− V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i, θ), (2.19)
where ` ∈ L indexes a particular combination of (i, (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it), σ˜i). Notice that
the function g(`; θ) must be positive if the equilibrium condition is to hold for the
specified ` = (i, (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it), σ˜i); otherwise, the firm i with states (ωit, kit, ρit)
violates the optimal condition because playing the alternative strategy σ˜i in the mar-
ket St = (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it) is in fact better than equilibrium strategy σ∗i . With the
procedure presented in section 2.4.2, function g(`; θ) can be estimated by forward-
simulating the value functions of firm i using strategy σ∗i and σ˜i,
gˆ(`; θ) = Vˆ (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, θ)− Vˆ (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i, θ). (2.20)
I draw {`1, `2, . . . , `Nl} from LNl , where Nl stands for the total number of equilibrium
conditions I consider, and minimize a measure of average penalties resulting from
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violating equilibrium conditions to get the parameters θ∗,
θ∗ = argmin
θ∈Θ
1
Nl
Nl∑
k=1
(min{gˆ(`k; θ), 0})2. (2.21)
Please see Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) for the prerequisite assumptions en-
suring the existence of a minimizer to the problem above, and they also specify the
sufficient conditions for this estimator to be consistent and asymptotically normal.
In practice, there are almost infinite number of different ways to draw {`1, `2, . . . , `Nl}.
Specifically for this application, I first take all firms in 1997 as well as their states to be
my draws of firms and states. I then generate a set of alternative strategies by adding
an error term drawn from a standard normal distribution to my estimated investment
and exit policy functions. For each combination of firm and state, I randomly select
10 alternative strategies for it. Thus the total number of selected combinations Nl is
10 times the number of observations in 1997.
Let us not revisit the linearity property of the firms' value function and discuss its
advantages. I substitute the linearized value function equation (2.18) into equation
(2.19) to get,
g(`; θ) =
[
W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i)−W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i)
]
· [1, θ]′ . (2.22)
As can be seen from this equation, I do not have to recompute separate outcome
paths for each different set of parameters. No matter what value θ takes, the term
W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i)−W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i)
does not change. Therefore I save considerable computational time by simulating
only once to get W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) − W (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it; σ˜i, σ∗−i) for all Nl
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combinations of (i, (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it), σ˜i). Then searching for optimal parameter values
θ∗ does not involve any forward simulations.
Unfortunately, even running the same simulation twice may give us different firm
behaviors, different market evolutions, and in turn different estimates of the param-
eters. Therefore, simply solving equation (2.21) once may not result in the best
estimates. Instead, I solve equation (2.21) multiple times and report the empirical
distributions of all those estimates along with some statistics of the distribution, for
example, the mean, the standard error, and the quantiles.
This concludes the discussion of my empirical model. To summarize, I present in
this section a two-step empirical method to estimate the parameters of my theoret-
ical model. In the first step, I estimate firms' static profit, productivity evolution,
entry and exit decisions, investment behavior, and governments' privatization and
termination decisions. In the second step, I find the optimal dynamic parameters by
minimizing the penalties of firms violating equilibrium conditions. The results of my
estimation are discussed in the next section.
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, I present the estimates of my model. I start with the results of
my first-stage estimation, including the estimated static profit function and firms'
policy functions. For each policy, I adopt several different models and the estimates
are compared with each other in order to find the most reasonable ones to use in the
second stage of the estimation. After that, I discuss my estimates of the dynamic
parameters from the second stage.
2.5.1 Static Profit and Productivity Evolution
The key parameters to be estimated for the static profit function p¯i are fixed time
effects γ1, γ2, . . . , γ10, elasticity of demand η, cost elasticity of capital βk, and the
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difference in marginal costs between private and state-owned firms βρ. To characterize
productivity evolution (equation (2.3)), I estimate its parameters α0, α1, . . . , α4. As
mentioned earlier, the static competition model, as well as its estimation and results,
are identical to the one used in my previous chapter. Therefore, all results have been
presented in Table 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8, as well as in Figure 1·4, 1·5, and 1·3. The detailed
discussion of the results can be found in section 1.6.
2.5.2 Private Firms' Exit Decisions
Private firms decide whether to exit based on their current states (equation (2.12)).
Their exit policy function can be estimated with logistic regressions, and I use three
models for this exercise. Real capital and productivity enter the policy function
linearly in model 1. Model 2 adds a market price index PIt. I also include second- and
third-order terms in model 3 for a more flexible specification. I report my estimates
of all three models in Table 2.2 and the numbers are very similar among them.
We have negative coefficients on real capital, indicating that the larger a firm is,
the more competitive it becomes and the less likely it exits. The odds ratio of one
more unit of kit is 0.882 (e
−0.125) in Models 1 and 2, and 0.840 (e−0.174) in Model
3. The coefficients on productivity also are negative, indicating that more efficient
firms are more likely to survive the competition and stay in the industry. This result
conforms to our common sense and is quite easy to interpret. The odds ratio of one
more unit of ωit is 0.015 (e
−4.188 and e−4.187) in Models 1 and 2, and 0.001 (e−6.532)
in Model 3. In addition, it seems like exit decisions are mainly based on firms' own
states, but not the state of the entire market, as the coefficient on the market price
index is not significant.
For all the models, I perform a coefficient test, which is in fact an F test on the
null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero except for the intercept term. The
P-values reported below the test statistics indicate that at least one coefficient in
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each model is non-zero. In addition, a likelihood-ratio test answers the question of
whether the chosen model fits significantly better than a model with only a constant.
The results again are significant in all my models, indicating that they have some
power to explain the underlying data. In the second stage where I simulate firms'
value functions, I use the results from Model 1, because it is simple, captures all the
features of the data, and gives us good results for the dynamic parameters.
2.5.3 SOEs' Exit and Privatization Decisions
In this section, I turn my attention to SOEs. I would like to know how governments
decide on the destiny of SOEs based on their states. I estimate the parameters in
equation (2.13), and report them in Table 2.3. There are two regressors, kit and ωit,
in Model 1. I add price index PIt in Model 2. In the last model, I also include squared
terms as regressors.
First of all, all three models show positive effects of productivity on the chances
of privatization but negative effects on termination. This indicates that, for two
SOEs of the same size, the more productive one is more likely to be privatized,
and the less efficient one has a higher chance of being terminated. These results
reflect a very important principle based on which governments make reform decisions
during China's transformation of the economic system. Efficient SOEs are more likely
to survive once they are no longer receiving governments' subsidies, and, therefore,
privatizing them becomes a sound strategy. In contrast, inefficient SOEs struggle
even with governments on their back, and they are unlikely to do well once privatized.
Therefore, closing those inefficient ones is the most reasonable action. In addition,
the numbers also tell us that, for SOEs with modest productivity, there is no special
treatment applied. In the second-stage estimation, I use Model 2 because (1) the price
index PIt has significant effects and (2) higher order terms are mostly insignificant. In
this model, for an average SOE (which has log real capital of 9.589 and productivity
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of 0.040), a 1% increase in productivity raises the probability of privatization by
0.004 percentage points and lowers the probability of termination by 0.01 percentage
points.25
In both Models 1 and 2, we can see clearly that the larger a SOE is, the lower
the chance of it being privatized or terminated. In fact, Model 3 delivers the same
information but may be less obvious because I have higher order terms in the re-
gressions. Even though the coefficient on capital in the first regression of Model 3
is positive, the marginal effect of log real capital on the chances of privatization is
still negative because of the negative coefficient on capital squared. For an average
SOE with a capital level of 9.589, the marginal effect calculated is -0.475, which is
comparable to that in Models 1 and 2.26 As mentioned before, governments' reforms
follow a guideline that can be summarized as grasp the large and let go of the small.
In accord with the literal meaning, small SOEs are often at the top of the list when
governments consider which firms to privatize or terminate. My results confirm this
policy and support it with meaningful numbers. The estimates of Model 2 suggest
that, for an average SOE,27 a one unit increase in log real capital (which is about
25.093 thousand RMB in terms of real capital) decreases the probability of privatiza-
tion by 0.683 percentage points and reduces that of termination by 0.495 percentage
points.28
Unlike private firms' exit choices, macro-level market conditions (summarized by
25The industry price index PIt used to calculate these probabilities is the average price index
across my sample periods. The probability of privatization changes from 3.177% to 3.181%, and
the probability of termination changes from 5.797% to 5.787%, in response to a 1% increase in
productivity.
26There is no such problem in the second regression of Model 3 because the higher order terms
are all insignificant.
27Recall that an average SOE has log real capital of 9.589 and productivity of 0.040.
28The industry price index PIt used to calculate these probabilities is the average price index
across my sample periods. The probability of privatization changes from 3.177% to 2.494%, and the
probability of termination changes from 5.797% to 5.302%, in response to a one unit increase in log
real capital.
89
the industry price indexes) play a significant role in governments' decisions on SOE
reform. From equation (1.9), we know that my definition of the price index, PIt, is a
complicated aggregation of the conditions of the firms in the market. Two dominant
factors affecting price indexes are the number of firms and their productivities. In
particular, price indexes increase with both the number of firms in the industry and
each existing firm's productivity level.29 Therefore a large PIt can be associated with
a market that appears to be in a relatively healthy condition. The negative coefficient
on PIt tells us that governments have less incentive to conduct dramatic reforms in
a market that is functioning well. In contrast, governments tend to pursue reforms
more urgently when an economy is in trouble. Finally, the results of likelihood-ratio
tests confirm that all my models explain the data better than a constant model.
2.5.4 Investment Policy
Investment decisions are estimated by regressing different measures of investment
level on firms' states. I design three groups of regressions, each with a different
dependent variable. In particular, the dependent variables chosen are (1) log real
capital level in next year, (2) investment level (not logged), and (3) investment capital
ratio (not logged).
Model 1 to Model 4 are specifications belonging to the first group and their results
are presented in Table 2.4. In Model 1, firms' log real capital, productivity, and private
ownership dummy enter the regression function linearly. We see from the estimates
that firms' capital levels are persistent over time with a coefficient on kit of 0.902. The
coefficient of ωit tells us that a one percentage point increase in productivity raises
the real capital in the next period by 0.91%, while keeping all other states constant.
This confirms the fact that more productive firms are more profitable and often find
themselves better off by expanding their production capacities. From section 1.6.2, I
29Recall that demand elasticity η is a negative number and its absolute value is larger than 1.
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obtained the result that private firms are more likely to realize a higher productivity
the next year than SOEs with similar characteristics. In turn, the potential to be
more productive increases private firms' willingness to invest relative to SOEs. I add
the measure of market conditions PIit in Model 2 in order to see how macroeconomic
components affect firms' investment decisions. The insignificant parameter belies
any effects of market price indexes on investments and it seems that the firms make
their investment decisions mainly based on their own states. Therefore I do not
include PIt in the following models. All other estimates in Model 2 are similar
to the ones in Model 1. In Model 3, I assume that private firms and SOEs face
different marginal effects of capital and productivity on investment. However, the
two interaction terms kit ∗ ρit and ωit ∗ ρit do not show significant effects. In the last
model, I add all possible second- and third-order terms to make the specification as
flexible as possible. All results are similar to the ones in previous models, except
that the magnitude of coefficients changes dramatically, which is not surprising since
I added many terms highly correlated with the regressors in previous models. Notice
that I obtain a significant negative coefficient on k3it, which is actually very important
for my simulations. The negative coefficient ensures that a firm's capital evolves
according to a diminishing marginal effect, such that its capital will not become
infinitely large when forward-simulating for many years into the future. This is why
I need a model that is sufficiently flexible and is also the main reason I chose to use
this model in the second estimation stage.
In the second group (Model 5 to Model 8), I regress physical investment (not
logged) on firms' states. The results are reported in Table 2.5. The specifications
of these models are very similar to the four models in the first group. Most results
derived in the first group are confirmed here. In addition, we see that larger firms
invest more in general and these increases in investments are more prominent in
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private firms than in SOEs.30 This can be explained by the fact that private firms on
average realize a higher productivity in the next period according to my estimates of
the productivity evolution function; higher expected productivities improve private
firms' potential for making profits and encourage them to arrange more investments.
Notice that in Model 8 I am not able to include as many regressors as in Model 4
because some variables could form a deficient matrix that significantly diminishes the
quality of my estimates.
In my last group of regressions, I change the dependent variable to investment
per unit of capital and run similar regressions again. We see from Table 2.6 that,
even though larger firms invest more in general, the investment per unit of capital
actually decreases with larger firm size. Further more, these regressions confirm
the tendency for highly productive firms to invest more. A one unit increase in
productivity grows investment per unit of capital by 2.24 to 3.23 units, depending on
the model specifications. In addition, I do not see a significant effect of ownership
type on investment per unit of capital in these models.
2.5.5 Entry Decisions
In this subsection, I report my estimates on firms' entry decisions. On average,
890.571 firms enter the market each year, as shown in Table 2.7. Therefore, I assume
the actual number of entrants is drawn from a Poisson distribution with a mean
of 890.571. Among all entrants, 4.299% are state-owned and the rest are private.
The distributions of initial log real capital are estimated separately for state-owned
entrants and private entrants. More specifically, I apply a kernel density estimation
with a normal kernel smoothing function and the optimal bandwidth for normal
density. The distributions of initial log real capital are presented in Figures 2·2 and
30This is because the coefficient on kit ∗ ρit is positive (0.052 in Model 7 and 0.053 in Model 8)
and significant.
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2·3 for private and state-owned entrants, respectively. In both graphs, the left panel is
a histogram plotted with observed data and the right panel shows the corresponding
probability density function estimated nonparametrically. Likewise, the distributions
of entrants' productivities are estimated in a very similar fashion and reported in
Figures 2·4 and 2·5. In the second stage of my estimation, I am going to draw
entrants' initial states from these distributions.
With my estimated distributions of entrants' initial states, I can also calculate and
list their means, standard deviations and quantiles to compare state-owned entrants
with private entrants. Table 2.8 presents such information. The initial log real capital
is on average 8.311 among private entrants, which is less than that of state-owned ones
by 0.204. This is not surprising, because firms with governments' money are usually
much larger than private firms. However, state-owned entrants draw their initial
capital from a much more widely spread distribution than private ones (26.448%
higher in standard error). This means that governments are much more flexible in
adjusting their firms' sizes. In addition, the average productivity of private entrants is
smaller than that of state-owned ones by 0.022 (0.203 versus 0.225). Therefore, even
though SOEs are on average less productive than private firms, the newly formed
SOEs are no worse in this respect than new born private firms.
2.5.6 Structural Parameters
At the very end of this section, I present the estimates of my structural param-
eters, θ = {CPK , CSK , Ca, φ¯}. As a reminder, I need to estimate a term in investment
adjustment cost Ca, per unit investment cost for both SOEs C
S
K and private firms
CPK , and average scrap value φ¯. I simulate 500 times in total and then use their means
as my point estimates of these parameters31.
31500 simulations are enough for us to obtain reasonable estimates, and yet not too time con-
suming. Of course, more simulations would yield more accurate estimates and smoother looking
histograms, but I am always mindful of the high cost of running more simulations.
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The mean, standard error, 5 percentile, and 95 percentile of these 500 simulations
are reported in Table 2.9. On average, a firm obtains 365.630 thousand RMB upon
declaring bankruptcy. Upon closing, 90% of all firms are worth between 150.016
and 773.783 thousand RMB. Ca is estimated to be 0.0166, which is lower than but
comparable to the same measure for the Korean electric motor industry (0.0441)
reported in Xu (2008).
Most interestingly, my estimates of per unit investment costs confirm the well-
documented evidence that SOEs in China receive easy access to credits from state-
owned Chinese banks, while private firms face significant financial constraints, espe-
cially for capital goods purchases. Notice that the mean level of per unit investment
costs for private firms, CPK = 0.0095, is 25% higher than that for SOEs, C
S
K = 0.0076.
It suggests a very probable inclination of banks to lend money to SOEs rather than
to private firms. To test whether the difference between CPK and C
S
K is significant, I
perform the following hypothesis test,
H0 : C
P
K − CSK ≤ 0
H1 : C
P
K − CSK > 0.
The test statistic is 8.029, which is associated with a p-value smaller than 0.005 when
compared to a t-distribution.32 Therefore I can confidently conclude that SOEs pay
a lower price for their investments at any reasonable significance levels.33
Finally, I plot the histograms of my estimates for these four dynamic parameters in
Figures 2·6, 2·7, and 2·8. The mean levels are also represented in those figures by solid
vertical lines. The estimates of Ca in Figure 2·6 are nicely concentrated around the
mean with a small standard deviation. On the other hand, the distribution of scrap
32I can also do a test using the matched sample technique. The t-statistic calculated in this case
is 8.832, implying a p-value much smaller than 0.005. Therefore, I can make the same conclusion if
realizing that the sample is matched.
33Please see the appendix for the details of this hypothesis tests.
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values in Figure 2·7 appears to spread out more. I plot the per unit investment cost
for private firms and SOEs side by side in Figure 2·8 in order to compare them easily.
From the figure, we see that the mass of CPK is more spread out, but definitely larger
than the mass of CSK . Interestingly, most SOEs' per unit investment costs are below
the average level, because the histogram skews to the right with few observations
located on the upper tail. This provides further evidence of SOEs' easy access to
credit.
2.6 Policy Simulations
Once I have obtained a complete set of parameter estimates, I can use the esti-
mated model to simulate market evolution under different circumstances and answer
some very important questions. At the beginning, I look at a situation where SOEs
have to pay the same investment price as private firms. The second group of sim-
ulations exploits alternative selection schemes by governments. Finally, I focus on
the two main channels of market reform, encouraging new entrants and privatizing
existing SOEs, and isolate the effects of one channel from the other. In the following
several subsections, I discuss these alternative policies in detail and quantify their
possible effects.
2.6.1 Prohibiting Easy Access to Credit
I start with a simulation without making any changes to my original estimates;
it is called the benchmark case and all other simulations are going to be compared
to it. I take the estimates of the dynamic parameters in Table 2.9 as given and find
equilibrium policies for all selected states by solving for a fixed point of the value
function. More specifically, I start with zero values for all states and continuously
solve for the left-hand side of equations (2.4) and (2.5) until they converge. Then
the optimal policies are defined to be the best decisions revealed in the last loop
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right before convergence. Since there are four different state variables in my model,
the number of possible combinations of these states can easily exceed several million,
which makes solving equilibrium policies nearly impossible within a reasonable time
span.34 Therefore, I have to greatly simplify the process, which is discussed in much
detail in the appendix.
Once equilibrium policies are found, I start with a market condition identical to
the one in my 1997 data and simulate its evolution for 10 consecutive years. Then
I use the simulated data set to calculate market statistics to inspect how it works.
There are five groups of statistics considered in general: TFP improvement, physical
capital, privatization, turnover, and entry. All are listed in the first column of Table
2.10, and the corresponding numbers for the benchmark case are presented in the
second column of the same table.
First of all, I want to compare how my benchmark simulation works compared
to my original data set. Since the benchmark simulation is carried out with original
model estimates, its statistics should be close enough to the ones calculated from
the actual data. Otherwise, my model estimates or simulation process need careful
checking. As seen from Table 1.8, an average (weighted measure) private firm is
36.632% (0.308 compared to 0.225) more productive than an average SOE. Similarly,
the simulated benchmark market sees a 34.219% (0.308 compared to 0.230) difference,
which is very close to the number derived from my dataset. In addition, privatization
on average (weighted measure) improves firms' productivities by 43.462% (from 0.253
to 0.364) as shown in Table 1.8, whereas the benchmark simulation gives us a very
close measure of 39.058% (from 0.248 to 0.344).
In addition to a simulation with original estimates of the model, I carry out
another simulation similar to the one above, but force SOEs to pay the same per unit
34My unsimplified version of the code needs more than three years to finish running, assuming
convergence happens within 10 loops. However it is very likely that the convergence would take
more than 10 loops.
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investment cost as private firms.35 The same set of statistics is calculated as in the
benchmark case and presented in the third column of Table 2.10.
Even though the numbers are a bit different, most results about TFP in the no
easy access case are in accordance with the ones in the benchmark. An average pri-
vate firm is 33.676% more productive than an average SOE, whereas privatization can
improve TFP by 37.593%. However, once SOEs' easy access to credits is prohibited,
their TFP improves by 0.4% (from 0.230 to 0.231) and does not lag as far behind that
of private firms. This is probably because SOEs can no longer rely on overinvesting
in capital to fulfill their production due to more expensive loans, and their existing
capital become more efficient.
The most obvious difference between these two simulations is the firms' sizes.
Once SOEs' easy access to credits is removed, their average size decreases by 4.150%
(from 187.562 to 179.778 thousand RMB). This is consistent with my expectation
that SOEs under the new condition have to cut back the purchase of capital goods,
because they are now more expensive. According to the policy grasp the large and
let go of the small, we know that being smaller in size increases SOEs' chances of
privatization or termination. This phenomenon is confirmed by my statistics: the
percentage of SOEs privatized rises from 12.191% to 12.206%, and SOEs' average
termination rate increases from 12.628% to 12.945%. I do not see much change in
firms' entry behavior
2.6.2 Possible Variations of Privatization Policy
As described above, the privatization process in China is selective and the proba-
bilities that a firm is to be privatized or terminated depend on its characteristics. The
selections are mainly based on two factors, real capital level (size) and productivity.
35Details about the simulation process and the numbers used for parameters can be found in the
appendix.
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The evidence in Table 2.3 indicates that smaller firms are more likely to be privatized
or terminated, consistent with the grasp the large and let go of the small policy.
In addition, more productive SOEs are more likely to be privatized rather than ter-
minated. In the following two subsections, I take a closer look at these two types of
selection, respectively, and investigate the possible effects of alternative policies.
Privatization Selection on Firm Size
In this subsection, I focus on two alternative policies. The first eliminates all
possible selection based on firm size. To do this, I eliminate the dependence of gov-
ernments' decisions on SOEs' capital levels in equation (2.13). The second alternative
assumes the exact opposite policy, which can be summarized as grasp the small and
let go of the large. In other words, the larger the firm, the more likely it is to be
privatized or terminated. To implement this policy, I force the coefficients on capital
in equation (2.13) to take the opposite sign.36 The statistics of the markets simulated
under these two alternatives are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table
2.11. For easy comparison, I also present the benchmark statistics in the second
column of the same table.
As the policy progresses from the benchmark, grasp the large, to the other ex-
treme, grasp the small, the average TFP of SOEs decreases gradually from 0.230
to 0.202, and then to 0.199. Studies have shown that China's large SOEs are rela-
tively more efficient and competitive, while the smaller ones suffer from serious losses.
Therefore, once governments start to privatize those large SOEs, state-owned enter-
prises appear to be less productive on average. In contrast, private firms become more
efficient (from 0.308 to 0.310, and to 0.311), not only because large capable SOEs are
privatized, but also because the remaining, smaller SOEs are unable to compete with
private firms. As a result, the percentage difference in TFP between private and
36Detailed explanations of how these two simulations are carried out can be found in the appendix.
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state-owned firms increases from 34.219% to 53.589% and to 56.419%. On an in-
dustry level, the average firm productivity under grasp the small is 1.980% (from
0.302 to 0.308) higher than that under grasp the large. Recall that the main reason
that governments retain large SOEs is that they do not want the reform to proceed
so dramatically as to shake the basis of a politically stable environment. Therefore,
the increase in productivities when governments grasp the small instead of the large
can be explained by their incentive to trade off some productivity improvements for
stable economic development.37
Probably the most obvious and expected effects of these alternative selection
schemes are the changes in firms' sizes. The mean SOE capital values for both alterna-
tives (no selection and grasp the small ) are both significantly smaller than that of
the benchmark, grasp the large. As long as governments do not intentionally retain
the large SOEs, the average size of the remaining SOEs drops significantly. At first
glance, it might be surprising to see that the average size of SOEs under the grasp the
small policy is larger than that under no selection. However, SOEs' average size
relates to governments' privatization and termination decisions that depend greatly
on firms' productivities as well. Therefore, it is possible that governments want to
grasp a small SOE but cannot because this SOE is too inefficient to be retained.
Under the no selection alternative, both the percentage of SOEs privatized and
the mean privatization rate are a little under five times higher than those calculated
from grasp the large (from 12.191% to 55.009% for the percentage of SOEs privatized
and from 2.018% to 9.303% for the mean privatization rate). The reason behind such
a big difference is that, when large SOEs are not protected by governments, they
are as likely to be privatized as comparable small SOEs. A similar result can be
seen in the average termination rate for SOEs (increasing from 12.628% to 27.366%),
37Notice that one of the draw backs of this model is that we are not able to incorporate social
stability into government decisions, because it is difficult to quantify social stability.
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and the explanation is very similar too. The hypothetical policy grasp the small
generates a similar privatization rate and SOE termination rate (9.165% and 29.386%,
respectively) as the no selection case, but the former is lower while the latter is
higher than the corresponding counterparts. I believe this has to do with SOEs'
productivity, which also affects their probability of being selected. First, I am not
surprised that the privatization rate under grasp the small is smaller than that of no
selection, because any intentional protection from governments, no matter what type
of firms are protected (large or small), can mitigate the degree of privatization. On the
contrary, according to the same reasoning, the result that the SOE termination rate
under grasp the small is higher than that of no selection seems peculiar. However,
we need to consider the fact that small SOEs are relatively less productive. It is
possible that the effects of low productivity on the probabilities of being terminated
outweighs those of grasp the small.
Privatization Selection on Firm Productivity
Governments' privatization and termination decisions also depend on firms' pro-
ductivities. In this subsection, I take a look at an alternative policy that does not
select on firms' productivities.38 In Table 2.12, I report in the second column the
statistics of a benchmark that is referred to as selection on productivity in this
case, and the third column presents statistics for the no selection alternatives.
First, almost all average productivity measures under selection on productivity
are higher than those under no selection. Especially, the mean TFP of privatized
SOEs before privatization decreases by 33.871% once selection is eliminated (from
0.248 to 0.164). This indicates that if higher productivity does not increase SOEs'
38Some curious readers may ask why I do not simulate a policy in which privatization and ter-
mination are selected inversely to productivities, similar to what I did in the previous subsection.
The reason is that I believe it is meaningless to investigate what would happen if governments pri-
vatized the less productive SOEs but closed the more productive ones, because it seems that such
an unreasonable policy would never be implemented in the first place.
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chance of being privatized, the SOEs selected for privatization are on average less
productive. In addition, the TFP percentage difference between private and state-
owned firms increases by 9.954 percentage points (from 34.219% to 44.173%) because
many more efficient SOEs are terminated under the no selection alternative. TFP
improvements from SOEs to private firms increase by 35.897 percentage points (from
39.058% to 74.955%) for similar reasons.
The mean capital value of SOEs is much lower when there is no selection on
productivity (92.080 thousand RMB compared to 187.562 thousand RMB). To explain
this phenomenon, notice that the mean TFP of SOEs is reduced, which indicates that
more efficient SOEs are reformed under no selection. In conjunction with the fact
that large SOEs are in general more efficient, we know that the size of remaining
SOEs must be smaller.
The privatization rate and SOE termination rate are 1.256% and 22.324%, respec-
tively, under no selection. The former is lower than the corresponding figure under
selection on productivity (2.018%), but the later is higher (compared to 12.628%).
This is probably because many SOEs are in fact performing well, and these SOEs
should be privatized instead of being closed if governments decide to give more pro-
ductive SOEs a second chance.
2.6.3 Two Channels of Market Reform
Governments took two different routes simultaneously to transform China's econ-
omy. First, they not only permitted but also encouraged the establishment of private
firms. Second, they privatized or terminated existing SOEs and released resources
and opportunities to other (probably more efficient) firms in the market. In this sec-
tion, I try to separate the effects of these policies by shutting down one or the other
channel and simulating the effects on markets. In the third column of Table 2.13, I
report the statistics of a simulation where entry is prohibited. The fourth column
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presents the statistics of a simulation that cancels any privatization and termination.
The benchmark simulation is presented in the second column for easy comparison.
First of all, there is no firm entry under reform only as shown at the bottom panel
of Table 2.13. Interestingly, the average firm sizes of both private and state-owned
firms are much larger in the reform only case, especially the existing private firms
(mean capital value of 575.439 thousand RMB, compared to 181.424 thousand RMB
in the benchmark). When the market is expanding and there is no new firm to fill the
demand, existing firms can grow much larger than usual. A related result is that the
privatization rate is higher (from 2.018% to 2.030%) but the termination rate is almost
cut in half (from 12.628% to 7.023%). Once again, when there are no new entrants to
meet the demand, governments try to privatize more SOEs instead of closing them.
The firms in general become more efficient (0.316 compared to 0.302) and I believe
that the reason must have something to do with economies of scale because all firms
are much larger when there is no entry. Recall that private firms in the reform only
environment become much larger and their changes in size are much more noticeable
than those for SOEs. Therefore, economies of scale can also explain why SOEs lag
further behind private firms in terms of TFP (56.197% difference in TFP between
private and state-owned firms compared to 34.219% in the benchmark). Finally, new
firm enter is the main source of market transformation because the total number of
observations (16,560) drops to one-third that of the benchmark case (52,052).
Under a market with entry only, there is no privatization or termination, as
shown in the far right column of Table 2.13. The average TFP of SOEs is lower than
that under entry and reform (0.208 compared to 0.230) because an SOE will never
be privatized even if it performs very poorly. Not surprisingly, average firm sizes of
both SOEs and private firms are smaller under entry only (168.144 and 176.484,
respectively) compared to entry and reform (187.562 and 181.424, respectively),
102
because new entrants are usually small firms.
2.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper constructs a dynamic structural model to study China's
recent economic reform. The model is estimated with the technique proposed by
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), and the results confirm our expectation on many
observed institutional features. In addition, policy simulations are carried out with
the help of my estimated model, and I am able to answer several important questions
that were difficult to address without such a model.
Of course, there are always areas where improvements can be made. First, gov-
ernments are not strategic players in this model and their actions are estimated with
reduced-form regressions. Therefore, I am not able to know how governments would
react to changes in firms' behavior. Second, since the reform in China was still in
progress during our sample period, I can model changes in investment costs over time
according to a basic time series model. Then I might be able to derive some direct
proof of the transformation of China's financial market. Lastly, mass layoffs can be
dynamic, and the number of laid-off workers may depend on market conditions. If
this is the case, the way we deal with mass layoffs in this paper may be too coarse, and
a model that specifies firms' labor choices as a function of market states is needed.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Testing Lower Investment Price for SOEs
To test whether the per unit investment cost for SOEs is significantly lower than
that for private firms, I construct the following hypothesis test,
H0 : C
P
K − CSK ≤ 0
H1 : C
P
K − CSK > 0.
(2.23)
To perform the test, I follow a procedure of inferences about the difference between
two population means when standard deviations are unknown. The test statistic can
be constructed using the following formula,
t =
CPK − CSK√
s2P
nP
+
s2S
nS
where sP and sS are standard deviations of C
P
K and C
S
K estimates, respectively, which
are reported in Table 2.9, and nP and nS are corresponding sample sizes, which are
both 500 in this case. Under some familiar assumptions, the test statistic follows a t
distribution with degrees of freedom
df =
(
s2P
nP
+
s2S
nS
)2
1
nP−1(
s2P
nP
)2 + 1
nS−1(
s2S
nS
)2
.
After calculation, t = 8.029 and df = 716.667. The resulting p-value is well below
0.005, which supports the alternative hypothesis for any reasonable levels of confi-
dence.
One may realize that my sample is matched in the sense that, for each simulation,
I obtain an estimate of CPK and an estimate of C
S
K , and a difference between C
P
K and
CSK , called d, can be calculated. Then a regular t-test can be used to perform the test
in equation (2.23). Let d¯ be the average of d from all simulations, n be the sample
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size which is 500 in this case, and sd be the standard deviation of d. The test statistic
is defined by,
t =
d¯
sd/
√
n
,
which is calculated to be 8.832. Under some familiar assumptions, the test statistic
follows a t distribution with degrees of freedom n− 1 = 499. Therefore, the resulting
p-value is again well below 0.005, and I arrive at the same result as the previous test.
2.8.2 Simulation Details
In this section, I discuss how I simulate the market. The most difficult step in
running a simulation for a given set of parameters, θ, is to solve for equilibrium in-
vestment and exit strategies.39 A regular method of accomplishing this is to discretize
each state variable and numerically solve for the fixed point of firms' value function.
However, this is very difficult to do, and it may take years for the program to converge.
Instead, I will take advantage of the fact that profit in the far future contributes very
little to firms' value today because of discounting, and use backward induction to find
the value function as well as optimal strategies. Once the equilibrium strategies are
known, simulation of the market is easy and runs very fast. All I need is to make
sure all firms behave as described by the strategies and then keep the market evolving
accordingly.
Solve for Equilibrium Strategies
As mentioned immediately above, it is a very processor demanding process to
solve for equilibrium strategies. To overcome this problem, I use backward induction
instead of trying to calculate a fixed point. I first discretize each state variable and list
39Note that I did not need to find the equilibrium strategies when estimating the model because
I was using the BBL and the equilibrium strategies were solved by reduced-form regressions in the
first stage.
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all possible combinations.40 For each listed combination of states, (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it),
I start with the value function, V (ωit, kit, ρit, S−it;σ∗, θ), when t = 101 and assume
their values are all zeros because those numbers are insignificant to the value function
when t = 1 due to the compounded discount factor βt. Then I can update the values
for each listed combination of states when t = 100, according to the firms' Bellman
equations (equations (2.4) and (2.5)). Once I am given the values at t = 100, I
am able to solve the values when t = 99. I keep performing this updating until I
reach the current period, t = 1. The advantage of this method is that, even though
updating the values for all combinations of states is time consuming, I am guaranteed
to finish running the program after 100 updates. Unfortunately, even this method
is difficult to implement and can take months to run. Therefore, I am forced to do
further simplifications and realize that I may be able to make the state of all other
firms deterministic.
Recall that a nice simplification of this model is that the states of all other firms,
S−it, can be aggregated as a single price index, PIt. In addition, the most important
factor that affects the value of PIt is the number of firms in the market, which can
be seen from equation (1.9). Given the fact that the number of firms in the market is
fairly stable and most of firms' decisions do not depend on PIt, I can assume the price
index is deterministic and does not change if a single firm deviates from its optimal
strategy. Hence the estimation can be further simplified. I take the price indexes in
the first 10 years (from 1997 to 2006) as given in the dataset, and interpolate the price
indexes for the next 90 years according to a regression with a flexible functional form
indicating the dependency of PIt on PIt−1. Then I am able to rerun the algorithm
presented in the previous paragraph without integrating over different levels of price
indexes. In addition, since price indexes are deterministic, the number of possible
40Log real capital ranges from 0 to 16.95 with an increment of 0.05, productivity ranges from -0.31
to 1 with an increment of 0.005, and private state can be either 0 or 1.
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combinations of states is much less than in the previous version. In this case, 100
updates can be done within 24 hours.41
Simulate according to Equilibrium Strategies
Once I have solved the equilibrium strategy, simulation can be done easily and
the program usually takes less than 30 seconds to terminate. For all simulations
considered in this paper, I start with a market condition that is the same as the
one in my data at year 1997, and simulate for 10 years. It is important to note
that I have only solved for the equilibrium investment function and private firms'
exit choices in the previous step. I reuse governments' privatization and termination
choices for SOEs, entering decisions, as well as the profit function and productivity
evolution function calculated in section 2.5. Unlike the previous step where I solve
for equilibrium strategies, the price indexes are not predetermined. As long as firms
are able to update their states according to equilibrium strategies, the price indexes
that represent market conditions can be calculated using equation (1.9).
Simulations of Policy Changes
In this section I describe exactly how the simulation of each case studied in section
2.6 is carried out. In section 2.6.1, I force SOEs to pay the same investment price
as private firms. In order to do that, I set SOEs' per unit investment cost CSK to be
0.0095, which is the per unit investment cost for private firms CPK , and then solve for
new equilibrium strategies that are used in the simulation.
In section 2.6.2, I run two different simulations: (1) a market where privatization
and termination do not depend on firm size and (2) a market that follows the grasp
the small and let go of the large policy. In the first simulation, I alter the gov-
ernment's privatization and termination policy such that the coefficients of log real
41The Matlab programs themselves are available upon request.
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capital are zero (βp2 = 0 and β
t
2 = 0 in equation (2.13)). With other policy functions
unchanged, I am able to solve equilibrium strategies and simulate the market. To
simulate for grasp the small and let go of the large, I follow a very similar proce-
dure as above, except that I reverse the sign of the coefficients of log real capital in
equation (2.13) (βp2 = 0.248 and β
t
2 = 0.110).
The simulation process in section 2.6.2 is very similar to the one in section 2.6.2.
I once again alter the governments' privatization and termination decisions. Recall
in Table 2.3 that the parameters on productivity in Model 2 are βp1 = 2.607 and
βt1 = −4.109 for privatization and termination, respectively. The numbers indicate
that the governments intentionally choose more productive SOEs to be privatized and
less productive ones to be terminated. In order to simulate an environment in which
the governments' decisions have nothing to do with firms' productivity, I set both βp1
and βt1 to zero so that productivity does not affect the probability of being privatized
or closed. Then I solve for new optimal strategies and simulate the market.
My last simulation, introduced in section 2.6.3, attempts to discern the effects of
isolating two different channels of the reform: (1) new firm entry and (2) privatization.
To see the effects of privatization only, I stop firm entry and make sure there are no
new firms in all years of the simulation. This can be done simply by setting the
average number of entrants, M(St), to zero. To investigate the effects of entering
only, I do not allow governments to privatize or terminate any SOEs by setting the
probabilities, F (ρit+1 = 0 | ωit, kit) and F (ρit+1 = 1 | ωit, kit), to zero for all firms i at
any time t.
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Table 2.1: Evidences of Easy Credit for SOEs
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
const 121.136 115.780
(5.847)*** (5.835)***
PrivateDummy -11.911 -12.497 -6.227
(6.124)* (6.101)** (9.273)
Added V alue 9.465 ∗ 10−5 3.879 ∗ 10−5
(0.665 ∗ 10−5)*** (0.653 ∗ 10−5)***
MainOperationProfit −5.819 ∗ 10−5 −2.436 ∗ 10−5
(1.417 ∗ 10−5)*** (1.350 ∗ 10−5)*
WageRate 0.076 0.029
(0.014)*** (0.011)***
Fixed Effect X
Num of SOEs 3858 3858 3858
Num of Private Firms 39852 39852 39852
Sample Size 43710 43710 43710
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 2.2: Private Firms Exit Choice
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
const -1.062 -1.058 -0.623
(0.137)*** (0.146)*** (0.444)***
kit -0.125 -0.125 -0.174
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.104)***
ωit -4.188 -4.187 -6.532
(0.267)*** (0.268)*** (0.957)***
PIt 1.098 ∗ 10−9
(14.584 ∗ 10−9)
Higher Order Terms X
Coefficient Test 203.416 135.618 128.904
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Likelihood-ratio Test 526.006 526.012 687.199
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
sample size 33784 33784 33784
Standard errors are in paraphrases.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.7: Entry Decision
Average Number of new entrants 890.571
percentage of state owned entrants 4.299%
Figure 2·2: Entrants Log Real Capital Distribution (Private Entrants)
Left panel shows the histogram of entrants' log real capital in my dataset. Right panel depicts the
probability density function estimated using my dataset. Log real capital is on horizontal axis of
both graphs, and number of observations is on vertical axis of the graph to the left, and probability
is on vertical axis of the graph to the right.
Table 2.8: Simple Statistics of Entrant State Distribution
State Ownership Mean Std Error 5 Percentile 95 Percentile
ke Private 8.311 1.864 5.517 11.628
State Owned 8.515 2.357 4.558 12.368
ωe Private 0.203 0.124 0.053 0.447
State Owned 0.225 0.189 -0.071 0.555
Table 2.9: Dynamic Parameter
Parameters Mean Std Error 5 Percentile 95 Percentile
φ¯ 365.6299 186.4794 150.0155 773.7826
CPK 0.0095 0.0048 0.0029 0.0173
CSK 0.0076 0.0023 0.0048 0.0120
Ca 0.0166 0.0041 0.0116 0.0248
Total number of simulation is 500.
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Figure 2·3: Entrants Log Real Capital Distribution (State Owned Entrants)
Left panel shows the histogram of entrants' log real capital in my dataset. Right panel depicts the
probability density function estimated using my dataset. Log real capital is on horizontal axis of
both graphs, and number of observations is on vertical axis of the graph to the left, and probability
is on vertical axis of the graph to the right.
Figure 2·4: Entrants Productivity Distribution (Private Entrants)
Left panel shows the histogram of entrants' productivity in my dataset. Right panel depicts the
probability density function estimated using my dataset. Productivity is on horizontal axis of both
graphs, and number of observations is on vertical axis of the graph to the left, and probability is
on vertical axis of the graph to the right.
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Figure 2·5: Entrants Productivity Distribution (State Owned Entrants)
Left panel shows the histogram of entrants' productivity in my dataset. Right panel depicts the
probability density function estimated using my dataset. Productivity is on horizontal axis of both
graphs, and number of observations is on vertical axis of the graph to the left, and probability is
on vertical axis of the graph to the right.
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Figure 2·6: Distribution of Estimated Capital Adjustment Cost
The vertical red line indicates the mean level of Estimated Capital Adjustment Cost. Capital
Adjustment Cost is on horizontal axis, and number of Estimates is on vertical axis.
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Figure 2·7: Distribution of Estimated Scrap Value
The vertical red line indicates the mean level of Estimated Scrap Value. Scrap Value is on
horizontal axis, and number of Estimates is on vertical axis.
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Figure 2·8: Distribution of Estimated Per Unit Investment Cost
The vertical red line indicates the mean level of Estimated Per Unit Investment Cost. Left panel
shows the histogram of estimated Per Unit Investment Cost for State Owned Enterprises. Right
panel depicts the estimated Per Unit Investment Cost for Private Enterprises. Per Unit Investment
Cost is on horizontal axis of both graphs, and number of Estimates is on vertical axis of both
graph.
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Table 2.10: Statistics of Simulated Markets (Prohibiting Easy Access to Credit for
SOEs)
Statistics Easy Ac-
cess
No
Easy
Access
TFP Improvement
Mean (Weighted) Industry TFP 0.302 0.302
Mean (Weighted) TFP of SOEs 0.230 0.231
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Private Firms 0.308 0.308
TFP Percentage Differences Between Private and
State-owned firms
34.219% 33.676%
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized SOEs Before Pri-
vatization
0.248 0.254
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized SOEs After Pri-
vatization
0.344 0.348
TFP Improvements from SOEs to Private Firms 39.058% 37.593%
Correlation Between Capital and TFP 0.424 0.426
Physical Capital
Industry Mean Capital Value (Thousands) 181.934 181.528
Mean Capital Value of SOEs (Thousands) 187.562 179.778
Mean Capital Value of Private Firms (Thousands) 181.424 181.663
Privatization
Number of Observations 52052 52100
Number of State-owned Observations 4167 4128
Number of Private Observations 47886 47972
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs Before Privatization 221 219
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs After Privatization 700 702
Percentage of SOEs Privatized 12.191% 12.206%
Mean Privatization Rate (Yearly) 2.018% 2.024%
Firm Turnover
Mean Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.963% 3.961%
Mean SOEs Termination Rate (Yearly) 12.628% 12.945%
Mean Private Firm Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.312% 3.290%
Firm Entry
Mean Number of Entry (Yearly) 889.897 891.396
Mean Number of State-owned Entrants (Yearly) 37.762 37.814
Mean Number of Private Entrants (Yearly) 852.134 853.581
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Table 2.11: Statistics of Simulated Markets (Reform Selection on Firm Size)
Statistics Grasp The
Large
No Selec-
tion
Grasp The
Small
TFP Improvement
Mean (Weighted) Industry TFP 0.302 0.307 0.308
Mean (Weighted) TFP of SOEs 0.230 0.202 0.199
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Private Firms 0.308 0.310 0.311
TFP Percentage Differences Between
Private and State-owned firms
34.219% 53.589% 56.419%
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized
SOEs Before Privatization
0.248 0.240 0.236
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized
SOEs After Privatization
0.344 0.342 0.342
TFP Improvements from SOEs to Pri-
vate Firms
39.058% 43.053% 44.873%
Correlation Between Capital and TFP 0.424 0.439 0.452
Physical Capital
Industry Mean Capital Value (Thou-
sands)
181.934 185.165 193.927
Mean Capital Value of SOEs (Thou-
sands)
187.562 26.117 37.045
Mean Capital Value of Private Firms
(Thousands)
181.424 197.157 204.386
Privatization
Number of Observations 52052 52148 52175
Number of State-owned Observations 4167 1619 1606
Number of Private Observations 47886 50528 50569
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs Before
Privatization
221 786 771
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs After
Privatization
700 3322 3319
Percentage of SOEs Privatized 12.191% 55.009% 54.199%
Mean Privatization Rate (Yearly) 2.018% 9.303% 9.165%
Firm Turnover
Mean Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.963% 3.861% 3.875%
Mean SOEs Termination Rate (Yearly) 12.628% 27.366% 29.386%
Mean Private Firm Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.312% 3.248% 3.242%
Firm Entry
Mean Number of Entry (Yearly) 889.897 889.437 890.177
Mean Number of State-owned Entrants
(Yearly)
37.762 37.757 37.777
Mean Number of Private Entrants
(Yearly)
852.134 851.680 852.400
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Table 2.12: Statistics of Simulated Markets (Reform Selection on Firm Productivity)
Statistics Selection
on Pro-
ductivity
No Se-
lection
TFP Improvement
Mean (Weighted) Industry TFP 0.302 0.301
Mean (Weighted) TFP of SOEs 0.230 0.213
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Private Firms 0.308 0.307
TFP Percentage Differences Between Private and
State-owned firms
34.219% 44.173%
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized SOEs Before Pri-
vatization
0.248 0.164
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized SOEs After Pri-
vatization
0.344 0.282
TFP Improvements from SOEs to Private Firms 39.058% 74.955%
Correlation Between Capital and TFP 0.424 0.429
Physical Capital
Industry Mean Capital Value (Thousands) 181.934 169.269
Mean Capital Value of SOEs (Thousands) 187.562 92.080
Mean Capital Value of Private Firms (Thousands) 181.424 176.935
Privatization
Number of Observations 52052 50972
Number of State-owned Observations 4167 3467
Number of Private Observations 47886 47504
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs Before Privatization 221 125
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs After Privatization 700 399
Percentage of SOEs Privatized 12.191% 7.082%
Mean Privatization Rate (Yearly) 2.018% 1.256%
Firm Turnover
Mean Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.963% 4.476%
Mean SOEs Termination Rate (Yearly) 12.628% 22.324%
Mean Private Firm Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.312% 3.315%
Firm Entry
Mean Number of Entry (Yearly) 889.897 888.177
Mean Number of State-owned Entrants (Yearly) 37.762 37.689
Mean Number of Private Entrants (Yearly) 852.134 850.488
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Table 2.13: Statistics of Simulated Markets (Separate Channels of Reform)
Statistics Entry
and
Reform
Reform
Only
Entry
Only
TFP Improvement
Mean (Weighted) Industry TFP 0.302 0.316 0.295
Mean (Weighted) TFP of SOEs 0.230 0.217 0.208
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Private Firms 0.308 0.339 0.308
TFP Percentage Differences Between Private
and State-owned firms
34.219% 56.197% 48.290%
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized SOEs
Before Privatization
0.248 0.242 N/A
Mean (Weighted) TFP of Privatized SOEs
After Privatization
0.344 0.333 N/A
TFP Improvements from SOEs to Private
Firms
39.058% 38.192% N/A
Correlation Between Capital and TFP 0.424 0.545 0.417
Physical Capital
Industry Mean Capital Value (Thousands) 181.934 500.243 175.395
Mean Capital Value of SOEs (Thousands) 187.562 284.461 168.144
Mean Capital Value of Private Firms (Thou-
sands)
181.424 575.439 176.484
Privatization
Number of Observations 52052 16560 54166
Number of State-owned Observations 4167 3293 6929
Number of Private Observations 47886 13266 47236
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs Before Pri-
vatization
221 252 0
Sample Size of Privatized SOEs After Priva-
tization
700 612 0
Percentage of SOEs Privatized 12.191% 17.824% 0%
Mean Privatization Rate (Yearly) 2.018% 2.030% 0%
Firm Turnover
Mean Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.963% 3.303% 2.779%
Mean SOEs Termination Rate (Yearly) 12.628% 7.023% 0%
Mean Private Firm Exit Rate (Yearly) 3.312% 2.444% 3.307%
Firm Entry
Mean Number of Entry (Yearly) 889.897 0 890.943
Mean Number of State-owned Entrants
(Yearly)
37.762 0 37.787
Mean Number of Private Entrants (Yearly) 852.134 0 853.157
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Chapter 3
State-owned Enterprises Reform and
Productivity: A Case Study of China
3.1 Introduction
In 1978, designed and Guided by Deng, Xiaoping, China adopted the twin policies
of opening its door to foreign trade and investment, and reforming its state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). It has been more than thirty years since the adoption of these
two policies and the open door policy had been recognized as very successful and
made China the world's second largest economy by nominal GDP and by purchasing
power parity after the United States. On the other hand, the state-owned-enterprise
reforming did not show a spectacular progress comparing to the open door pol-
icy. China has taken a gradual and selective approach towards privatization mainly
because, in addition to profit making, another important goal of China's SOEs is to
absorb surplus labor. Policies makers worried that drastic privatization of large SOEs
will rise unemployment quickly and bring China unstable economic as well as polit-
ical environment. Even though Chinese government has been very conservative on
performing SOE reforms, the speed of reforming was still fast enough to distinguish
China from other formerly centrally planned economies. Therefore, China is a very
interesting case to study the effects of privatization and other related SOE reforms.
There were many economic and political literatures focus on China's privatization
process. one of the most relevant one is Bai et al., (2009) which investigated the effects
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of privatization on social welfare and firm performance indicators using the data from
annual surveys of manufacturing and mining firms conducted by the national Bureau
of statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005. They used three sets of indicators:
(1) social welfare indicators on labor, consumers and governments, (2) indicators on
firm performance, and (3) individual components of the operating income to sales.
They found that privatizing China's SOEs led to increasing sales and more productive
labor. In addition, there was a gain in firms' profitability.
As in Bai et al., (2009), our paper also studies the impacts of China's privatization
process, however with a different approach. Bai et al., (2009) uses sale per labor as a
measure of labor productivity and there is no indicator that can be considered as a
measure of capital productivity. In fact, ignoring capital productivity is a big pitfall
since SOEs are relatively bigger in size because of government's preferential policies.
How SOE reform works on capital allocation and efficiency can not be overlooked.
Therefore we instead focus on firms' total factor productivity (TFP) by estimating
their production function using the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The second main difference of our paper from Bai et
al., (2009), is that we carry out the analysis for each industries separately. The reason
is that firms in different industries can behave very differently because they compete
in different market structures. Therefore, their responds to the reform may also be
very different.
Once a measure of TFP for each firm is found, we carry out the following three
analyses. (1)We look at each industry's aggregate TFP and investigate whether there
is an improvement in overall efficiency. (2)We follow Olley and Pakes (1996) to
decompose industry level aggregate TFP into two parts, firms' average productivity
and output allocation, and ask if the improvement in TFP (if any) can be attributed
to more efficient market output allocation. (3)We are interested in comparing TFP
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between SOEs and private firms.(4) We use difference in difference model to study
the role played by SOE reform in firms' TFP changes.
Our results show that improvements in aggregate TFP for all industries in China.
These growths in productivity were resulted from enterprises becoming more pro-
ductive, but not from more efficient output allocation in the market. Private firms
were proven to be more productive than state-owned enterprises in all industries, but
privatization itself improved firms efficiency only for some industries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe our samples
constructed from the annual surveys of manufacturing and mining firms, and offer
some summary statistics of the data. The econometric method used for analysis is
offered in Section 3.3, and the results of econometric analysis are presented in Section
3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Statistics
Our data set is the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database extracted and reor-
ganized from the annual surveys of manufacturing and mining firms conducted by
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The target firms of this database include
all state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with an annual sale of
products higher than 5 million RMB (approximately 782,000 US dollars). The sam-
ple period is from 1997 to 2006.1 This is a very comprehensive dataset in a sense
that the number of firms covered in the surveys varied from approximately 162,000
to approximately 336,000, it includes enterprises from 32 different province-level di-
visions and more than 40 two digits industries, and, in addition, it reports hundreds
of variables for each enterprises. All of the features above make this dataset one of
the most important resources in economic and management researches in China.
1Even though 2007 data is also available, the lack of firm identification number makes this year
very hard to use.
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Using the unique firm identification number, we first construct an unbalanced
panel data with enterprises that appear at least three consecutive years in our sample
and have valid data entries2. This process gives us a sample of 276,057 enterprises and
1,502,916 observations in total. The sample is used to estimate the production func-
tion and calculate TFP for each firms. Once productivity measures are constructed
and all productivity related questions are answered, we pick exclusively those enter-
prises that start as SOEs in our dataset, and use only those observation for further
investigation on the effect of privatization. This step reduces our sample to 26,753
enterprises and 172,557 observations. Among these 26,753 enterprises, 7,446 of them
are privatized and the rest maintains state ownership.
The variables we use for this study include legal person number (unique firm iden-
tification number), industry classification, industrial added value, fixed assets, average
number of employees, location ID, opening date (opening year in specific), long term
investment, and, of course, ownership and registration type. We construct measures
of labor, capital, output, age and time by using average number of employees, total
assets, industrial added value, opening year, and the survey year respectively. All
value based variables (industrial added value, total assets, and long term investment)
are discounted using industry specific producer price index (PPI) found in China's
statistical year book.
Note that most of the missing and unreasonable values for ownership type are
interpolated using the information available in other years for the same firms. For
example, if an enterprise has never been state owned through out sample periods
according to the available data, its missing ownership type is interpolated as privately
owned. In other cases where missing ownership can't be figured out this way, we can
use their registration type to find out their missing ownership type. We are very
2Hsieh and Song (2015) use the same dataset and decide to include only firms which appear
at least three consecutive years for more accurate estimation. More details about data cleaning
procedure can also be fount in Hsieh and Song(2015).
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confident about the accuracy of this process since most of the cases are very similar
to the case explained in the examples above. For the cases we are uncertain, we decide
to delete those observations, but they are very few.
To interpolate missing and unreasonable location IDs and opening years, we used
a technique refered to as finding dominant values. Specifically, when there are
different location IDs or opening years for the same firm, we find out the dominant
value (or the most frequently appeared value) and use this value for the missing ones.
Since it is very rare for enterprises to change locations, we believe the way we deal
with location ID is satisfactory. Similarly, birth year will never change for a firm
and different open years must simply be a typo. Therefore, our finding dominant
values method should work well enough. In addition, the number of missing values is
relatively small. As usual, we delete all firms which give us a hard time to interpolate
those information. We also delete all firms with zero or negative average number of
employees, long term investment, total assets or industrial added value. The process
deletes very few firms.
Variable creation is fairly standard for this study except the construction of a
real capital measure. In specific, it is difficult to build real capital measure for the
following two reasons. First, firms only report the value of their fixed capital stock at
the original purchase prices. Therefore, considering fixed assets as a measure of capital
without any adjustment would be problematic. Second, firms do not report their fixed
investment. So the standard perpetual inventory method can not be applied directly.
In order to solve these two problems and build real capital correctly, we follow the
approach proposed by Brandt, Biesebroeck & Zhang (2012) in which they developed
a procedure that converts estimates at original purchase prices into real values that
are comparable across time and firms.3
3The details of this procedure can be found in the appedix, section 3.6.1, as well as in Brandt,
Biesebroeck & Zhang (2012).
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3.2.1 Basic Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides us some basic information of our underlying firm level dataset.
The table shows average value of some most relevant variables over sample years.
Firstly, we notice that the sample size increases over years from 84,880 firms in 1998
to about 200,000 firms at the end of sample period. On average, added industrial
value, gross output value, net fixed asset and Intermediate Input values rises gradually
over time, that is consistent with the fact that China's economic had been growing
during those years. It is interesting that, as time goes by, the average firm hires
less and less employees (from 431.21 in 1998 to 284.05 in 2007). This might be a
byproduct of privatization, as we know from the introduction that one social function
of SOEs is to hire access among of employees in order to keep unemployment rate
low and help government to achieve economic and political stability. Once privatized,
those firms focused only on profit maximization and started to lay off redundant
workers. Another possible reason for firms hiring less workers over time could be
that potential private entrants started to enter the market and compete, and those
starters were relatively small.
A more important statistic to our study is to how many firms are actually reformed
and how many percent of firms with different ownership types exist in the market
over years. In table 3.2, we list the percentage of enterprises by registration type over
our sample periods. As expected, the percentage of SOEs and collective enterprises
decrease over years. Instead, the percentage of private firms grows dramatically from
only 7.58% in 1998 to more than 50% in 2007 as public owned firms take a smaller
proportion. One interpretation for such a drastic change is that SOEs go through
reform and are privatized. The other interpretation is that a lot more private firms
enter the market in later years, but there are very few state-owned entrants. We
believe that both interpretations explained above are responsible and the structure
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of the market has changed dramatically during that period of time. To see this more
clearly, we plot a bar chart showing the proportion of firms by registration type. In
figure 3·1, the proportion of private firms (yellow bars) grows a lot replacing that
of collective firms (light blue bars) and SOEs (dark blue bars). In addition, the
proportion of foreign firms (red bars) stays almost intact over years.
Now we show some evidences for the achievement of China's SOE reform. Our
panel sample covers 39 two-digit industries and 31 province level districts. Table 3.3
and Table 3.4 present the distribution of privatization by two-digit industries and
by provinces respectively. The number of SOEs is the number of enterprises that are
state-owned the first time they appear in the sample. The number of reformed are the
total number of SOEs that undergoes reform during sample period. The percentage
reformed is the ratio of the number of reformed SOEs (column 4) to the total number
of SOEs (column 3). In both Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the rows are sorted according
to the percentage of reformed SOEs in descending order. In total, our panel dataset
includes 26,753 SOEs as in 1998. Up to 2007, 7,446 of them (27.83%) are reformed.
27.83% is not a small number given only ten years. The speed of reform in China is
in fact much faster than some other countries which adopt similar policies. On the
other hand, even though 27.83% of SOEs are privatized, there are still many SOEs
controlled by government.
There are more than 20,000 enterprises for textile industry (23,444 firms) and non-
metal mineral products (21,589 firms). Their percentages of privatization are 39.36%
and 35.18% respectively. Among 39 industries, Medical and Pharmaceutical Product,
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals, Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Met-
als, Ferrous Metal Mining and Dressing, and Chemical Fiber Production undertake
a dramatic privatization and more than 40% of SOEs are reformed in these indus-
tries. Notice that many of these top five reformed industries involves metals. It is
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surprising to see Medical and Pharmaceutical Products industry having such a high
level of privatization since this industry is usually strictly supervised and regulated
by governments. On the other hand, Production and Supply of Tap Water (10.11%),
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction (13.81%), and Production and Supply of
Power, Steam and Hot Water (15.62%) stay at the bottom of Table 3.3. Even though
Tobacco Processing (11.52%), Other Minerals Mining and Dressing (0%) and Waste
Resources and Material Recycling (0%) also have very low privatization percentage,
our sample contains very few firms in these industries (less than 300 firms). Therefore,
there is not enough information for us to discuss these industries in details.
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of privatization by locations. In specific, we break
our sample into sub-samples according to province-level districts and our sample
covers all province-level districts in China main land (31 in total). The province-level
districts include not only regular provinces, but also municipalities directly under the
central government and autonomous administrative divisions. Jilin province have the
highest percentage of privatization (46.51%), followed by Jiangsu (45.37%), Shandong
(39.7%), and Anhui (39.39%) provinces. The least privatized provinces are Tibet
(8.2%), Hainan (12.28%), Guizhou (13.51%), Tianjin (16.28%) and Guangxi (16.3%)
provinces. In general, we see relatively rich provinces stay on top of the list and
relatively poor provinces stick around the bottom of the table. As stated in Bai
et al., (2009) that privatized firms on average enjoy a higher profit margin, we are
not surprised to see such correlation between privatization and GDP. However, this
table does not tell us whether privatization is the cause for better economic condition
because it can also be the case that relatively richer provinces are more likely to
undergo drastic privatization. We will investigate this question in details in later
sections.
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3.3 Estimation of Production Function and Productivity
Previous subsection provides a broad view of China's recent economic reform. In
this section, we estimate production function using the method proposed by Levinsohn
& Petrin (2003) and calculate productivity for each firm. Once we have the estimates
of productivity measures, we will investigate productivity related questions in the
following sections. Different from Brandt, Biesebroeck & Zhang (2012), we estimate a
distinct production function for each industry because industries work very differently
from each other and our estimates should unfold such differences.
3.3.1 Production Function
Production function estimation suffers from the difficulty caused by simultaneity
problem, a contemporaneous correlation between input (capital and labor) and error
term. Simple OLS only offers biased estimates and the sign of the biases are undeter-
mined. Fixed effect estimators offer more protection from this problem but may not
be enough either. In order to perform this task well, we follow the method proposed
by Olley & Pakes (1996) and Levinsogn & Petrin (2003). In fact, we are using the
method proposed by Levinsogn & Petrin (2003) (LP) which is a variety of method
originated by Olley & Pakes (1996). We can't apply Olley & Pakes (1996) directly
because they use investment as a proxy but valid investment information is often not
available for developing countries and China is no exception. Fortunately, Levinsogn
& Petrin (2003) utilizes intermediate inputs value as a proxy which is observable for
Chinese firms.
We assume that the production function for firm i at time t follows a usual Cobb-
Douglas functional form,
yit = β0 + βllit + βkkit + εit
=⇒ yit = β0 + βllit + βkkit + ωit + ηit,
(3.1)
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where yit is its logged added value, lit and kit are its logged labor and capital, ωit is
a transmitted component, and ηit is an iid component. The problem with estimating
equation (3.1) using OLS is that ωit (as well as εit because εit = ωit+ηit) is correlated
with factors of production, capital and labor. To deal with the issue, we assume
intermediate input demand function is
τit = τ(ωit, kit).
By assuming τit is monotonic in ωit for all kit, we can invert the intermediate input
demand function,
ωit = ω(τit, kit).
Then we try to identify the coefficient βl and βk with a two steps procedure. In
step 1, we figure out an unbiased estimate of the coefficient for labor, βˆl. In step 2,
we estimate the coefficients for capital, βˆk, using GMM.
In specific, we rewrite equation (3.1) as
yit = βllit + φ(τit, kit) + ηit (3.2)
where
φ(τit, kit) = β0 + βkkit + ωit(τit, kit) (3.3)
Then we regress yit on τit and kit using a 4th order polynomial and obtain an estimate
of E(yit|τit, kit). We also obtain an estimate of E(lit|τit, kit) by running a similar
regression of lit on τit and kit. Subtracting expected output from production function
(3.2) offers the following equation,
yit − E(yit|τit, kit) = βl(lit − E(lit|τit, kit)) + ηit, (3.4)
which can be estimated without bias to get βˆl. This concludes the first stage of my
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estimation method.
In stage 2, we can transform equation (3.2) into the following form,
yit − βˆllit = β0 + βkkit + ωit + ηit
=⇒ yit − βˆllit = β0 + βkkit + E(ωit|ωit−1) + ξit + ηit,
(3.5)
where
ξit = ωit − E(ωit|ωit−1).
Notice that yit− βˆllit = φ(τit, kit)+ηit. So we can obtain an estimate of φit by running
a regression of yit − βˆllit on τit and kit with a 4th order polynomial. Let's denote the
estimates as φˆit.
Then we carry out the following steps.
1. We pick candidate values for β0 and βk, and let's call them β
∗
0 and β
∗
k respec-
tively.
2. Calculate A = ˆωit + ηit = yit − β∗0 − βˆllit − β∗kkit, by equation (3.1).
3. Calculate B = ˆωit−1 = φˆit−1 − β∗0 − β∗kkit−1, by equation (3.3).
4. We regress A on B with a 4th order polynomial to obtain an estimate of
E(ωit|ωit−1), Eˆ(ωit|ωit−1).
5. Compute η∗it = ξit + ηit = yit − βˆllit − β∗0 − β∗kkit − Eˆ(ωit|ωit−1) according to
equation (3.5).
6. GMM can be calculated using the following equation
GMM(β∗0 , β
∗
k) =
∑
h
(
∑
i
∑
t
(η∗it(β
∗
0 , β
∗
k) · Zhit))2
where Zit = {kit, τit−1, lit−1, kit−1, τit−2} and h is the index for elements in vector
Z.
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7. Go back to step 1 and choose another set of β∗0 and β
∗
k , and then recalculate
variables from step 2 through step 6. We keep doing the steps above until
GMM is minimized, and β∗0 and β
∗
k which achieves the minimal GMM are our
estimates, βˆ0 and βˆk respectively.
This completes the description of our estimation method and all parameters of pro-
duction function, βˆ0, βˆl, and βˆk are estimated.
3.3.2 Productivity
Once we have estimated the parameters in production function, we can calculate
each firm's productivity as residual using the equation,
εit = yit − βˆ0 − βˆllit − βˆkkit (3.6)
3.4 Results
In this section, we present our main results. We start with the estimated pa-
rameters of production functions, and show you how Productivity evolves in China
during our sample periods. Then we practice a productivity decomposition proposed
by Olley and Pakes (1996) to investigate whether productivity changes are related to
industries' output reallocation. Finally, we present our difference in difference results
on whether China's SOE reform play a significant role in firms' efficiency gain.
3.4.1 Estimated Production Function
In Table 3.5, We show the results of our production function estimation. In addi-
tion to the results from using the LP method, we also present the results from three
additional models for comparisons, (1) simple OLS, (2) OLS with firm fixed effect to
deal with unobserved firm specific features, (3) OLS with firm and time fixed effect to
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further account for macro economics changes. In general, OLS overestimates coeffi-
cients βˆl and βˆk for almost all industries. By adding firm fixed effect, the coefficients
are corrected downwards by a lot. It seems like that the dependent variables (capital
and labor) are positively correlated with unobserved factors that affect output. In
fact, this confirms our expectation that more productive firms find themselves more
profitable by producing more outputs, which increase their uses of production factors
(capital and labor). The firm fixed effect method provides some protection from this
endogenous problem. The model with both firm and time dummy offers similar results
from the one with firm dummy only. Therefore we claim that the effects of macro
economics environment changes on a firm's output is limited. Note that Levinsogn
& Petrin (2003) (LP) method adjusts βˆl downwards but βˆk upwards for almost all
industries compared to our two fixed effect models. Without LP adjustment, the esti-
mate of labor coefficient is much larger than that of capital coefficient. This is saying
that labor is much more important than capital in production process. However, LP
method shrinks the gap between these two numbers. We bootstrap the standard error
of LP model with 100 samples selected from original dataset with replacement. The
standard errors for all models are reported in parenthesis below each estimates. The
regression results of all industries and of all models are significantly different from
zero.
3.4.2 Productivity Growth
To see how Productivity evolves in China during our sample periods, we calculate
each firm's productivity using equation (3.6) as well as the estimates from LP model
presented above. We then aggregate firms' productivity to find an efficiency measure
for each industry. We first calculate the weighted average productivity for each in-
dustry at each year using firms' market share (measured by output level) as weights.
Table 3.6 reveals such information with each entry representing the annual growth
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rate of weighted average productivity for the corresponding industry and sample year.
In general, even though the weighted average productivities for most industries go
up and down all the time, they increase hermetically within years. Howeverm some
industries growing faster than others.
In order to compare productivity growth among industries, we normalize the
weighted average in 1997 (our starting sample year) to be 1. To make our com-
parison easier, we selected only 5 representative industries and draw a bar chart for
their productivity measures. The selected industries are Textile Industry, Nonmetal
Mineral Products, Raw Chemical materials and Chemical Products, Production and
Supply of Tap Water, Medical and Pharmaceutical Product, and Ordinary Machin-
ery. Figure 3·2 represents the weighted average productivity (normalized) in each
sample years for these industries. As can be seen, our productivity measures for all
these industries start with 1 in 1997 and continuously rising through out our sample
periods. Textile Industry shows the most impressive improvement in efficiency among
these industries and its average productivity in 2006 is about 6.5 times more than
that in 1997.
3.4.3 Productivity Decomposition
In addition to output weighted average productivities, we can also practice a pro-
ductivity decomposition proposed by Olley and Pakes, (1996). In specific, we can
separate weighted average productivity into (1) unweighted average productivity and
(2) a term related to correlation between market share and productivity. Mathemat-
ically, the decomposition can be written as
Pt =
Nt∑
i=1
SitPit =
Nt∑
i=1
(S¯t +∆Sit)(P¯t +∆Pit)
= NtS¯tP¯t +
Nt∑
i=1
∆Sit∆Pit = P¯t +
Nt∑
i=1
∆Sit∆Pit,
(3.7)
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where Pt is market share weighted average productivity for an industry at time t,
Sit and Pit are market share and productivity for firm i at time t, S¯t and P¯t denote
unweighted average market share and productivity at time t, and, in addition, ∆Sit =
Sit−S¯t and ∆Pit = Pit−P¯t are deviations of market share and productivity from their
corresponding mean. This equation is applied to all industries individually and we
omit industry subscript here for easy representation. According to this equation, there
can be two sources of rising productivity: (1) increased productivity of each individual
firm on average, and (2) more efficient market allocation with more productive firms
producing more industry outputs.
To convey the idea more efficiently, we omit long tables containing information
for all industries and plot a bar chart only for the 5 representative industries selected
in the previous subsection. Figure 3·3 reveals the growths of unweighted average pro-
ductivity for these industries. All of them increase over time, similar to the overall
behavior of market share weighted averages presented in Figure 3·2. However, un-
weighted average productivities change less dramatically compared to their weighted
counter part, which tells us the impressive growth shown in igure 3·2 being largely
driven by the second term of the decomposition. This conjecture is confirmed by
Firgure 3·4 in which we plot growths of the second term in equation (3.7) for these
industries. As expected, these measures increase over time for all industries selected
and Textile Industry is again the winner among five selected industries with an in-
crease of more than six times within ten years.
Let's now focus on the second part of our productivity decomposition which is∑Nt
i=1∆Sit∆Pit in equation (3.7) above. Technically, this is not the covariance be-
tween market share and productivity if not dividing it by the number of firms in the
industry. The correct covariance should be written as 1
Nt
∑Nt
i=1∆Sit∆Pit. To differen-
tiate this term from real covariance, we call it the covariance between market share
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and productivity without market size adjustment, as in the caption of Figure 3·4.
This observation suggests that the increase in
∑Nt
i=1 ∆Sit∆Pit over years has two
possible sources: (1) more efficient market allocation and (2) more firms in the market
or larger market size. In order to find out which is the main driving force, we calculate
the real covariances and their corresponding correlation coefficients. In Figure 3·5, we
plot the correlation coefficients which not only take into account the effects of market
size but also normalize variances. We do not see more efficient market reallocation
among five selected industries in this figure. In fact, this is also the case for all
other industries which are not shown in this figure. The conclusion we arrive from
decomposing weighted average productivity is that the increases in weighted average
productivity in China can be explained by increased productivity of each individual
firms on average and larger market size, but little can be explained by more efficient
allocation of production within markets.
3.4.4 The Effects of Reform
In previous sections, we only discuss firms' productivity in China, but do not try
to disentangle the relationship between productivity and China's economic reform. In
this subsection, we switch gear and answer the question whether China's SOE reform
plays a big role in its productivity growth. In order to do this properly, we delete six
industries which either have less than 100 SOEs or do not experience privatization
from our original sample. In this reduced dataset, we have 33 industries and 171,046
observations left. All these industries have more than 100 SOEs and all undergo
reform to some extent.
There are two challenges that need our attentions when setting up regressions.
First, we have to properly control for those unobserved factors that are correlated
with a firm's ownership and also essential for its productivity. Take labor quality
for example. It has been noticed that SOEs attract very different types of workers
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from those working for private firms. Public firms in China are used to offer Iron
Rice Bowl, a term referring to an occupation with guaranteed job security, as well
as steady income and benefits. Jobs in a SOE are certainly viewed as more secure
and stable than those in private firms, and are attractive to some people even though
similar jobs in private sectors pay more. Therefore, the most ambitious people, who
happen to be more efficient, will choose to work for private firms, and people who
enjoy stable and relaxed life style will be more likely to stay in a SOE. Hence, the
quality of labor hired by SOEs is very different from that hired by private firms, and
the quality of labor certainly affect productivity of the firm.
Second, privatization in China is a careful selection process. Instead of adopting a
uniform reform policy for all SOEs, the governments decided to take conservative and
gradual steps and experiment with policy on the smallest SOEs first before applying
it to larger ones. This is the central idea of the policy called grasp the large, let
go of the small. In fact, when governments decide which firms to be privatized,
their productivity is also an important factor to be considered in addition to their
size. Generally speaking, for two SOEs of the same size, the more productive one is
more likely to be privatized. Therefore, simple OLS may over estimate the effects of
privatization on firms' productivity.
After a conprehensive consideration, we decide to use difference in differences
model to investigate the effects of SOE reform on productivity. In specific, we consider
the following four different model specifications. First, we use the simplest model with
firm fixed effect,
Pit = αi + τRit + εit,
where Rit is the dummy variable indicating private ownership of firm i at time t
and αi is the firm fixed effect representing unobserved firm characteristics which
affect productivity. Next, We use difference in differences model with the following
141
specification,
Pit = αi + λt + τRit + εit.
In this specification, we add time period dummies, λt. In the next model, we add
control variables which are relevant to firms' productivity,
Pit = αi + λt + τRit +Xitγ + εit.
The control variables used include firms' added value, labor, capital stock and labor
cost. Finally, we not only control for relevant characteristics in current period, but
also include characteristics in previous years,
Pit = αi + λt + τRit +Xitγ + Zit−1θ + εit.
Table 3.7 presents the results from these regressions for all industries. In general,
the results are mixed. The key estimate we are interested in is the effect of a firm's
private ownership on its productivity. We find significant effects for only 9 out of 33
industries. 8 of them exhibit significant positive effect and only 1 shows significant
negative effect. Even though we do not find significant results for the majority of
industries, the sign of the coefficients for 21 industries are positive, which indicates
that privatization increases firms' productivity. Therefore, our conclusion from this
exercise is that, even though productivity has improved a lot in all industries in
China during transformation, we can only attribute such productivity growths for
some industries to China's SOE reform.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a production function for each two-digits industry in
China using the method proposed by olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and
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Petrin (2003), and we calculate a measure of total factor productivity for each firm
out of those estimates. We then look at how overall productivity evolved during
our sample period (1997-2006), if such productivity improvement is related to more
efficient output allocation, and whether the changes in productivity were related to the
reform. We find improvements in average market productivities for all industries in
China. These growths in productivity were resulted from enterprises becoming more
productive, but not from more efficient output allocation within markets. Finally, we
found that privatization improved firms efficiency only for some industries.
One drawback of this study is that the effects of privatization may not be im-
mediate. Once SOEs change its ownership and management system, they may need
time to adjust their production factors and their productivity may not be improved
right away. Therefore, a model that investigate long term effects of privatization
may be more appropriate. In addition, it is very interesting to look at the spillover
effects of privatization. Firms becoming more efficient can be a result of not only
changing their ownership but also facing more competitive environment. Therefore,
the spillover effects may be significant and change the angle we view this question
completely.
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3.6 appendices
3.6.1 Construction of Real Capital
To explain the procedure of real capital construction proposed by Brandt, Biese-
broeck and Zhang (2012) in a greater detail, we show it as a five step process. (1) We
find the average fixed asset information in 1993 for each industries at each provinces
and construct the total growth of nominal capital stock from 1993 to 1998 at the
two-digit industry level for each provinces. We then calculate average nominal capi-
tal growth rate per year from 1993 to 1998 by simply assuming all years exhibit same
growth rate. In addition, the yearly growth rate from 1998 to 2007 can be calculated
directly because the data on those years are observable. (2) By discounting the fixed
asset reported in the last available year using the growth rate calculated in step 1,
we can derive the nominal capital for each firms at their birth year. (3) We use the
information calculated from step 1 and 2 to obtain the nominal capital for each firms
from their birth year to the last year in our dataset. (4) The difference between nom-
inal capital measures in two consecutive years can be thought as the firm's nominal
investment and real investment can be derived by price deflation using Brandt-Rawski
deflater. (5) Finally, real capital stocks for each year are calculated using perpetual
inventory method, Kit =
∑τ=t
τ=0(1 − δ)τ × Iiτ , which means that the real capital of
firm i at time t is the sum of all its real investments (depreciation are accounted for)
from its birth year to current year.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of The Underlying Firm Level Data Set
Year No. of
Firms
Value
Added
Gross
Output
Employment Net
Fixed
Asset
Intermediate
Input
1997 84880 16.16 53.43 431.21 47.33 39.56
1998 94108 16.82 54.87 403.30 49.52 40.45
1999 106771 18.28 60.13 370.81 51.41 44.46
2000 115742 19.04 62.51 334.39 52.53 46.15
2001 127428 20.62 67.66 323.49 53.40 49.80
2002 144228 23.32 77.67 308.78 54.65 57.39
2003 199547 22.70 78.19 255.95 45.78 58.15
2004 219908 27.70 94.44 257.35 50.96 69.96
2005 211956 34.34 117.76 269.23 59.12 87.43
2006 198348 43.56 149.54 284.05 70.54 111.13
Notes: all values are average numbers and denoted in million RMB.
(except employment and number of firms).
Table 3.2: Percentage of enterprises by registration type
Year No. of
Firms
% SOEs % Collec-
tive
% Private % Foreign
& HMT
% Other
1997 84880 26.76% 30.36% 7.58% 17.79% 17.51%
1998 94108 24.22% 28.28% 10.01% 18.34% 19.15%
1999 106771 20.62% 25.01% 14.31% 18.53% 21.54%
2000 115742 15.30% 18.78% 22.79% 19.58% 23.54%
2001 127428 12.46% 15.48% 28.66% 19.80% 23.59%
2002 144228 9.27% 11.61% 35.90% 20.12% 23.10%
2003 199547 5.84% 6.69% 44.91% 21.03% 21.53%
2004 219908 4.78% 5.80% 47.51% 20.45% 21.47%
2005 211956 4.41% 4.96% 49.21% 20.58% 20.85%
2006 198348 3.29% 4.43% 50.10% 21.09% 21.10%
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Figure 3·1: Percentage of enterprises by registration type
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Reform by Industries
Industry No.
of
Firms
No.
of
SOEs
No.
of Re-
formed
Percentage
Reformed
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 4867 721 336 46.60%
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 4754 238 104 43.70%
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 6423 303 132 43.56%
Ferrous Metal Mining and Dressing 1881 106 45 42.45%
Chemical Fiber Production 1247 47 19 40.43%
Textile Industry 23444 1034 407 39.36%
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 18676 1658 649 39.14%
Beverage Production 3998 769 300 39.01%
Petroleum Refining and Coking 1933 164 59 35.98%
Electric Equipment and Machinery 15255 742 265 35.71%
Electronic and Telecommunications 8041 379 135 35.62%
Nonmetal Mineral Products 21589 2163 761 35.18%
Rubber Products 3055 155 52 33.55%
Paper Making and Paper Product 7810 425 142 33.41%
Production and Supply of Gas 368 135 44 32.59%
Ordinary Machinery 19940 1534 487 31.75%
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 6457 98 30 30.61%
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Clerical Ma-
chinery
3412 337 97 28.78%
Metal Products 14066 495 142 28.69%
Special Purpose Equipment 10341 1273 360 28.28%
Food Processing 15627 2443 686 28.08%
Coal Mining and Processing 5410 958 269 28.08%
Textile Clothing, Shoes, Hats Production 12751 251 69 27.49%
Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods 3428 66 18 27.27%
Nonferrous Metal Mining and Dressing 1738 311 84 27.01%
Food Production 5868 930 247 26.56%
Transport Equipment 11135 1397 366 26.20%
Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 155 47 12 25.53%
Logging and Transport of Timber and Bamboo 5558 249 59 23.69%
Nonmetal Mining and Dressing 2709 386 91 23.58%
Plastic Products 12305 353 79 22.38%
Handicraft and Other Manufacturing 5517 177 31 17.51%
Furniture Manufacturing 3099 111 19 17.12%
Production and Supply of Power, Steam and Hot
Water
5057 2901 453 15.62%
Printing and Record Medium Reproduction 5244 1405 194 13.81%
Tobacco Processing 262 165 19 11.52%
Production and Supply of Tap Water 2342 1820 184 10.11%
Other Minerals Mining and Dressing 15 6 0 0.00%
Waste Resources and Material Recycling 280 1 0 0.00%
total 276057 26753 7446 27.83%
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Table 3.4: Distribution of Reform by Provinces
Province No. of
Firms
No. of
SOEs
No. of Re-
formed
Percentage
Reformed
Jilin 1800 129 60 46.51%
Jiangsu 36580 1816 824 45.37%
Shandong 27933 1826 725 39.70%
Anhui 6039 726 286 39.39%
Inner Mongolia 2494 534 200 37.45%
Ningxia 662 128 46 35.94%
Zhejiang 41749 922 330 35.79%
Chongqing 3287 420 141 33.57%
Sichuan 7744 948 303 31.96%
Hubei 7817 1522 486 31.93%
Yunnan 2418 740 236 31.89%
Hebei 10216 1394 416 29.84%
Qinghai 405 159 47 29.56%
Shanxi 4347 903 264 29.24%
Shanghai 13947 814 214 26.29%
Guangdong 36655 1939 505 26.04%
Henan 11530 1202 310 25.79%
Heilongjiang 3163 851 200 23.50%
Hunan 8977 1549 359 23.18%
Shenyang 10653 1098 241 21.95%
Gansu 1874 115 25 21.74%
Jiangxi 5011 1376 274 19.91%
Shanxi 3229 936 181 19.34%
Xinjiang 1744 752 140 18.62%
Beijing 5979 1216 222 18.26%
Fujian 9995 221 38 17.19%
Guangxi 3851 1190 194 16.30%
Tianjin 3022 301 49 16.28%
Guizhou 2222 733 99 13.51%
Hainan 475 171 21 12.28%
Tibet 239 122 10 8.20%
total 276057 26753 7446 27.83%
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results of Production Function
Industry ID Coef OLS Firm
Fixed
Effect
Firm+
Time
Fixed
Effect
LP
Coal Mining
and Processing
6
βl
0.2586 0.3985 0.3688 0.0723
(0.0068)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0166)***
βk
0.4083 0.1110 0.0602 0.1924
(0.0053)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0218)***
NOO 28159 22749 22749 28159
Petroleum and
Natural Gas
Extraction
7
βl
0.4021 0.5293 0.4031 -0.0758
(0.0337)*** (0.0613)*** (0.0603)*** (0.0205)***
βk
0.5774 0.1593 0.1190 0.1490
(0.0247)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0279)*** (0.0199)***
NOO 813 658 658 813
Ferrous Metal
Mining and
Dressing
8
βl
0.4580 0.4499 0.3939 0.1126
(0.0125)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0197)*** (0.0192)***
βk
0.2640 0.1490 0.0941 0.3430
(0.0091)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0497)***
NOO 8594 6713 6713 8594
Nonferrous
Metal Mining
and Dressing
9
βl
0.3672 0.3132 0.2854 0.1059
(0.0132)*** (0.0194)*** (0.0180)*** (0.0168)***
βk
0.2786 0.1085 0.0747 0.1557
(0.0095)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0180)***
NOO 9334 7596 7596 9334
Nonmetal
Mining and
Dressing
10
βl
0.4208 0.3032 0.3038 0.1539
(0.0090)*** (0.0146)*** (0.0141)*** (0.0187)***
βk
0.2170 0.0821 0.0657 0.1460
(0.0063)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0280)***
NOO 13853 11144 11144 13853
Other Minerals
Mining and
Dressing
11
βl
0.0858 -0.2544 -0.2229 -0.0514
(0.1406) (0.1012)** (0.1056)** (0.0130)***
βk
0.3070 0.0536 0.0383 0.2777
(0.0862)*** (0.0914) (0.1035) (0.0098)***
NOO 77 62 62 77
Food Processing 13
βl
0.5036 0.3214 0.2971 0.1115
(0.0049)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0233)***
βk
0.2624 0.1033 0.0817 0.1816
(0.0034)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0041)*** (0.0371)***
NOO 80387 64760 64760 80387
Food
Production
14
βl
0.5919 0.2997 0.2859 0.0997
(0.0079)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0224)***
βk
0.3439 0.0902 0.0751 0.1244
(0.0053)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0224)***
NOO 31607 25739 25739 31607
Beverage
Production
15
βl
0.5699 0.3249 0.3153 0.1438
(0.0091)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0176)***
βk
0.3565 0.0762 0.0662 0.1191
(0.0060)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0269)***
NOO 21941 17943 17943 21941
Tobacco
Processing
16
βl
0.9573 0.3378 0.3515 0.1689
(0.0318)*** (0.0448)*** (0.0446)*** (0.0210)***
βk
0.4926 0.1153 0.1018 0.1850
(0.0192)*** (0.0268)*** (0.0268)*** (0.0184)***
NOO 1758 1496 1496 1758
Note: * 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results of Production Function (Continued)
Industry ID Coef OLS Firm
Fixed
Effect
Firm+
Time
Fixed
Effect
LP
Textile Industry 17
βl
0.4720 0.3645 0.3570 0.1732
(0.0028)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0153)***
βk
0.2521 0.1006 0.0784 0.1581
(0.0020)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0312)***
NOO 125443 101999 101999 125443
Textile
Clothing,
Shoes, Hats
Production
18
βl
0.5732 0.3529 0.3494 0.2273
(0.0043)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0199)***
βk
0.2156 0.1009 0.0858 0.1542
(0.0028)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0260)***
NOO 69174 56423 56423 69174
Leather, Furs,
Down and
Related
Products
19
βl
0.4984 0.3903 0.3795 0.1822
(0.0053)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0177)***
βk
0.2496 0.0909 0.0754 0.1381
(0.0039)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0284)***
NOO 34850 28393 28393 34850
Logging and
Transport of
Timber and
Banboo
20
βl
0.5239 0.3583 0.3306 0.1572
(0.0074)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0213)***
βk
0.2238 0.0990 0.0780 0.1957
(0.0044)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0509)***
NOO 26803 21245 21245 16803
Furniture
Manufacturing
21
βl
0.6158 0.4311 0.3938 0.1602
(0.0092)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0198)***
βk
0.2157 0.1146 0.0929 0.1541
(0.0062)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0199)***
NOO 16049 12950 12950 16049
Papermaking
and Paper
Product
22
βl
0.5029 0.3365 0.3254 0.1667
(0.0060)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0186)***
βk
0.3056 0.1017 0.0859 0.1387
(0.0038)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0270)***
NOO 43195 35385 35385 43195
Pringting and
Record Medium
Reproduction
23
βl
0.4906 0.3329 0.3240 0.1685
(0.0080)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0209)***
βk
0.4641 0.0957 0.0882 0.1442
(0.0049)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0225)***
NOO 29696 24452 24452 29696
Cultural,
Educational
and Sports
Goods
24
βl
0.5257 0.3505 0.3472 0.2112
(0.0068)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0174)***
βk
0.2201 0.0740 0.0554 0.0869
(0.0048)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0266)***
NOO 19257 15829 15829 19257
Petroleum
Refining and
Coking
25
βl
0.4742 0.4904 0.4672 0.1568
(0.0126)*** (0.0234)*** (0.0225)*** (0.0213)***
βk
0.3878 0.1111 0.0750 0.1789
(0.0082)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0113)*** (0.1742)
NOO 9915 7982 7982 9915
Raw Chemical
Materials and
Chemical
Products
26
βl
0.3758 0.3535 0.3357 0.1139
(0.0038)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0203)***
βk
0.3490 0.1078 0.0837 0.1589
(0.0025)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0369)***
NOO 103617 84941 84941 103617
Medical and
Pharmaceutical
Product
27
βl
0.5416 0.3980 0.3792 0.1306
(0.0077)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0263)***
βk
0.3723 0.1026 0.0796 0.1650
(0.0051)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0244)***
NOO 28635 23768 23768 28635
Note: * 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results of Production Function (Continued)
Industry ID Coef OLS Firm
Fixed
Effect
Firm+
Time
Fixed
Effect
LP
Chemical Fiber
Production
28
βl
0.5348 0.4777 0.4394 0.1441
(0.0132)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0267)*** (0.0200)***
βk
0.2963 0.1195 0.0988 0.1750
(0.0086)*** (0.0147)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0548)***
NOO 6728 5481 5481 6728
Rubber
Products
29
βl
0.4851 0.4110 0.3957 0.0996
(0.0085)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0142)*** (0.0193)***
βk
0.2982 0.1046 0.0812 0.1581
(0.0060)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0331)***
NOO 17017 13962 13962 17017
Plastic
Products
30
βl
0.4638 0.3576 0.3369 0.1665
(0.0045)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0236)***
βk
0.3047 0.1022 0.0832 0.1602
(0.0029)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0349)***
NOO 65103 52798 52798 65103
Nonmetal
Mineral
Products
31
βl
0.3853 0.3327 0.3305 0.1244
(0.0035)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0182)***
βk
0.3121 0.0847 0.0753 0.1310
(0.0022)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0224)***
NOO 121043 99454 99454 121043
Smelting and
Pressing of
Ferrous Merals
32
βl
0.5494 0.4991 0.4715 0.1726
(0.0070)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0189)***
βk
0.3080 0.1175 0.0867 0.1599
(0.0047)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0993)
NOO 32756 26333 26333 32756
Smelting and
Pressing of
Nonferrous
Merals
33
βl
0.4575 0.4447 0.4086 0.1718
(0.0087)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0227)***
βk
0.2883 0.1096 0.0747 0.1850
(0.0056)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0736)**
NOO 25175 20421 20421 25175
Metal Products 34
βl
0.4698 0.3553 0.3309 0.1520
(0.0043)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0208)***
βk
0.3027 0.1123 0.0882 0.1471
(0.0028)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0263)***
NOO 74532 60466 60466 74532
Ordinary
Machinery
35
βl
0.4571 0.3862 0.3601 0.1278
(0.0038)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0188)***
βk
0.2955 0.1070 0.0771 0.1407
(0.0026)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0237)***
NOO 108524 88584 88584 108524
Special Purpose
Equipment
36
βl
0.4414 0.3768 0.3605 0.0814
(0.0058)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0087)*** (0.0230)***
βk
0.2911 0.1109 0.0860 0.1629
(0.0040)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0249)***
NOO 55816 45475 45475 55816
Transport
Equipment
37
βl
0.5648 0.4261 0.4062 0.1523
(0.0051)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0081)*** (0.0217)***
βk
0.3328 0.1094 0.0850 0.1205
(0.0034)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0372)***
NOO 61451 50316 50316 61451
Electric
Equipment and
Machinery
39
βl
0.5032 0.4128 0.3892 0.1376
(0.0041)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0216)***
βk
0.3240 0.1183 0.0941 0.1514
(0.0028)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0260)***
NOO 84276 69021 69021 84276
Note: * 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results of Production Function (Continued)
Industry ID Coef OLS Firm
Fixed
Effect
Firm+
Time
Fixed
Effect
LP
Electronic and
Telecommuni-
cations
40
βl
0.5172 0.4645 0.4419 0.1596
(0.0058)*** (0.0101)*** (0.0100)*** (0.0197)***
βk
0.3485 0.1162 0.0946 0.1024
(0.0039)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0564)*
NOO 43467 35426 35426 43467
Instruments,
Meters, Cultural
and Clerical
Machinery
41
βl
0.4554 0.3887 0.3769 0.1384
(0.0089)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0229)***
βk
0.2724 0.0968 0.0802 0.1441
(0.0059)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0363)***
NOO 18817 15405 15405 18817
Handicraft and
Other
Manufacturing
42
βl
0.4864 0.3003 0.2956 0.2091
(0.0057)*** (0.0090)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0188)***
βk
0.2212 0.0750 0.0595 0.0932
(0.0038)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0224)***
NOO 29734 24217 24217 29734
Waste
Resources and
Material
Recycling
43
βl
0.7816 1.0042 0.7601 0.1468
(0.1137)*** (0.1783)*** (0.1820)*** (0.0727)**
βk
0.2457 0.2467 0.1425 0.2457
(0.0531)*** (0.0949)*** (0.0950)*** (0.0487)***
NOO 1128 848 848 1128
Production and
Supply of
Power, Steam
and HotWater
44
βl
0.5117 0.2086 0.2062 0.1849
(0.0058)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0120)*** (0.0197)***
βk
0.5960 0.1042 0.0894 0.1897
(0.0036)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0791)**
NOO 33951 28894 28894 33951
Production and
Supply of Gas
45
βl
0.2103 0.2396 0.1957 0.0738
(0.0289)*** (0.0590)*** (0.0565)*** (0.0236)***
βk
0.4170 0.1473 0.1139 0.2212
(0.0207)*** (0.0266)*** (0.0256)*** (0.0587)***
NOO 2079 1711 1711 2079
Production and
Supply of Tap
Water
46
βl
0.5503 0.2238 0.1790 0.2541
(0.0079)*** (0.0208)*** (0.0205)*** (0.0218)***
βk
0.4921 0.0332 0.0160 0.1169
(0.0045)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0134)***
NOO 18162 15820 15820 18162
Note: * 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Coal Mining
and
Processing
6
1997-1998 -1.11%
1998-1999 -0.65%
1999-2000 -1.97%
2000-2001 9.79%
2001-2002 -2.32%
2002-2003 16.21%
2003-2004 -0.43%
2004-2005 -4.34%
2005-2006 19.92%
Petroleum
and Natural
Gas
Extraction
7
1997-1998 -0.66%
1998-1999 113.10%
1999-2000 -19.99%
2000-2001 -7.80%
2001-2002 2.88%
2002-2003 37.42%
2003-2004 7.37%
2004-2005 -10.70%
2005-2006 -14.87%
Ferrous
Metal
Mining and
Dressing
8
1997-1998 9.09%
1998-1999 -4.54%
1999-2000 58.75%
2000-2001 -39.28%
2001-2002 0.06%
2002-2003 58.32%
2003-2004 -2.67%
2004-2005 -9.32%
2005-2006 10.42%
Nonferrous
Metal
Mining and
Dressing
9
1997-1998 -68.24%
1998-1999 -3.53%
1999-2000 42.75%
2000-2001 -35.31%
2001-2002 5.26%
2002-2003 43.02%
2003-2004 72.05%
2004-2005 -5.88%
2005-2006 11.54%
Nonmetal
Mining and
Dressing
10
1997-1998 83.71%
1998-1999 -63.79%
1999-2000 -1.56%
2000-2001 -3.40%
2001-2002 -7.02%
2002-2003 7.43%
2003-2004 39.46%
2004-2005 -15.83%
2005-2006 13.07%
Other
Minerals
Mining and
Dressing
11
1997-1998 -53.82%
1998-1999 38.63%
1999-2000 -22.20%
2000-2001 20.09%
2001-2002 169.28%
2002-2003 -47.86%
2003-2004 -2.72%
2004-2005 1.96%
2005-2006 -0.63%
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time (Continued)
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Food
Processing
13
1997-1998 -31.20%
1998-1999 -7.27%
1999-2000 0.48%
2000-2001 19.59%
2001-2002 -24.16%
2002-2003 -2.36%
2003-2004 19.06%
2004-2005 7.15%
2005-2006 -2.99%
Food
Production
14
1997-1998 2.22%
1998-1999 -3.53%
1999-2000 -10.33%
2000-2001 12.03%
2001-2002 0.91%
2002-2003 33.58%
2003-2004 -17.70%
2004-2005 6.49%
2005-2006 -6.85%
Beverage
Production
15
1997-1998 25.23%
1998-1999 -11.40%
1999-2000 2.70%
2000-2001 -2.24%
2001-2002 -0.96%
2002-2003 26.42%
2003-2004 -5.76%
2004-2005 -3.68%
2005-2006 7.33%
Tobacco
Processing
16
1997-1998 12.41%
1998-1999 -14.23%
1999-2000 -1.33%
2000-2001 9.13%
2001-2002 4.07%
2002-2003 4.49%
2003-2004 -8.67%
2004-2005 10.99%
2005-2006 40.56%
Textile
Industry
17
1997-1998 6.40%
1998-1999 -11.93%
1999-2000 2.47%
2000-2001 6.83%
2001-2002 0.72%
2002-2003 8.61%
2003-2004 17.26%
2004-2005 5.42%
2005-2006 13.84%
Textile
Clothing
Shoes Hats
Production
18
1997-1998 -42.09%
1998-1999 7.11%
1999-2000 6.50%
2000-2001 -8.58%
2001-2002 2.41%
2002-2003 27.77%
2003-2004 -8.27%
2004-2005 19.64%
2005-2006 -14.51%
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time (Continued)
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Leather Furs
Down and
Related
Products
19
1997-1998 -39.68%
1998-1999 7.78%
1999-2000 6.70%
2000-2001 -12.10%
2001-2002 3.95%
2002-2003 3.05%
2003-2004 3.13%
2004-2005 16.21%
2005-2006 9.33%
Logging and
Transport of
Timber and
Banboo
20
1997-1998 2.21%
1998-1999 10.32%
1999-2000 2.67%
2000-2001 4.57%
2001-2002 -12.96%
2002-2003 7.89%
2003-2004 10.30%
2004-2005 9.46%
2005-2006 24.77%
Furniture
Manufacturing
21
1997-1998 -48.51%
1998-1999 8.03%
1999-2000 21.06%
2000-2001 8.71%
2001-2002 -41.21%
2002-2003 84.65%
2003-2004 -36.98%
2004-2005 -1.39%
2005-2006 16.32%
Papermaking
and Paper
Product
22
1997-1998 -14.41%
1998-1999 -10.07%
1999-2000 -2.64%
2000-2001 4.42%
2001-2002 -2.13%
2002-2003 4.67%
2003-2004 30.75%
2004-2005 -20.66%
2005-2006 14.04%
Pringting
and Record
Medium
Reproduction
23
1997-1998 -9.85%
1998-1999 -5.45%
1999-2000 10.11%
2000-2001 -1.09%
2001-2002 -6.11%
2002-2003 13.49%
2003-2004 -7.23%
2004-2005 9.39%
2005-2006 1.83%
Cultural
Educational
and Sports
Goods
24
1997-1998 -26.19%
1998-1999 2.23%
1999-2000 15.78%
2000-2001 -10.70%
2001-2002 -0.07%
2002-2003 14.54%
2003-2004 -10.19%
2004-2005 0.67%
2005-2006 4.91%
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time (Continued)
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Petroleum
Refining and
Coking
25
1997-1998 1.69%
1998-1999 -8.51%
1999-2000 -6.63%
2000-2001 30.99%
2001-2002 -5.98%
2002-2003 8.08%
2003-2004 7.97%
2004-2005 6.23%
2005-2006 12.32%
Raw
Chemical
Materials
and
Chemical
Products
26
1997-1998 -54.59%
1998-1999 2.05%
1999-2000 6.82%
2000-2001 -7.13%
2001-2002 8.30%
2002-2003 28.24%
2003-2004 -16.28%
2004-2005 1.85%
2005-2006 4.31%
Medical and
Phamaceuti-
cal
Products
27
1997-1998 17.47%
1998-1999 0.10%
1999-2000 2.77%
2000-2001 56.44%
2001-2002 -44.31%
2002-2003 19.67%
2003-2004 -12.68%
2004-2005 -7.94%
2005-2006 -0.59%
Chemical
Fiber
Production
28
1997-1998 -1.88%
1998-1999 -14.06%
1999-2000 -0.85%
2000-2001 16.13%
2001-2002 -12.24%
2002-2003 -1.32%
2003-2004 -0.45%
2004-2005 1.78%
2005-2006 19.89%
Rubber
Products
29
1997-1998 0.77%
1998-1999 -2.54%
1999-2000 6.30%
2000-2001 -4.61%
2001-2002 -3.17%
2002-2003 31.89%
2003-2004 -30.38%
2004-2005 0.59%
2005-2006 2.90%
Plastic
Products
30
1997-1998 -13.02%
1998-1999 9.35%
1999-2000 4.86%
2000-2001 -0.77%
2001-2002 3.71%
2002-2003 -2.19%
2003-2004 -1.57%
2004-2005 17.62%
2005-2006 103.19%
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time (Continued)
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Nonmetal
Mineral
Products
31
1997-1998 -6.76%
1998-1999 26.29%
1999-2000 81.45%
2000-2001 -52.56%
2001-2002 5.26%
2002-2003 3.59%
2003-2004 6.47%
2004-2005 11.03%
2005-2006 8.16%
Smelting
and Pressing
of Ferrous
Merals
32
1997-1998 11.28%
1998-1999 2.32%
1999-2000 6.03%
2000-2001 3.02%
2001-2002 18.16%
2002-2003 25.88%
2003-2004 -9.52%
2004-2005 0.34%
2005-2006 -4.46%
Smelting
and Pressing
of
Nonferrous
Merals
33
1997-1998 262.06%
1998-1999 -64.06%
1999-2000 15267.81%
2000-2001 271.51%
2001-2002 -99.85%
2002-2003 7.17%
2003-2004 5.42%
2004-2005 2.34%
2005-2006 -5.08%
Petroleum
and Natural
Gas
Extraction
34
1997-1998 -0.21%
1998-1999 35.25%
1999-2000 -9.55%
2000-2001 1.94%
2001-2002 0.35%
2002-2003 -1.10%
2003-2004 50.36%
2004-2005 -36.42%
2005-2006 12.32%
Ordinary
Machinery
35
1997-1998 -2.71%
1998-1999 0.62%
1999-2000 -0.38%
2000-2001 -1.30%
2001-2002 1.88%
2002-2003 5.03%
2003-2004 3.29%
2004-2005 -1.58%
2005-2006 8.69%
Special
Purpose
Equipment
36
1997-1998 -8.63%
1998-1999 71.80%
1999-2000 -38.41%
2000-2001 0.73%
2001-2002 -4.40%
2002-2003 10.67%
2003-2004 9.12%
2004-2005 6.56%
2005-2006 -3.96%
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time (Continued)
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Transport
Equipment
37
1997-1998 15.70%
1998-1999 -11.57%
1999-2000 1.16%
2000-2001 11.41%
2001-2002 5.00%
2002-2003 -4.51%
2003-2004 16.71%
2004-2005 -3.39%
2005-2006 -4.48%
Electric
Equipment
and
Machinery
39
1997-1998 -27.89%
1998-1999 12.41%
1999-2000 -3.99%
2000-2001 -1.04%
2001-2002 -5.98%
2002-2003 15.21%
2003-2004 -2.37%
2004-2005 -13.77%
2005-2006 -0.55%
Electronic
and
Telecommunications
40
1997-1998 -9.83%
1998-1999 12.98%
1999-2000 -5.33%
2000-2001 19.94%
2001-2002 -2.43%
2002-2003 13.18%
2003-2004 1.41%
2004-2005 2.71%
2005-2006 -20.98%
Instruments
Meters
Cultural and
Clerical
Machinery
41
1997-1998 -12.10%
1998-1999 60.92%
1999-2000 -28.30%
2000-2001 1.26%
2001-2002 -10.18%
2002-2003 10.43%
2003-2004 6.85%
2004-2005 -2.75%
2005-2006 0.13%
Handicraft
and Other
Manufacturing
42
1997-1998 -10.18%
1998-1999 5.58%
1999-2000 3.44%
2000-2001 -11.45%
2001-2002 -5.05%
2002-2003 15.25%
2003-2004 12.95%
2004-2005 -12.13%
2005-2006 10.14%
Waste
Resources
and Material
Recycling
43
1997-1998 -15.00%
1998-1999 -1.83%
1999-2000 0.27%
2000-2001 2.65%
2001-2002 -3.37%
2002-2003 19.82%
2003-2004 31.15%
2004-2005 -22.26%
2005-2006 -0.58%
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Table 3.6: Productivity Growth Over Time (Continued)
Industry ID Period Productivity
Growth Rate
Production
and Supply
of Power
Steam and
HotWater
44
1997-1998 -10.68%
1998-1999 -25.01%
1999-2000 11.23%
2000-2001 3.95%
2001-2002 5.45%
2002-2003 -28.87%
2003-2004 29.92%
2004-2005 2622.56%
2005-2006 173.06%
Production
and Supply
of Gas
45
1997-1998 30.87%
1998-1999 -33.00%
1999-2000 58.19%
2000-2001 -34.95%
2001-2002 22.72%
2002-2003 392.06%
2003-2004 -72.33%
2004-2005 -8.05%
2005-2006 10.27%
Production
and Supply
of Tap
Water
46
1997-1998 -7.34%
1998-1999 1.51%
1999-2000 6.13%
2000-2001 -2.88%
2001-2002 2.30%
2002-2003 7.75%
2003-2004 0.96%
2004-2005 -1.64%
2005-2006 19.53%
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Figure 3·2: Growth of Weighted Average Productivities
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Figure 3·3: Growth of Unweighted Average Productivities
Figure 3·4: Growth of covariance between market share and productivity without
market size adjustment
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Figure 3·5: Growth of correlation coefficient between market share and productivity
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Table 3.7: Effects of Reform on Productivity
Industry ID Model Coef on Priv
Coal Mining
and Processing
6
Model 1 -201.32
(210.82)
Model 2 -298.27
(207.82)
Model 3 -262.72
(206.75)
Model 4 -245.70
(236.34)
Ferrous Metal
Mining and
Dressing
8
Model 1 71.71
(68.49)
Model 2 65.49
(66.52)
Model 3 7.62
(56.51)
Model 4 1.32
(68.18)
Nonferrous
Metal Mining
and Dressing
9
Model 1 -435.80
(600.62)
Model 2 -475.72
(561.76)
Model 3 -539.39
(561.72)
Model 4 -723.57
(726.49)
Nonmetal
Mining and
Dressing
10
Model 1 103.77
(100.08)
Model 2 108.78
(99.23)
Model 3 128.45
(97.39)
Model 4 133.06
(118.28)
Food Processing 13
Model 1 70.44
(50.91)
Model 2 85.49
(50.65)*
Model 3 67.94
(50.25)
Model 4 52.57
(60.09)
Food
Production
14
Model 1 192.51
(80.81)**
Model 2 223.00
(79.67)***
Model 3 215.94
(78.66)***
Model 4 231.89
(92.21)**
Beverage
Production
15
Model 1 -104.07
(191.11)
Model 2 25.86
(188.56)
Model 3 15.37
(187.43)
Model 4 31.78
(234.74)
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Table 3.7: Effects of Reform on Productivity (Continued)
Industry ID Model Coef on Priv
Tobacco
Processing
16
Model 1 -1345.71
(2809.94)
Model 2 -1862.97
(2729.63)
Model 3 -1498.38
(2515.02)
Model 4 -758.69
(3076.27)
Textile Industry 17
Model 1 152.30
(71.06)**
Model 2 193.19
(70.52)***
Model 3 183.93
(69.88)***
Model 4 207.66
(87.08)**
Textile
Clothing,
Shoes, Hats
Production
18
Model 1 209.59
(54.04)***
Model 2 224.44
(53.12)***
Model 3 197.92
(52.45)***
Model 4 236.89
(63.17)***
Logging and
Transport of
Timber and
Banboo
20
Model 1 8.00
(59.33)
Model 2 -2.81
(57.23)
Model 3 -15.13
(57.33)
Model 4 -29.25
(68.86)
Furniture
Manufacturing
21
Model 1 -69.52
(77.72)
Model 2 -62.16
(73.44)
Model 3 -57.89
(73.15)
Model 4 -71.58
(91.59)
Papermaking
and Paper
Product
22
Model 1 -230.68
(156.56)
Model 2 -151.69
(154.92)
Model 3 -145.29
(154.46)
Model 4 -236.71
(191.57)
Pringting and
Record Medium
Reproduction
23
Model 1 88.15
(40.26)**
Model 2 108.22
(39.88)*
Model 3 112.69
(39.86)*
Model 4 56.82
(44.22)
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Table 3.7: Effects of Reform on Productivity (Continued)
Industry ID Model Coef on Priv
Petroleum
Refining and
Coking
25
Model 1 228.61
(793.80)
Model 2 48.56
(776.97)
Model 3 -238.76
(747.17)
Model 4 -174.92
(872.46)
Raw Chemical
Materials and
Chemical
Products
26
Model 1 62.70
(70.52)
Model 2 129.72
(69.50)*
Model 3 106.14
(68.69)
Model 4 118.85
(83.78)
Medical and
Phamaceutical
Products
27
Model 1 -49.68
(96.22)
Model 2 -17.68
(95.28)
Model 3 -6.15
(94.84)
Model 4 -77.40
(110.58)
Rubber
Products
29
Model 1 226.57
(448.36)
Model 2 348.55
(450.40)
Model 3 236.24
(436.16)
Model 4 512.29
(480.65)
Plastic
Products
30
Model 1 14.85
(89.64)
Model 2 27.56
(89.07)
Model 3 23.79
(89.02)
Model 4 14.58
(125.22)
Nonmetal
Mineral
Products
31
Model 1 98.62
(50.79)*
Model 2 138.69
(50.21)***
Model 3 126.70
(49.85)**
Model 4 128.62
(59.47)**
Smelting and
Pressing of
Ferrous Merals
32
Model 1 -481.96
(590.45)
Model 2 -475.82
(584.96)
Model 3 -515.49
(582.78)
Model 4 -396.26
(730.40)
165
Table 3.7: Effects of Reform on Productivity (Continued)
Industry ID Model Coef on Priv
Smelting and
Pressing of
Nonferrous
Merals
33
Model 1 -297.79
(408.77)
Model 2 -128.98
(377.72)
Model 3 -201.12
(375.03)
Model 4 -409.86
(494.08)
Metal Products 34
Model 1 -159.75
(93.78)*
Model 2 -143.37
(92.37)
Model 3 -136.74
(91.73)
Model 4 -181.37
(108.82)*
Ordinary
Machinery
35
Model 1 97.30
(84.81)
Model 2 103.97
(83.92)
Model 3 111.49
(83.49)
Model 4 101.15
(99.17)
Special Purpose
Equipment
36
Model 1 163.10
(149.14)
Model 2 166.82
(146.12)
Model 3 173.68
(145.86)
Model 4 125.32
(174.00)
Transport
Equipment
37
Model 1 79.54
(213.83)
Model 2 169.57
(209.25)
Model 3 190.04
(208.87)
Model 4 -28.58
(255.22)
Electric
Equipment and
Machinery
39
Model 1 42.01
(186.24)
Model 2 82.09
(185.79)
Model 3 32.03
(185.43)
Model 4 -111.17
(228.28)
Electronic and
Telecommunications
40
Model 1 -691.12
(550.06)
Model 2 -743.32
(547.54)
Model 3 -475.30
(537.22)
Model 4 -625.60
(652.27)
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Table 3.7: Effects of Reform on Productivity (Continued)
Industry ID Model Coef on Priv
Instruments,
Meters,
Cultural and
Clerical
Machinery
41
Model 1 115.49
(112.65)
Model 2 166.38
(108.56)
Model 3 167.86
(107.08)
Model 4 90.76
(126.39)
Handicraft and
Other
Manufacturing
42
Model 1 327.01
(209.10)
Model 2 523.22
(205.35)
Model 3 503.01
(203.14)
Model 4 698.93
(275.74)
Production and
Supply of
Power, Steam
and HotWater
44
Model 1 51.99
(117.75)
Model 2 48.56
(117.84)
Model 3 60.92
(117.70)
Model 4 53.16
(128.44)
Production and
Supply of Gas
45
Model 1 207.82
(361.20)
Model 2 158.58
(357.78)
Model 3 57.37
(358.71)
Model 4 -54.05
(412.14)
Production and
Supply of Tap
Water
46
Model 1 128.74
(26.33)***
Model 2 120.74
(26.25)***
Model 3 126.81
(25.96)***
Model 4 128.42
(25.79)***
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